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Sándor Fekete

Conflicts in the Hungarian Local Government System*

Abstract

The concept of the actual local self-government system had been created at the age of the dualism. The development had two parts, the first one was the decentralization of the public law system, and the second one was the broadening of the council's sovereignty. Unfortunately there were a lot of councils that went into liquidation so the state had to help them. Therefore, the state's influence became bigger and bigger, which process is reflected in the new local self-government law. This law is limiting the local self-government's sovereignty because it ignores the recommendations of the European Charter of Local Self-Government. It was necessary to make a new local self-government law, but it should have been done with the consent of the local councils.

Keywords: Hungarian party system, local elections, Hungarian parties, local self-governments

Introduction

The new Fundamental Law of Hungary, which entered into force in 2012, regulates the local self-government system differently from the relevant provisions of the previous Constitution, adopted during the political transition in 1990. The justification provided for these very detailed constitutional provisions concerning local governments was to guarantee local autonomy. In the new constitution, they were replaced by overarching provisions that relegated more detailed regulations to the cardinal Act¹ on local self-government in Hungary.²

The previous Constitution defined the right to local self-government as a fundamental right belonging to local voters, but today this right is not recognized by the new Fundamental Law, only by the cardinal Act. The legal consequence is that the right to local self-government is no longer a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution and is not constitutionally protected. The other important change in the interpretation of the right to local self-government is the appearance of obligations in the regulation.

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¹ Cardinal acts are special constitutional laws, "the adoption and amendment of which require the votes of two thirds of the Members of Parliament present".

² Cardinal Act No. CLXXXIX of 2011 on local self-government in Hungary (Mötv.).

Thus the emphasis is on the responsibility of local citizens,³ who – being entrusted with the right to local self-government – “should reduce the common charges and contribute to the execution of the common tasks”.⁴ The place of local government within the organization of the state has also been redefined by the Fundamental Law and the cardinal Act on local self-governments in Hungary. According to the Act, “local governments shall function as a part of the organization of the State.”⁵ The management of local public affairs has been redefined, and now focuses on the local public services prescribed by the Act.⁶ The system of local powers has not been formally changed. Therefore, two types of them exist: local governments’ own powers determined by law or appropriated by the local government itself, and the other powers delegated by the state administration.

In reality, the technique of regulating the powers of local governments, both mandatory and belonging to the government, has resulted in profound changes. Under the previous system, the Act on local self-government in Hungary defined the basic powers of local governments. This fact provided stability and guarantees, because any amendment processes required a two-thirds majority.

This situation has changed, and the powers of local governments can now be regulated by means of ordinary laws. As a consequence, local powers were severely diminished following the entry into force of the new constitutional control over local autonomy. These basic changes resulted in other important provisions concerning local autonomy, along with a remarkable centralization of the Hungarian public administration.

Concept of Self-Governance and Local Government. European Standards for Local Governments and Hungarian Regulations

“One of the most important legislative tasks of these months and even of this year is to adopt the Act on local self-government and to hold local elections”, declared Prime Minister József Antall before the Hungarian Parliament on 22 May 1990, and the last twenty-plus years have verified his statement. (Kiss 2004: 1598) The new structure was extended with a new sub-system (the sub-system of local government administration), new organizational principles were introduced (e.g. real decentralization and autonomy), and while the importance of certain principles of operation declined (e.g. state guidance); others increased at the same time (e.g. the principle of legality).

After the full review of Act No. XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, local communities gained independence and were granted the right to independently regulate and manage local public affairs within a legal framework (Art. 44/A (1) a) of Act No. XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. In effect until 1 January 2012.).

³ Mötv. 2. § (1).

⁴ Mötv. 8. § (1).

⁵ Mötv. Preamble.

⁶ Mötv. 4. §.

Autonomy made the interests and peculiarities of individual municipalities known as the result of a legally managed correct procedure and made it possible for local governments to perform their tasks and exercise their authority independently. (O'Toole 1994: 293) All of these were accompanied by economic independence guaranteed by the Constitution. During the transition period, a liberal and – relatively – modern system of local government institutions developed on the basis of the provisions of the Constitution:

- the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government prevailed
- democratic power could be exercised locally and
- the system offered scope for self-regulatory processes and local legislation (Csefkó – Pálné 1993: 175)

“Convention no. 122 of the Council of Europe, the European Charter of Local Self-Government was a milestone in the development and legal regulation of local governments. This Charter laid down the principles and legal precepts of local self-governance which are generally applied and applicable in the member States of the Council of Europe. The contents of the Charter comply with the generally accepted legal principles of the concept of local self-government.” (Berényi 2003: 311)

The convention, adopted in Strasbourg on 15 October 1985, was announced in Act No. XV of 1997 on the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The Charter was created under the auspices of the Council of Europe (this international organization is not to be confused with the Council of the EU, which is an organization of the EU), and its purpose was to specify standards derived from the rule of law and democracy to be generally applied in the nearly fifty Member States of the Council of Europe in the course of establishing their respective systems of local government.

A certain democratic mechanism was developed in which “centralization, which may be regarded as having a general effect, can prevail in the interest of achieving social aims, while in the interest of achieving all other aims of public interest, partial self-governance (autonomy) can prevail”. (Tamás 1997: 157) The peculiarities of the Hungarian local government system, developed in this way, stem from several sources: Hungarian traditions of local government, the institutions of the former Soviet-type council system which were “presentable” and proper within the framework of a constitutional state bound by the rule of law, and solutions originating from Western European (mainly South-German) local government systems. The modern structure of Hungarian local government is based on these factors.

The structure of Hungarian local government system rests on two other pillars: municipal-level and county (regional level) governments. Task performance (and financing) is focused on municipal-level governments. Since 1990, county governments have been seeking their place in Hungarian local government administration. (Szabó 1994: 721) Although the task of self-government has a dual character, combining service and (public) authority, it is indisputable that local governments provide certain local public services, while self-government organs rarely participate in exercising local public authority.

On the one hand, the past two decades have proved that local objectives and intentions, collaboration, common will, parochial spirit, and a sense of local identity can yield significant results, bring about revival and preserve values. On the other hand, by the end of the first decade of the new millennium, it became obvious that the local government system was suffering from internal conflicts, and due to the steadily decreasing state subsidies and the impact of the economic downturn, anyone could see that the established system was unsustainable and grievously unfair – from several points of view. (Kákai 2010: 149)

The Constitutional Legal Status of Local Governments in Hungary

The Constitution of Hungary (abrogated on 1 January 2012), when compared internationally, dealt with local governments in quite a detailed way, as does the Fundamental Law of Hungary (which came into force on 1 January 2012). Only five articles and twenty-three paragraphs of the Fundamental Law deal with local government. The territorial division of Hungary is specified in Article F) of the part entitled Foundation of the Fundamental Law:

1. “The capital of Hungary is Budapest.
2. The territory of Hungary consists of the capital, counties, cities and towns, as well as villages. The capital, as well as the cities and towns may be divided into districts.”

A more important change is that – unlike the Constitution – the Fundamental Law does not define the districts of the capital as a special type of municipality (vested with the right to local self-governance). Thus, the Fundamental Law repealed the constitutional guarantee of self-government by districts in the capital. Provisions pertaining to public authority at a local level can be found in the part entitled Local self-government. The fact that “constitutional statutes”, called cardinal Acts, detailing special rules pertaining to local governments – to be adopted later – are referred to four times in this part indicates that essential content elements of legal regulation appear in the detailed rules. (“Cardinal Acts shall be Acts, the adoption and amendment of which require the votes of two thirds of the Members of Parliament present.” Article T (4) of the Fundamental Law.)

The provisions pertaining to the territorial division of the country and to local governments were “dismantled” (structurally) by the Fundamental Law. “In Hungary local governments shall be established to administer public affairs and exercise public power at a local level” and the basic rules are to be defined by a cardinal Act (Article 31 (1) of the Fundamental Law). The Fundamental Law – unlike the provisions of the Constitution – makes no reference to local self-governance, local independence (autonomy) or the fundamental constitutional right to local self-governance which enfranchised local citizens are entitled to. Obviously, enfranchised local citizens can still participate both directly and indirectly in the exercise of local power. A provision in the chapter titled Freedom and responsibility declares that “Every adult Hungarian citizen shall have the right to vote and to be voted for in elections of Members of Parliament, local government representatives and mayors, and Members of the European Parliament” (Article XXIII (1) of the Fundamental Law).

Article 32 of the Fundamental Law sets forth that “In administering local public affairs local governments shall, to the extent permitted by law:

- a) adopt decrees;
- b) adopt decisions;
- c) perform autonomous administration;
- d) determine their regime of organization and operation;
- e) exercise their rights as owners of local government properties;
- f) determine their budgets and perform independent financial management accordingly;
- g) engage in entrepreneurial activities with their assets and revenue available for the purpose, without jeopardizing the performance of their compulsory tasks;
- h) decide on the types and rates of local taxes;
- i) create local government symbols and establish local decorations and honorary titles;
- j) ask for information, propose decisions and express their views to competent bodies;
- k) be free to associate with other local governments, establish alliances for the representation of interests, cooperate with the local governments of other countries within their competences, and be free to affiliate with international local government organizations, and
- l) exercise further statutory responsibilities and competences.”

Acting within their competences, local governments shall adopt local decrees to regulate local social relations not regulated by an Act or by authority of an Act. Local decrees may not conflict with any other legislation.

Local governments shall send their local government decrees to the metropolitan or county government office immediately after their publication. If the metropolitan or county government office finds the local government decree or any provision of it unlawful, it may apply to any court for a review of the decree.

The metropolitan or county government office may apply to a court to establish a local government’s neglect of its statutory obligation to pass decrees or take decisions. If such local government continues to neglect its statutory obligation to pass decrees or take decisions by the date determined by the court’s decision on the establishment of such neglect, the court shall, at the initiative of the metropolitan or county government office, order the head of the metropolitan or county government office to adopt the local government decree or local government decision required for the remedy of the neglect in the name of the local government. The properties of local governments shall be public properties which shall serve for the performance of their duties.

There are minimal, hardly noticeable changes in the text compared to previous regulation. The most important change was the title of the article: instead of the term fundamental rights of local governments used formerly, the Fundamental law refers to them as the responsibilities and powers of local governments. This term – compared to fundamental rights – better corresponds to the nature of local governments as administrative organs. (Fábián 2011: 47)

The possibility of intervention granted to county (metropolitan) government offices is relatively far from the modern supervisory methods (e.g. consultation, notice) used to prevent violations that local governments might commit. The primary goal of state supervision is to ensure the lawful operation of governments. State organs must facilitate the performance of the tasks of local governments while striving to assert the constitutional principle of the legality of public administration. A further goal of state supervision is to help local governments perform their tasks by providing advice and support, protecting local communities, and giving a greater sense of responsibility to local government organs.

Establishing the statutory obligation of local governments to legislate and acting on these grounds, county (metropolitan) government offices adopt the required local government decrees in the name of the local governments immediately after the failure to adopt the local decree is established by the (supreme) court (Kúria) (Article 32 (5) of the Fundamental Law). The county (metropolitan) government offices adopt the required local government decrees – which are also placed under the jurisdiction of the courts – in the name of the local governments. This new right of government offices to adopt “substitute decrees” should be regarded as a strong supervisory authority.

The responsibilities and competences of local governments are to be exercised by local representative bodies. Local representative bodies are headed by mayors. County representative bodies elect one member to serve as president for the term of their mandate. Local representative bodies may elect committees and establish offices as defined by a cardinal Act. (Article 33 of the Fundamental Law.) It can be claimed that no essential changes have been made to the organizational units and organs of local governments, except that in the text of the Fundamental Law – unlike in the Constitution – there is no reference to town clerks. Thus, this institution has lost its constitutional status.

The internal construction of Hungarian local governments is remarkably structured and proportioned; it almost maps the system of “checks and balances”. This means that there are three organs (the representative body, the mayor and the town clerk) at the imaginary centre of the organization and operation of local governments, none of which can be replaced or circumvented – due to legal regulation – and are all stable, for the most part.

Local governments and state organs must cooperate to achieve community goals. An Act may define compulsory responsibilities and powers for local governments. Local governments are entitled to proportionate budgetary and other financial support for the performance of their compulsory responsibilities and competences. A law can authorize local governments to perform their compulsory duties through associations.

A law or a government decree authorized by law may exceptionally specify duties and powers related to public administration for mayors and presidents of county representative bodies. “The Government shall perform the legal supervision of local governments through the metropolitan and county government offices. An Act may define conditions for, or the Government’s consent to, any borrowing to a statutory extent or to any other commitment of local governments with the aim of preserving their budget balance.” (Article 34 of the Fundamental Law)

The traditional “natural law” approach should undoubtedly be abandoned when defining the notion of local self-government. It should grow out of the idea that modern (local) governments form part of the state organization, although the notion of self-governance may be traceable to several theoretical starting points.

Modern local governments have their autonomy, yet they are still clearly state government organs, not independent from state organizations, and genuine collaboration and cooperation with central (state administration) is indispensable – the importance of which is constitutionally recognized under the provisions of the Fundamental Law.

The economic situation of Hungarian local governments before 2012 is best characterized by the fact that the number and volume of their compulsory tasks dramatically outweighed their revenues, especially the amount of state subsidies. This has led to the situation in which governments are indebted to such an extent that no one can precisely assess and measure it, as it is not only local government budgets that are weighed down by debts (which is clear) but local government undertakings as well (which is mostly invisible). What this actually means is that the central (state) budget attempts to keep its own deficit in check by “shifting” it upon the local government system to an ever-growing extent.

Instituting mandatory local government associations, making it possible to provide for them by law, may serve further modernization. In the interest of effective task performance, the previous government practice attempted to make municipalities fulfill their tasks jointly by budgetary-financial means, while in the future, by virtue of the Fundamental Law, this will also be possible under a statutory provision.

State control (supervision) of local governments has been a cardinal issue in the Hungarian system of self-governance since before 2012. The multitude of remedial and control mechanisms is a peculiar feature of the Hungarian local government system, but at the same time it can make the system weak and contingent. It is true that there are enough – internal and external – organs (county government offices, prosecution services, State Audit Office, local government committees, clerks, auditors etc.) to supervise the legality of the operation of local governments, but these organs have insufficient enforcement powers.

The reinforcement of legal control and its conversion into legal supervision from time to time have been urged in the special literature for theoretical reasons and also on the basis of accumulated practical experience. A minimal widening of the sphere of authority was regarded as achievable by temporarily implementing decisions deemed unlawful and by authorizing supervisory organs to adopt a decision in the case of a failure to adopt a decision. (Some authors argued in favor of a more substantial broadening of supervisory authority.)

The other supervisory power according to the Fundamental Law is debatable: “An Act may define conditions for, or the Government’s consent to, any borrowing to a statutory extent or to any other commitment of local governments with the aim of preserving their budget balance” (Article 34 (5) of the Fundamental Law).

The above-mentioned provision is another novelty in Hungarian constitutional law; its aim is easy to specify: preventing the further indebtedness of local governments, which has grown to such an extent that it now jeopardizes the balance of the national budget. (Legal regulation restricted local government borrowing before 1 January 2012 as well, but these restrictions were easy to avoid, so expectations were not met.)

Borrowing by local governments tends to serve the purpose of operation and the performance of compulsory tasks instead of financing investments and developments. Obviously, the deficit in the budget of local governments is caused typically by state subsidies and own source revenues that are insufficient to cover the expense of performing compulsory tasks and providing local public services.

The Fundamental Law cannot solve the issue of financing; a tool for “a debt break” has simply been institutionalized. Its effectiveness is intensely disputed, and it severely restricts local economic autonomy. It should also be added that the effectiveness of this provision is further endangered by its belated nature: credit institutions – aware of the enormous problems of managing property of and financing local governments – tend to be less willing to finance the operation of local governments, regardless of whether the Government will consent to borrowing or not.

“Voters exercise universal and equal suffrage to elect local government representatives and mayors by direct and secret ballot, during the elections allowing the free will of voters in the manner defined by a cardinal Act. Local government representatives and mayors are elected for a term of five years according to a cardinal Act. The mandate of local representative bodies shall end on the day of the national elections of local government representatives and mayors. In the case of elections cancelled due to a lack of candidates, the mandate of local representative bodies shall be extended until the day of the interim elections. The mandate of mayors shall end on the day of the election of the new mayor.

Local representative bodies may declare their own dissolution, as provided by a cardinal Act. At the motion of the Government – submitted after obtaining the opinion of the Constitutional Court – Parliament shall dissolve any representative body which operates in a way contrary to the Fundamental Law.” (Article 35 of the Fundamental Law)

Until now, the above-mentioned provisions were contained in separate statutes, but by raising them to a constitutional level, their core contents have not changed except for lengthening the term of the representative bodies and mayors from four to five years and terminating the mandate of the mayor in the case of the dissolution of the representative body.

The previous wording of the Constitution evoked the atmosphere of the transition of 1989-90; also defined as fundamental rights of self-government were local self-governance, which did away with the central direction of local councils; independence, the freedom of wide local self-determination, which was especially manifest in considering the concept of self-governance as a collective right enjoyed by the community of the local electorate; and the functions of local representative bodies.

Act No. CLXXXIX of 2011 – on the local self-governments of Hungary

In the 2010 election campaign, Viktor Orbán mentioned it as one of his primary objectives that if citizens put their trust in him, his government would carry out a complete public law reform, and would pass a new fundamental law instead of the constitution already displaying several weaknesses. FIDESZ-KDNP ('Alliance of Young Democrats- Christian Democratic People's Party') won the 2010 election, and following the counting of votes, it became clear that having a two third majority, the new government could start the process of drawing up a new constitution without the opposition. As a result, on 18 April, 2011, the Parliament passed the new constitution, Hungary's Fundamental Law. As had been planned, the government carried out a complete public law reform which involved the amendment of the current act on local self-governments, as well. In order to be able to investigate the differences between the 1990 Act on local self-governments and the equivalent 2011 Act, the regulations set out in the constitutions should be studied and the missing links should be explored.

Starting from the beginning, it is important to observe how these two fundamental law documents provide for the right of self-government. The Constitution is based on the right to local self-government, regulating the control of the state over local self-governments in a minimalist way. It is not surprising given the fact that the Act on local self-government was passed directly after a suppressive, authoritarian regime ceased to exist so it was a primary consideration to reduce state control to the minimum level. The fundamental rights local self-governments were entitled to were general and extended to each local self-governments. Unfortunately, however, due to the large number of tiny self-governments and overregulation, this system became impossible to finance. The Fundamental Law attempts to find a solution to this. However, it does not provide for the right to self-government but incorporates the concept of local public affairs in its wording instead. The exact formula is: 'In Hungary local governments shall function to manage local public affairs and exercise local public power.' It confers the right of local self-government on the citizens of settlements and counties so only the complete revocation of the right to self-government violates the Fundamental Law as the right to self-government does not appear in it as a fundamental right. Citizens may directly exercise their rights to self-government through local referenda and indirectly through elected representatives. According to the law, these rights mean the expression and implementation of local public will. Accordingly, the subject of law shall not be deemed to be the local self-governments but inhabitants of the local settlements who exercise the right of self-government. According to the act, local public affairs 'are related to the provision of the population with public services and to the creation of the organizational, personnel and material conditions for local self-government and cooperation with the population.' That is, the task is to cater for the needs of the population and to create and provide the conditions for their well-being so the law does not only regulate but also sets forth obligations for the local self-governments and citizens. It is the citizens' obligation to alleviate the burdens of the community through self-provision, that is, to contribute to the performance of community activities as far as they are able to. The local self-government may define these tasks in a decree, and may also create legal consequences in case of non-compliance, so it may hold inhabitants responsible.

However, as a moral constraint, the principle of good faith and mutual cooperation should be followed while the law is exercised and enforced.

The tasks of local self-governments are regulated in section (1), Article 31 of the Fundamental Law, which sets forth that local self-governments manage local public affairs and implement local public will. However, it fails to give an exact definition of what local public affairs are so it is left to the legislature to clarify it. The Fundamental Law gives a list of all the rights that the local self-government may exercise during the management of public affairs so through decrees and orders, it is a matter of local regulation to determine organizational and operational order, to exercise the right of enterprising, the right to charge taxes or to establish partnerships with other local self-governments. However, neither the act nor the Fundamental Law provides for the separation of the tasks and powers of local self-governments. And with this, we have arrived to an important point without the exploration of which it is impossible to go on as we are concerned with local self-governments here. These are the principles of decentralization/deconcentration and subsidiarity.

The state system of the separation of powers is built out along two axes: a horizontal and a vertical one. (Dr. Gallai – Dr. Török 2003: 318) The horizontal axis is the classical tripartite principle of the division of powers, treated by every country having a democratic political system as a basic element of power construction. The vertical division means the division of state power and tasks among lower levels. However, vertically, division cannot be complete as through its power to make the constitution, the legislative power may modify the powers of the hierarchical organizations of the vertical power system. Thus, local self-governments should always comply with the provisions of currently effective law so there is no institution system where one could speak about unlimited organizational powers. In the case of the central and local division of power, one can speak about decentralized and deconcentrated models. (Dr. Gallai – Dr. Török 2003: 319) Regional autonomy is the greatest in federal-type countries where the state grants separate state-level powers to federal elements. Nowadays, countries strive for decentralization as the division of state powers also involves the passing on of functions and financial burdens in addition to the fact that this way, the principle of vertical power division also prevails. Thus, in case of decentralization, division of power and division of labor are both attained, resulting in greater autonomy for local authorities. However, autonomy does not mean complete sovereignty as local self-governments also exist as part of the state. 'In a narrower sense, decentralization is the actual division of powers among regional decision makers who are not organizationally subordinated to central authorities.' (Dr. Gallai – Dr. Török 2003: 320)

Deconcentration is based on hierarchy so it means the subordination of local and regional authorities to the central power. At the same time, this shows the limitation of the right to make free decisions as self-governments organized on this basis work under the control of the central administrative authority in every case. Their power is only mediated power, and their scope of authority only covers the performance of specific tasks. Next, it is important to mention the principle of subsidiarity, the content elements of which appeared as early as in the antiquity but was first widely applied in practice after World War II, and then it became the basic principle of the European Community.

Former president of the European Committee, Jacques Delors named the following two aspects as the basis of subsidiarity:

- everybody should have the right to fulfill his/her duties on the level where he/she is most suitable for it;
- the obligation of the central authorities is to provide everyone with every device necessary to fully exploit their possibilities.

In today's modern states, subsidiarity is the principle of the limitation of power and the supervision of interference, which was incorporated by the Treaty of Maastricht (section (1), article 5 of the Treaty on European Union). With regard to the fact that these are uniform principles and models in the field of local self-government, the Hungarian local self-government system was also created by the act regulating this structure according to these models.

After this, let us return to the most recent Hungarian act on local self-government. In section (1), article 13, chapter II, the act gives a detailed description of the range of tasks to be performed by local self-governments. In this section, 21 activities are specified from urban planning through cultural and social tasks to waste management and water supply. The new Act on local self-governments regulates the tasks to be performed by local self-governments in greater detail, incorporating new fields, and putting former tasks of local self-governments under state control. Municipal development and urban planning are included in both acts but municipal operation is a new concept although it is true that some of the tasks to be performed were also included in the former act.

The new act incorporates the following tasks in municipal operation: establishment and maintenance of public cemeteries, provision of street lighting, provision of chimney sweep services, construction and maintenance of public roads and their accessories, establishment and maintenance of public parks and other public areas, and provision of parking places for motor vehicles. In other words, the act specifies the tasks that local self-governments shall perform. Earlier, these tasks were not specified individually. In my opinion, the reason for such detailed regulation is to prevent any legal disputes arising from the lack of regulation. Beyond the incorporation of social benefits and services, the new act on local self-governments also includes the right of the local self-government to determine social benefits.

The Act on social benefits and the Act on local self-governments set forth that the self-government representative body of the settlement shall provide social benefits in cash for individuals socially in need subject to the conditions set forth in the relevant decrees of the local self-government in the form of care allowance and self-government benefit but may also define other benefits paid in cash. In addition, the local self-government may also provide social benefit in kind, and may order personal care to be provided for those in need. (Dr. Feik 2017: 57) Since the introduction of the public works program, the organization and provision of public works have also been the task of local self-governments although it is true that the state gives assistance in the provision of the necessary financial resources. It could have been included among the social tasks of the state, still, the provision of care for and rehabilitation of people who have become

homeless, and the prevention of this are regulated separately. The reason for giving it priority in the act may have been the increasing social sensitivity for the problem. The provision in the act requiring local self-governments to provide an opportunity for local small farmers and primary producers to sell the products listed in legal statutes has greater importance in the provinces.

With this, legislators try to promote the development of the Hungarian sector of small producers and the prioritization of Hungarian goods. Unfortunately, this regulation has not been of much help in stopping the decrease of the number of agricultural primary producers as since 2008, there have been fewer and fewer primary producers registered year by year. The Hungarian production sector badly needs this layer so this problem is an ever recurring item on the political agenda. The organization and provision of local waste disposal services is also a new task to be performed. Earlier, it caused problems several times as in many cases, waste management companies could not agree with local self-governments so waste disposal was not solved. In order to prevent such cases, the act makes it the responsibility of local self-governments to perform waste management tasks.

The most important issue in today's political situation in Hungary is the educators' movement against the improper conditions and the system of financing in education. These causes can also be led back to the provisions in the Act on local self-governments as earlier, it was the responsibility of the local self-governments to provide education but in the new Act on local self-governments, the authority of local self-governments only covers the supervision of kindergarten education while other levels of education are put under state control.

The impact of the 2011 Act on local self-governments on the Hungarian education system

Following the change of the political system, similarly to many other areas, the Hungarian education system underwent significant reorganization. Education itself was regulated by Act No. LXXIX of 1993. The act made it the responsibility of the self-governments of villages, towns, capital districts and cities with county rank to organize and supervise the operation of kindergarten and public education services. This act made it possible for the educational services to be provided jointly by several local self-governments in the framework of a self-government partnership in which 'every such self-government could become a member that maintained a school providing vocational training.' (Csörgits 2017: 52) Thus, according to the former regulation, the local self-government was the basis of the organization and provision of education from kindergarten to university.

This system was overturned by the new Acts on public education and local self-governments, which deprived local self-governments of the right to maintain educational institutions with the exception of kindergartens, and put these institutions under state control. In the exact wording of the act, 'a public education institution may be established and maintained by the state, and subject to the provisions herein, by ethnic minority self-governments, church legal entities, organizations involved in religious activities or by other persons or organizations if it has obtained the right to

pursue such activities in compliance with the relevant legal statutes.’ The act also sets forth that kindergarten institutions may also be maintained by local self-governments. As of 1 September, 2012, the state established Klebelsberg Intézményfenntartó Központ (‘Klebelsberg Centre for Institution Maintenance’) (Hungarian abbreviation: KLIK), the task of which is to maintain public education institutions involved in providing state services and to operate public education institutions efficiently, professionally and legally. KLIK performed the tasks set forth in the act in 198 educational districts with more or less success. Right after starting its operations, the institution already generated considerable loss, and the educational experts of the opposition labeled it ‘the most unnecessary institution’ since the change of the political regime.

It is a fact that the operation of this institution shows the signs of chaos, with its accumulated debt already exceeding ten billion HUF although repayment of it has started in the meantime. Teachers’ former demonstrations, which turned public attention to the conditions in education, may have partly been attributed to the operational problems of KLIK and partly to other circumstances. Probably due to social pressure, the government announced that it would close down KLIK, and the new institution to be established would only have maintenance and employer functions, and all other authorities would be given back to school principals. School principals would also have cash funds so that no central approval would be required for every single procurement of assets, which formerly endangered everyday work in schools. The secretary of state for education, László Palkovics said in a television interview that the operations of the universities would not be affected by the new institution as they were functioning properly.

With regard to the universities, it is important to remark that they have a different maintenance system. Universities are led by their senates headed by the rectors but they are operated by the chancellors, who are responsible for economic, financial, controlling, internal auditing, accounting, HR, legal, administrative and IT activities as well as for the asset management of the institution, including any technical, facility utilization, operational, logistics, service, procurement and public procurement issues, as well, pursuant to law. This means that the actual supervision of universities has been taken over by individuals appointed by the prime minister, through which the autonomy of the universities has also been curbed. It is a negative impact of the reorganization in higher education that several institutions have been closed down, faculties have been merged, several, formerly state-owned specializations have been made tuition-based, and in several cases, the tuitions have been considerably increased so that many students cannot pay them. As a result, there is a significant decrease in the number of students in higher education.

Due to the act, several educational institutions have been taken over by the churches for maintenance. In comparison with the 2009/2010 period, the number of elementary schools in church ownership had increased by a little more than one hundred by the academic year 2014/2015 while in the case of the academic grammar schools, this number was thirty. Since 2005, the number of students in public education has decreased by almost 200,000 while the number of students educated in church schools could only be counted in thousands at that time but now a quarter of a million students

are taught there. Due to the better financial conditions – as church schools get both state and church subsidies –, more and more students are enrolled in church schools by their parents. The fact that the number of students educated in church schools is increasing is in line with the government's objectives.

Changes in the sovereignty of Hungarian local self-governments

The Hungarian self-government system had prominent significance from the early Middle Ages. The Hungarian principle of local self-government originates from the sovereignty of counties, and if there is any dispute between the state and local self-governments, as a rule, historical experiences are activated to support the importance of the power and autonomy of local self-governments. In the 27 years that have passed since the change of the political system, there have been frequent changes in the obligations and control of local self-governments. At the time of the change of the political system, legislators, understandably, intended to give back to local self-governments the maximum sovereignty permitted by law, which worked well in the beginning, and were welcomed by citizens. As the years passed, the negative aspects of the system became evident, as well. Mainly due to the increase in their responsibilities, local self-governments got indebted, and by 2010, the amount of their outstanding debt had reached 1,200 billion HUF.

Understandably, local self-governments expected the state to solve this problem, and as a result, they had to sacrifice some of their sovereignty, giving it over to the state. The restructuring of the education system described above was due to this sacrifice but the access of the local self-governments to loans has also become limited and the system of central resource allocation has been changed, as well, so settlements with stronger economic potential get fewer subsidies than the more disadvantaged ones. Before the changes, there were some who were of the opinion that Hungary should adopt the Swedish local self-government model, where first, the number of local self-governments was reduced from 2,498 to 1,037, and then, due to further reductions, only 278 local authorities remained. This means that a large number of local governments were eliminated or merged. However, under Hungarian conditions, this would have been an inconceivable change as Hungarian local self-governments enjoy historically guaranteed autonomy.

The new regulation in the Fundamental Law gives up the fundamental right approach to the right to local self-government, and sets forth that local self-governments may only exercise their functions (and not their fundamental rights) subject to the principle of legality, thus creating the possibility for a broad limitation of the rights of local self-governments just like for the re-qualifying of local public issues as national public issues. These provisions reduce the autonomy of local self-governments, guaranteed by the constitution. In the new regulation system, local self-governments are controlled by the competent government authorities, whose status and functions have been considerably extended due to the combination of the great many deconcentrated functions. Through this, the county has become the scene of intermediate level administration. The result of the new regulation is a local self-government system shifting towards centralization, accompanied by a considerable reduction of the functions and limitation of the autonomy of the local self-government system. Leaving the role of the 'night watchman' behind, the

state actively interferes in local and regional politics and self-government activities. The fundamental changes can be summarized as follows:

- there has been a considerable decrease in the number of local self-government representatives;
- in contrast to the previous system, a five-year election cycle has been introduced with the justification that it is worth separating local elections from the parliamentary cycle and elections in the hope of a higher participation rate and more balanced power relations;
- the next element is the reduction in the functions and roles of local self-governments referred to several times;
- with the appearance of government offices, authority functions have been taken away from local self-governments;
- in case of the existence of the conditions set forth in the act, the opportunity for local self-governments to form mandatory partnerships, and the closing down of mayor's offices in settlements having fewer than two thousand inhabitants;
- judicial review has become stricter;
- the management functions of local self-governments have become stricter due to the large number of cases of their getting indebted;
- one of the most important changes on the local level is that the position of the mayor has become stronger within the organization of the local self-government, weakening that of the notary so few opportunities have remained to control mayors.

Conclusion

These were the most essential points bringing about a change in the new Act on local self-governments. It is quite sure that it is impossible to investigate the actual impacts of changes after such a short period of time but some initial conclusions can be made. Evidently, the new act over-regulates local self-governments, thus curtailing their sovereignty, and giving too much priority to state influence. The termination of the former close connections between county self-governments and local self-governments may also be the source of significant problems in the future. With regard to the fact that due to the absolute majority of the governing party, the new constitution was passed relatively quickly, the Act on local self-governments was also drawn up without any serious impact studies or negotiations with the local self-governments themselves.

As our country is a member state of the European Union, our fundamental acts should comply with the basic principles of the Union, and, as far as local self-governments are concerned, with the European Charter for Local Self-government, as well. Whether the provisions in the new Fundamental Law and the Act on local self-governments comply with the Charter or not is doubted by many, what is more, one of the reports which investigated Hungarian conditions explicitly recommended the review of the Hungarian Act on local self-governments referring to excessive centralization. Therefore, it is becoming more and more evident that according to the experience gathered so far, the new regulation needs reviewing but in view of current political trends, this review is not likely to be carried out in the near future.

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György Gyukits

Social Conflicts in Taktaszada*

Abstract

The study describes the social conflicts explored in Taktaszada. Taktaszada is a village in the north of Hungary with 50 per cent of Roma population. The research combined the techniques of questionnaires and structured interviews. The main conflicts arise from social inequalities, poverty and the problems of socialization among young people, which may also occur in the form of conflicts between generations as well as in those of ethnic origin. The social conflicts analyzed in the study are decisive from the point of the future of the village.

Keywords: conflict, poverty, Roma, social capital, social inequality, slum

Aim of the Research

The aim of the research was to review the conflicts in Taktaszada. In typifying the conflicts, we used the typology of Csizmadia (2015). Csizmadia reviews the conflicts from the individual up to the macro-levels, based on the dimensions of demography, social relations, labor market, region and power (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Typology of conflicts

	level of measurement/ scope of influence	
	individual micro-level group mezo-level	community macro-level
demography	age-group / generation, gender-based, ethnic / minority	
private life, social relations	family / social life, personal relations	
labor market	income / job-related, superior-subordinate	
region, place of living	place of living, neighbourhood, region, urbanisation	
hierarchy / institution	subordinate vs. superior, political standing, decision-making, representation	

Source: Csizmadia: www.matud.iif.hu/2014/11/08.htm

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In accordance with the above, our research focused on conflicts related to the following areas:

- private life, family,
- friends
- workplace: superior-subordinate, work performance, income
- education
- health care
- ethnicity
- religion
- differences of age
- gender differences
- deviant forms of behavior: drug abuse, alcohol, crime (violence, theft, etc.)
- neighbors
- politics, representation, power, legal matters (litigations)
- business, investment
- globalization, migration, environmental pollution, war

The research was carried out by combining quantitative and qualitative sociological methods, which are detailed in the chapter on methodology. However, we want to emphasize right at the beginning that the interview technique offered the opportunity for the respondents to define the concept of conflict themselves: that is what the term „conflict” means in their interpretation; what they consider to be conflicts and what they do not. This is important because our hypothesis was that there might be significant differences between the typology of conflicts used by the present research and the way the respondents understand it.

In addition, we also came to see which conflicts were important for them and how they coped with their conflicts. This question leads us to another significant aspect of conflicts which can be described in terms of constructivism and deconstructivism (Sass – Síklaki 2011).

If – allowing for some inaccuracy in terminology – a settlement with a low number of population, like Taktaszada is, can be considered a community, then the community may learn a lesson from a constructive type of conflict, because its members learn the viewpoints and opinions of the others, they can even understand those who disagree with them. This may give rise to changes which can lessen the accumulated strain resulting from the conflicts. In contrast, in the case of deconstructive conflicts, the emotions take the leading role, which contribute to forming extremist viewpoints, acting against the feeling of unity within the community and, consequently, this can bring about the disintegration of the community in the long run.

By exploring the conflicts we hope that it will not only give detailed information about the life and future perspectives of the people living in the settlement, but also give an insight into its present and recent past, and may also give a prognosis about the possible alternatives of the future.

The Research Site

Taktaszada is located in the north-eastern crisis-zone of Hungary. After the change of regime in 1989, a major social crisis developed in this region, due to the collapse of heavy industry, the effects of which can still be felt (Beluszky – Síkos 2007). The most important social problems of the region are connected to unemployment, poverty and to the Roma population, as this is the region where the percentage and the actual number of the Roma minority are the highest.

Taktaszada is a settlement situated about thirty kilometers from Miskolc, with a population of about two thousand. The term „takta” in its name means swamp-like backwater (Percsák 1986), and the name of the geographical region “Taktaköz” is derived from that word as well. In the past, water always played a vital role in the life of the people living in Taktaszada: for example in the forms of fishing or reed harvesting (Dobány 2011).

Taking the whole Taktaköz into account, we can say that the conditions in Taktaszada are relatively better than those in the villages located in the centre of the region, closer to the River Tisza, because the lands around Taktaszada have higher agricultural value. Typically, there are great differences between the settlements within the Taktaköz-region – we should remember that the wine-growing area of Tokaj is very near, with settlements like Tokaj and Tarcál, both of which have expressly favorable conditions. In fact, this discrepancy is characteristic of the whole region: typically, the income tax per capita in the settlements belonging to the Miskolc-agglomeration shows five-fold differences (Kristóf 2017), and this is true not only for recent times as Szabó Zoltán also points it out in his classic sociography „Cifra nyomorúság” (Genteel Poverty) written in the 1930s (Szabó 1986). Taktaszada was established around the times of the Hungarian Conquest. During the Ottoman era it was deserted, and it was only in the 18th century that its population reached again the figures characteristic of the times before the Ottoman rule. (Dobány 2011).

Figure 2. Changes in the population of Taktaszada from the 18th century to the present

1784/87	1850	1870	1880	1890	1900
639	803	993	1037	1216	1694

1920	1930	1941	1949	1960	1970
1669	1756	1889	1981	2014	2249

1980	1990	2001	2010
2119	2112	2046	1862

Source: Dobány (2011): *Tájhasználat*, 119.

Originally, the population of Taktaszada was mainly Hungarian, but in our days the proportion of the Roma population is gradually increasing. According to the 2011 census, 1792 people identified themselves as Hungarian and 555 people as Rom. The

respondents' nationality was defined on the basis of the answers given about their mother tongue or the language used in the family and with friends (KSH 2011). It was also possible for them to choose the option of dual identity. However, the proportion of the Roma population is probably higher than the above figure: according to the estimates of the mayor, the social worker, the health visitor as well as the teacher of the local primary school, this proportion is around fifty per cent in the settlement.

Before the Second World War, the overwhelming majority of the village earned their living in agriculture. Although - as mentioned earlier - it belonged to the settlements of Taktaköz with relatively more favorable agricultural potentials, still the specific features of the soil, together with the sizes of properties (mostly smallholdings), influenced living standards negatively (Dobány 2011). Based on the above, there seems to be a fair ground to say that the population of Taktaszada lived in relatively homogeneous poverty before the world war. After the war, a lot of people started to commute to Szerencs and Miskolc, due to the forced industrialization of the region. During the existence of the regime that called itself communist or socialist, the standard of living was uniformly low, which also meant that inequalities were relatively small. (Spéder 2002).

After the change of regime, the social conditions became catastrophic in the region, mainly due to the high rate of unemployment. I first visited the area a few years after the change, in 1992, and the breath-taking scenes of poverty which I saw in the Gypsy colony of the settlement is still a haunting memory for me. In those times, pensioners formed a better-off layer of the population, because they were the only ones who had a modest but secure source of income – the old-age pension. Even the local usurer (Béres – Lukács 2008) was living in a decrepit house which did not differed from those of his clients. In short, there continued to be no big differences between the inhabitants, only the general standard of living had declined, and utter destitution had occurred. That was the time when Taktaszada started to decline into a slum (Wilson 1997). The final phase of this tendency in the region can be seen in Csenyété, which is a settlement inhabited exclusively by Roma (Ladányi – Szelényi 1998).

A lot of people moved out of Taktaszada, hoping for a better life. As a result, the population of the settlement decreased by more than ten per cent during the period between 1990 and 2010 (Figure 2). For those who stayed the social allowances form the main source of income. As one of my interviewees in a former research project said, it was too little to live on, but too much to starve to death. During the past decade the government introduced communal work but, according to experts of the field, it has failed to meet the original targets of employment and reintegration (Váradi 2016), more exactly, the target of market-based employment. Contrary to that viewpoint, the respondents in my interviews who were doing communal work or were unemployed had a much more positive opinion about communal work. The question whether they have to survive on some twenty thousand forints (80 Euros) or on an amount between fifty to seventy thousand forints (160–230 Euros) is by no means of little consequence for them.

It is important to call attention to the fact that Taktaszada does not stand alone with its specific circumstances in Taktaköz, as similar tendencies can be seen in other settlements belonging to the region and, as a consequence, we may say that it is a region slowly turning into slums (Virág 2006).



Method

The research in Taktaszada was carried out within the framework of a more extensive research project, by combining the methods of quantitative and qualitative analysis: fifty people were asked using questionnaires, and twenty structured interviews were taken.

The questionnaire-part was carried out on the basis of quota-sampling, which was representative of gender, age and education. However, due to difficulties emerging on site, we were unable to keep the quotas accurately, although we made every effort to do so: for example, we returned to the same address several times, in different parts of the day, even at the weekends.

Based on my experience gained on the site, there had been inaccuracies in the data base itself which was used for the quota, because several people had moved away from Taktaszada – mainly those of the younger generation –, yet their permanent address was still there.

Due to the difficulties with the questionnaires, I decided to make twice as many structured interviews as I had originally planned. In some cases no audio recording was made during the interviews, because I thought it would have affected the success of the interview: for example, when I managed to induce the head of the local mafia to have a conversation with me. In such cases I made a short written draft about the conversation afterwards, on the same day.

The questionnaires were done by students involved in the research, whereas I made all the structured interviews.

Findings

At least twenty-five years had passed since I last visited Taktaszada, and when I started to walk along the narrow road from the railway station towards the village, the sight of the great number of BMWs and Audis astonished me. When I finally arrived in the village, I was shocked to see a lot of shops of all sizes, filled up with high-quality goods. Also, there was a brand new Mediterranean style luxury building in the middle of the village, together with some other houses in perfect condition – most of them built in the old socialist era but renovated and modernized recently. As a matter of fact, the whole experience did not fit into the image of a settlement turning into slum as described in the literature. It would not have surprised me if I had seen some battered Mercedes or BMWs parking around the area, as such cars were seen in the 1990s even in the worst slums like Szondi Telep in Miskolc, the glassworks slum or the Gypsy slum in Szerencs. They were mainly used by the local pimps. However, seeing a new A4 Audi standing in the yard next to a BMW, was really strange. What is more, there were a lot of vans in the streets. All these did not fit into the image of a seriously underprivileged settlement declining into ghetto status.

Later it became clear from the interviews that there are some businessmen in the village engaged in scaffolding who hire the locals to work mainly in Germany. That way the businessman can easily afford a new Audi, whereas his employees, who earn about 2000-2500 Euros a month, can buy a second hand BMW which is still in good condition. I asked the scaffolders who were in the village at the time of the interviews, as well as some other council people living in the village (e.g. social worker) to give me a rough estimate of the number of people working abroad. Of course, we must bear in mind that such estimates are subjective, but still, based on them, we can say that about fifty to sixty people may be working abroad. Even if reckoning with families of four only, about 200 to 240 persons may be concerned, which amounts to nearly fifty percent of the Roma population, which numbered 555 at the time of the Census (KSH 2011). The scaffolders are in fact Romas, almost without exception. That is because the employers themselves also come from the Roma population, and they recruit the workers through their social network. Therefore, social capital plays an essential role here (Coleman – Granovetter 1994). It is important to note, that the workers and their families do not want to move out of the village, and they continuously renovate, modernize their homes. They would not do so if they had any intention to move because people from other settlements do not tend to buy properties in the village. This group of scaffolders may act against the tendency of the village becoming a slum, as they form a group who are better off and, through their spendings they help the local shops to thrive.

A monthly pay of 2000-2500 Euros is an outstanding salary not only in terms of Taktaszada but anywhere else in Hungary as well. However, they spend it all: they buy a good BMW, renovate their homes, buy some expensive Italian furniture and household appliances. Practically, they do not have any savings. An example of that is when a scaffolder who had been working in Germany for several years was convicted for assault by the German court and was given a fine of 750 Euros, he could not pay it due to the lack of savings. He asked for my advice in his lawsuit, and I actually saw the order of the court and the man's despair.

This living for the present can probably be explained by the attitude of people living in poverty (Lewis; Jahoda – Lazarsfeld – Zeisel 1999).

We should be aware that these people, who are experiencing a steep rise in their standard of living now, may easily find themselves in a defenseless situation in the case of a crisis (in the building industry). They have no secondary education, sometimes even their primary education is incomplete; they are often employed in the black market – as a consequence, they are not flexible workers. What is more, they do not have savings that may help them survive a potential crisis.

There is, however, another group of well-to-do people in Taktaszada: the criminals. They are involved mainly in drug and human trafficking, but earlier a special form of usury was also typical among them: giving loans for high interest rates. Based on the information I received from the interviewees, the latter form of crime seems to have lost ground in the village. Naturally, the data and the accounts given about these kinds of activity must be treated with reservation. When all the respondents, from the owner of the pub to the mayor, say that Special Force Commandos raided the village and took away the suspects, this must be true, because there were witnesses. However, the amount of synthetic drugs and cash found on these men remains unclear and are mere guesses.

Women in great number are being sent as prostitutes to Dubai, Switzerland and Holland. According to the estimates of the different local council people, like the social worker, health visitor and the primary school teacher, there may be about forty of them working in this kind of trade in those countries. We should not cherish illusions about the methods the local pimps use: they recruit their victims from the poorest and most defenseless families. It is enough to look at language incompetence alone (Gréczi-Zsoldos 2018), for the illustration of which here is a part of an interview with a potential victim:

„...What is the opposite of quarrelling?

Well... there must be something they quarrel about...

That's the reason, but what is its opposite?

Talking? Shouting?"

It goes without saying that a girl with such poor language competence can easily fall prey to false promises about a better life. On the other hand, owing money to the usurer can also be the reason for entering into prostitution:

„What did you go through?

Well... everything..., although I was raised properly. When I was young, I fell in love with a forty-year old businessman, and he took me to his place. He cheated on me, so I moved back to my mother. My father brought up my first child, and then I had no other choice but to become a prostitute, although I had learnt to be a cash machine operator... I could not endure being poor; when my father made some money from collecting scrap iron and copper, we had some food; we owed money to the usurer, our electricity was cut off..."

In spite of the fact that these women are sexually exploited and the victims of human trafficking, some of them at least can improve the financial conditions of their families – as it can be seen from interview extract the above. This was demonstrated well by a father boasting in the local shop about his daughter working in Dubai, or when a prostitute who is paid for dancing in a shop window in Holland furnished her home with expensive furniture. They can earn as much as is enough to help themselves and their families to emerge from utter destitution – even if it may last for a short while only.

In a village of two thousand forty prostitutes is such a high number that it is not unreasonable to suppose that their income brings reasonable improvement in the circumstances of the poorest families.

On the other hand, the destitution known throughout the region still exists. For example, one of the interviewees is a communal worker and she earns 48 000 forints (160 Euros) a month. Due to her debts the electricity supply has been cut off, so her only source of relaxation is to listen to a battery-operated radio at candle light in the evenings. She had permanent employment until the chocolate factory in Szerencs closed down, and now she is happy to be involved in the communal work project. Naturally, a lot of people in the Gypsy ghetto also live under similar circumstances. This example has been mentioned to illustrate the fact that poverty does not strike the Gypsy population only. The information gained from the questionnaire shows that nearly two-thirds of the respondents consider poverty an impending danger, and 44.9 per cent out of them think that poverty means a particularly great danger for them (Table 5). A few hundred meters from the decaying houses is an elegant house with a brand new A4 Audi parking in the yard, next to a new BMW. This striking social inequality, existing side by side, accounts for one of the basic types of conflict in the village. And then, there are the mainly Hungarian pensioners who had a fix income after the change of regime and, consequently, a relatively high standard of living in those days: they regard their present status as having gone down in the world.

This conflict is summarized by the wife of a Roma scaffolder:

„How shall I say it... here the Hungarians feel that they are oppressed... we, Roma people outnumber them here in the village, and they are envious in a way. They see the expensive cars, the money spent on the house, a lot of gold and everything, and then there is this envy. Face to face they are sweet, but behind our backs they bad-mouth us. There is jealousy: there are some Roma families who are still down in the pit and cannot rise higher. We say that they do not belong here, it would be better if they left the place.”

Also, another Roma interviewee:

„There is great poverty, life hasn't changed at all... if I think back to my childhood, in the old days people kept together, there was no ranking then, now there is ranking, even among the Roma people; those who have necklaces and handbags, ear-rings and rings, they can afford a better life... those who cannot afford these things,...it is poverty and the same is true for housing....”

It is interesting that this huge social gap is only of secondary importance for the poor families of the village: for them the main problem is crime:

„There are a lot of bad people here in Szada, bad alcoholics. Here the doors must be permanently locked. Well, they break all the windows when I go to work... sorry to say, but they have fun by breaking windows...”

Beside drugs, alcoholism is also a significant source of conflicts, as it can be seen from the interview extract. The social worker and the health visitor regard prostitution as a grave problem in the village, however, with the exception of a few respondents, the majority did not mention it. There may be several reasons for that: the older generation may not have any information about it, or simply they may be reluctant to talk about it – due to the sensitive nature of the subject (Gyukits 2018). According to the answers given in the questionnaires, 41.6 per cent of the respondents consider public security bad (Table 4): they mostly mention theft and robbery (42.8 per cent), whereas a much smaller number reckon with organized crime as a major source of crime (12.9 per cent, Table 5). Out of the deviant forms of behavior, alcoholism is mentioned in the first place as a major source of danger (58.3 per cent), and only a smaller number think the same about drugs (24.5 per cent, Table 5), although this figure also seems quite high.

Another type of conflict originates from the generation gap. This may explain why the behavior of schoolchildren becomes uncontrollable, particularly at primary school, and mainly in the case of boys. The head mistress of the school says that the greater part of teaching time is used for trying to discipline the students. This subject is often mentioned in the interviews as well. One of the mothers explains the reasons:

„When I was young, parents knew how to raise kids. Now we live in a three-dimensional world. Children do not show respect – they hold that f... mobiles in their hands and do not know what it means to communicate with someone. They do not ask you,” mother can I help you with anything?”

This mother is right. However, the things she mentions apply to a lot of kids nowadays. On the other hand, in the case of the families in Taktaszada, the fathers who work abroad are in fact absent most of the time. They only come home for a week or two after three or four months of work. As a consequence, women bring up their children by themselves, even if they have a partner in life. Another dangerous tendency is that the local elite of criminals may become the reference group for the boys (Merton 1980). One of the boys – whose mother I made an interview with – called himself *Spartan*. I had no doubts that he did not mean the Antique model. It turned out later that this was the name of the local elite of criminals – they are on YouTube, and the kids regularly watch their videos. The boys adopt the behavioral patterns of these criminals, making it even harder for their mothers to cope with the task of bringing them up normally.

Another problem making it difficult to bring up a child according to the normal standards is the case when the mother is (was) a prostitute. First of all, these kids must face the contempt of the peer group, but it can be a permanent source of conflicts within the family as well. It is needless to say how hard it is to gain information about this

subject, even by using the qualitative interview technique. Still, an episode I witnessed in the street may well illustrate the situation: The grandfather was drinking alcohol in front of a shop - he did not seem to be drunk. His grandson came up to him and asked for some money to buy a bar of Milka chocolate for himself. The grandfather refused despite the boy's repeated requests. The grandson took his revenge by saying that the body of the grandmother will be moved into the collective grave. The grandfather snapped at him, saying: what sort of woman is your mother? – she is a whore. We should know that the grandson was Gypsy by sight, whereas the grandfather was not. So probably the grandfather's son married a Gypsy woman, which may give an additional ethnic shade to the situation.

The situation mentioned above leads us to the question of ethnic conflicts. Fifty per cent of the respondents say that belonging to an ethnic group may give rise to mistrust. On the other hand, the interviews revealed that the Roma people experience ethnic discrimination almost entirely outside the village. This may be explained by the demographic structure of the village: there is a rapidly growing young Roma population, and a decreasing number of older Hungarian people. Also, mixed marriages occur in great number, and there are people with dual identity as well - when a person identifies both as Roma and as Hungarian – this may have an effect of mitigating the conflicts within the village.

Finally, we must mention the tendency of graduated people moving away from Taktaszada. This tendency started already in the 1970s. In the 1980s there was a significant decrease in its rate but then it became more intensive again (Figure 2). At the present, the questionnaires indicate that 12.3 per cent of the respondents plan to move out of the village within the next three years.

There are some Roma graduates as well in Taktaszada or, rather to say, there were: there was somebody with a degree in law, and there is still a woman with a degree in engineering, who is planning to move away with her family. The process of declining into a slum settlement can be spotted in this respect. There are still some people with university degrees in Taktaszada: the teacher, social worker, doctor, andragogist, an agricultural engineer (the mayor), but they will be pensioners within 10 or 20 years, so they will not be able to help the village with their work. The younger people who graduated recently have already moved out, or plan to do so. The same refers to the young graduated Roma persons: when asked about the reasons, they mentioned the unfavorable conditions in the village, related first of all to crime. The Roma woman with a technical university degree mentions the school as an additional reason. In fact, even the Roma people who live under better circumstances – including the elite of criminals – send their children to the school in the nearby town, to Szerencs (Durst 2002).

As a result, the cultural elite of the village gradually disappears which, from a broader perspective, means the terminal phase in the process of the village declining into a slum. The daughter of the pub owner, for example, has left secondary school recently and applied to the university to study law. However, it was not an option for the family to apply to the University of Miskolc, although it would be easier to commute from Taktaszada, and they could save a lot of money by doing so. I learnt from the conversation with the girl and her father that she not only wants to move out of the

village, but out of the whole region as well and, in order to do so, the family is willing to make additional financial efforts. This, however, foreshadows the possibility of the entire region becoming a slum area.

Instead of a summary

Finally, I would like to answer the question raised at the beginning of the study: to what extent do the conflicts described in the analysis above belong to constructive or deconstructive types? Based on my experience gained on the site, these social conflicts cannot be solved within the capacity of the settlement. What is more, due to the lack of proper solutions, they become deconstructive, and bring about conditions of anomy in the village. The basic problem is that the village is declining into a slum – this is a social problem. Despite the fact that the different techniques aimed at the treatment of conflicts may be successful in certain aspects, or at least partly successful, they shift a social problem into the area of psychology – with the unwanted effect of obscuring the original problem.

In the case of Taktaköz, Dobány (2011) thinks that the process of becoming a slum may be halted on the basis of the natural potentials of the region, that is, the agricultural potential. Another option for the people of Taktaszada is to find employment abroad, as mentioned earlier. These can probably provide some solutions. All things considered, if the outward movement of the intellectuals cannot be stopped, the tendency of declining into a slum cannot be avoided in Taktaszada.



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Attachments

Table 1. To what extent are you satisfied with the following things in your life? (1: not at all... 5: perfectly) Valid answers given to the question, in terms of percentage.

	1	2	3	4	5
The relationship maintained with the closest members of the family	-	4.1	6.1	22.4	67.3
The financial conditions of your household	8.2	14.3	32.7	34.7	10.2
Your relationship maintained with friends	2.0	6.1	16.3	30.6	44.9
The possibility to meet your demand for food	2.1	10.4	12.5	20.8	54.2
Your accommodation	2.0	-	28.6	24.5	44.9
The perspectives for the future	10.2	14.3	20.4	32.7	22.4
Your education	12.2	6.1	22.4	28.6	30.6
The way you spend your free time	6.3	12.5	22.9	18.8	39.6
Your private life	4.3	2.1	6.4	19.1	68.1
Your present job	7.5	2.5	7.5	32.5	50.0

N=50

Table 2. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1: absolutely not... 5: fully) Valid answers given to the question, in terms of percentage.

	1	2	3	4	5
I often feel that I am torn between my workplace and my family	28.9	10.5	23.7	18.4	18.4
I often feel stressed.	20.5	9.1	18.2	22.7	29.5
I have a harmonious family life.	7.1	4.8	11.9	21.4	54.8
The relationship with my friends is mainly harmonious.	-	-	9.3	37.2	53.5
My boss appreciates my contribution at my workplace.	2.8	2.8	2.8	30.6	61.1
My colleagues respect me at my workplace.	-	2.9	11.4	25.7	60.0
I feel good the way as I am.	2.3	9.1	18.2	20.5	50.0
In general, I do not escape from conflicts.	2.3	6.8	4.5	25.0	61.4
I often feel that I am unable to meet all the expectations set for me.	20.9	2.3	27.9	39.5	9.3

N=50

Table 3. Have you ever had/ do you have any conflicts, great problems in any of the following areas? Valid answers given to the question, in terms of percentage.

	yes	no
private life, family	35.4	64.6
friends	20.8	79.2
workplace	25.6	74.4
education	6.4	93.6
health care	20.8	79.2
some valuables, property (e.g. theft)	8.3	91.7
of ethnic character	10.4	89.6
religion	4.2	95.8
originating from age differences	6.4	93.6
originating from gender differences	2.1	97.9
related to neighbors	12.8	87.2
related to politics, representation of interest	6.4	93.6
related to business, investment	2.1	97.9

N=50

Table 4. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1: absolutely not 1... 5: fully) Valid answers given to the question, in terms of percentage.

	1	2	3	4	5
In this settlement it is difficult to find friends.	56.3	12.5	14.6	6.3	10.4
In this settlement it is difficult to do something together with others.	53.2	12.8	19.1	6.4	8.5
In this settlement everybody is only concerned with their own business.	50.0	4.2	4.2	12.5	29.2
In this settlement people do not welcome newcomers.	50.0	8.3	16.7	10.4	14.6
In this settlement there are many conflicts between the families.	38.3	8.5	27.7	14.9	10.6
In this settlement only certain families/persons can achieve success.	39.6	8.3	20.8	12.5	18.8
In this settlement the public security is bad.	29.2	8.3	20.8	8.3	33.3
In this settlement the number of criminal events is high.	37.5	8.3	25.0	8.3	20.8
In this settlement everybody knows about the others.	17.0	2.1	14.9	12.8	53.2

N=50

Table 5. Do the following problems affect the life of the settlement? If it is so, to what extent? (1: absolutely not... 5: they are significant problems) Valid answers given to the question, in terms of percentage.

	1	2	3	4	5
unemployment	32.7	-	22.4	18.4	26.5
drugs	36.7	10.2	28.6	6.1	18.4
alcohol abuse	18.8	4.2	18.8	27.1	31.3
lack of looking after the elderly	55.1	4.1	20.4	12.2	8.2
environmental pollution, throwing away rubbish, waste-burning practices	26.1	14.3	18.4	18.4	22.4
theft, robbery and other criminal events	22.4	6.1	26.5	16.3	26.5
conflicts and violence within the families	42.9	14.3	28.6	10.2	4.1
homeless people	73.5	16.3	8.2	-	2.0
activities of groups of organized crime	57.4	6.4	21.3	6.4	8.5
poverty	16.3	4.1	18.4	16.3	44.9
deficiencies of the health care system	39.6	10.4	16.7	8.3	25.0

N=50



Havasi Virág

Typical Conflicts in Settlements Inhabited by Romani People – and Why These Do Not Exist in Fulókércs*

In Hungary the most important and serious social conflicts derive from the cohabitation of Gypsy and non-Gypsy people. The conflicts have a latent dimension, which is manifested in hostile emotions. Regarding Gypsy people it can be captured with anti-Romani sentiments which are running high in the country. This is shown by the results of a representative poll conducted in 2005, according to which 62% of the respondents agreed with the statement “inclination to criminality is in Roma people’s blood”. (Janecskó 2016.). The most visible and alarming forms of manifest conflicts are the anti-romani demonstrations (2011: Lak, Gyöngyöspata; 2012: Devecser, Miskolc, Paks) and the murder of Gypsy people (2008: Nagycséc, Tatárszentgyörgy, Tiszalök, Alsózsolca). In many cases these events were preceded or followed by serious crimes committed by Gypsy people and received extensive press coverage.

The aim of this study is to summarize and analyze the typical conflicts occurring in settlements inhabited by Romani people. I have visited several settlements in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (BAZ) county over the last decade, and have been working and conducting research in these places. Despite the existence of common features and patterns I can state that every community has its own characteristics. Among the villages Fulókércs seems to be a special place with a relatively low level of social conflicts. I try to explore and explain the reasons behind this situation.

It has to be emphasized that the Gypsy society is layered, and although the conflict situations described below are common and typical they do not characterize every Gypsy person not even those living in deep poverty.

Conflict is a „rubber concept”, it can cover many things from war to choices between ice-creams. (Mack-Snyder 2016.). First I will clarify the definition of social conflicts as I use it.

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The definition of conflict

It is easier to start with listing what is not a conflict. Competition, antagonistic interests, misunderstandings, aggression, hostility, desire or intention to oppose, social cleavages (e.g. along class lines), logical irreconcilability of goals or interests, tensions, rivalry are not conflicts (yet). These can be synonyms or sources of conflicts (Mack–Snyder 2016), or they can follow and amplify conflicts.

My definition of conflict is the same as Mack and Snyder's who identify the following characteristics of conflicting behaviors and conflict relationships:

- Conflicts require at least two parties or two analytically distinct entities (e.g. group, collectivity, individual etc.).
- Conflicts arise from position or resource scarcity.
- Conflicting behaviors are designed to destroy, injure, thwart, control another party and in a conflict relationship a party can gain at the other's expense. Intention and action are present in conflicting behaviors.
- Conflicts require interaction among parties. Actions and counteractions are mutually opposed. (Mack–Snyder 2016.)

Conflicts can arise at different levels, among different actors. I shall analyze the following levels:

1. Level: Conflicts on the level of institutions and conflicts between institutions.

There are at least two possible meanings of an institution. On the one hand, we refer to institution as a consistent and organized pattern of behavior and as activities which are established by law or custom. On the other hand, an institution is an establishment, foundation, or organization created to pursue a particular type of endeavor. I will use the expression in this latter sense.

In conflicts between institutions the manifestations of conflicts ultimately appear between individuals. The personality of the members and especially the leaders of institutions matters that is why it may happen that between similar institutions there are conflicts in some places while in other places there is none. Yet I call these types of conflicts as institutional ones, as they derive from the institutional features.

2. Level: Conflicts between institutions and individuals.

3. Level: Conflicts between individuals.

Research methodology

The study is based on a number of sources. Since 2009 I have been participating in the life and projects of several Gypsy settlements and communities thus I have a lot of information as a participant observer. I conducted several research projects on Gypsies (on religiosity, Gypsy pastoration, community development, civil society) which also gave me insight and information on our present topic.

During 2017–2018 I sent online questionnaires on social conflicts to all mayor's offices in BAZ and Nógrád counties. Only 13 responses were given from the 600 requested settlements, so I will not analyze the results in details, but I will refer to them sometimes.

During 2018–2019 surveys with questionnaires were conducted on social conflicts in several settlements of BAZ county (Fulókércs, Ózd, Sátoraljaújhely, Pácin, Bükkszentkereszt, Kistokaj, Miskolc).

In 2018 I conducted interviews regarding social conflicts in Fulókércs.

Situation of Romani People in Hungary

At present the number of Gypsies in Hungary is 876 000 according to a research by the University of Debrecen, and it is a credible estimation that 13% of the Hungarian children's population is of Romani origin. (Pénzes et al 2018.)

Being a Gypsy person does not equal living in deep poverty. Havas (2008) estimated that less than half but more than a third of the Hungarian Gypsies live in deep poverty and the same is true for the rate of Gypsies among the extremely poor people. According to the KSH (the Central Hungarian Statistical Office) three quarters of the Gypsies lived at risk of poverty and social exclusion in 2018 and 55.5% of Gypsy children were living in severe material deprivation. (KSH 2019.)

Poverty, bad living and health conditions, low level of education and labor market status and the intergenerational inheritance of these factors are connected in a vicious circle.

Many Gypsies in Hungary are affected by residential and school segregation.

The TÁRKI Social Research Institute reported in 2005 that in 29 per cent of settlements there was a neighborhood where a disproportionately large number of the Gypsy population lived. Nearly the same proportion of settlements (27 per cent) had segregated those of low incomes. The TÁRKI found that the proportion of settlements with tense relations between Gypsy and non-Gypsy population is the highest in Northern Hungary and the Northern Great Plain (36 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively) and the lowest in Central and Western Danubia (16-16 per cent). The incidence of conflict between Gypsy and non-Gypsy population depends on the size of the settlements and also on the relative size of the Gypsy population. The incidence of conflicts increases as the settlements increase in size and where the proportion of Gypsy population was more than 25. In such cases the incidence of ethnic tensions was 53%. (Kopasz 2004.)

Pap Z. analyzed school segregation in 2011 based on the data of the Hungarian national competency measurements. He found that in 15% of schools the percentage of Gypsy children was over 40%, in 10% of schools it was more than 50%. The competency results showed that when the proportion of Gypsy students rose above 10% the average school performance began to decrease. (2011.) Educational segregation is not the sole cause of Gypsy children's early school leaving and low level of education, but it is one reason for that.

Hajdú et al. conducted a research regarding the school career of Gypsy children. According to their results:

- 6,97% of Gypsy children do not finish primary school
- 4,39% do not enroll in secondary or Vocational Education Training (VET) school
- 42,35% drop out from secondary or VET schools and 24,69% obtain vocational school qualification
- 21,59% pass leaving exams and complete secondary school
- 4,21% start higher education. (Hajdú et al. 2014.)

Another important issue regarding the situation of the Gypsies in Hungary is the question of criminality. In the majority of the society an extremely strong fear of crime is connected to this group of people. There is a presumption that the majority of the prison inmates are of Gypsy origin and also – as we mentioned before – criminality is in the blood of the Gypsies. There are three main theories regarding the causes of the criminality of these people. One of them states that crime is an integral part of their hundreds of year-old way of life, a kind of cultural heritage. According to the second theory the causes of crimes lie in poverty, while the third one supposes that the overrepresentation of Gypsies among criminals is a negative side effect of the modernization process (Feith 2012, Póczik 2000 and Póczik 2003.).

In Hungary during criminal proceedings it is prohibited to keep a record of one's ethnicity so in order to get detailed information I will turn to the results of a survey conducted in the prison of Vác in 1998–1999. 41,5% of the inmates was of Gypsy origin and 15% assimilated i.e. he had Gypsy relatives. Gypsy criminals are indeed overrepresented in the penal institutions. This figure supports the idea that although prejudice is mainly a bunch of stereotypes it is often based on experience. A typical feature of the Gypsy criminals compared to their Hungarian counterparts was that financial reasons and livelihood played a bigger role in committing the first crime (57,9% vs. 44,2%) and rage crime was less significant (33,3% vs. 49,2%). 32,7 % of the Gypsy criminals came from criminal family background. (Póczik 2000 and Póczik 2003.)

We can conclude from these data that various reasons lead to becoming a criminal in case of Gypsies. Gypsy criminals coming from criminal families are an example of the cultural heritage while poverty as a source of criminality is an explanation of the crime committed for livelihood. In both cases it must be emphasized that the connection is not deterministic since not every Gypsy person coming from a poor or criminal family will become a criminal.

Apart from that, the research has provided evidence for the theory of victim-criminal circulation. A significant percentage of the Gypsy convicts was a victim (almost 30%) or was forced to commit a crime (13%) at an early age. (Póczik 2000 and Póczik 2003.)

In a criminological sense it is also relevant to note that Gypsies are the victims of discriminative practices during prosecution and police procedures.

The visibility of the successful Gypsy intelligentsia could have a role in reduction of negative attitudes. There is some expectation to restrict them to be the advocacy of the Gypsy cause, but this role is rejected by many of them who lose their Gypsy identity or at least become uncertain regarding it. (Tóth 2007.)

Conflicts at Institutional Level Politics

Not many people of Gypsy origin have managed to join country level politics. Although some Gypsy parties have been created like Magyarországi Cigányszervezetek Fóruma Roma Összefogás Párt, Magyarországi Cigánypárt, Magyarországi Cigányok Szolidaritási Párt, they have never managed to get a mandate. Gypsy politicians typically got a parliamentary seat on other party lists, e.g. Péli Tamás – MSZP, Horváth Aladár – SZDSZ, Farkas Flórián, Járóka Livia, Berényi László, Varga József – Fidesz, Osztolykán Ágnes – LMP, but even their number is low. The low number of Gypsy MPs is partly due to the electoral system. A Gypsy candidate could get an individual mandate only if they managed to mobilize non Gypsy voters too. At the same time the Gypsy voters themselves distrust the Gypsy candidates. This tendency can be observed not only at national elections but also at the municipal elections in case of Gypsy candidates for mayors. Both in national politics and at municipal elections – especially in regions dominated by Gypsy inhabitants – the candidates' and parties' plans and attitudes to Gypsies have a significant role in making election decisions. Programs aiming at the integration of Romani people or related to the Roma often generate conflicts locally. For instance in 2012 three cities – Miskolc, Ózd and Sárospatak – all gave up the plans to establish a Romani centre of science and culture, which would have been financed from EU funds, as a result of the pressure and protests of the local people and the opposition parties.

Gypsies as potential voters are also something to count with. There are many ways to gain their votes. One of them, which is extremely problematic is to buy their votes. There are four types of clientelism in Hungary: vote buying, the provision of public benefits in exchange for votes, coercion through threatening, receipt of benefits, and economic coercion involving threats from non-state actors, such as money lenders and employers. Mares and Young ran surveys in 93 villages in three Hungarian counties and found that 5–7% of respondents had experience done of the four clientelism strategies (a similar result to the case of Argentina). (Mares 2019.)

The party controls the mayors – with promises of financial resources to the settlement and threats of denying these resources- and the mayors in turn control the distribution of benefits and secure the „right” votes. This dynamics among other things contributed to the success of Fidesz, which has had the third victory in a row. (Mares 2009.) However, the majority of those living in deep poverty do not only vote for the currently governing party because of these mechanisms. They are satisfied with Fidesz as they introduced an extensive community work program and they incite the whole society against the immigrants. This latter means that the Gypsies are no longer the social outcast (at least not the only one) but the immigrants.

The Gypsy voters have less room for political maneuvering, it is restricted by the fear from the right wing parties (presently Jobbik) and they would not vote for them by any means. There are racist paramilitary organizations related to the right wing parties like Nemzeti Légió, Új Magyar Gárda, Nemzeti Gárda, Véderő, Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület, Betyársereg and they are active in the country though the first one the Magyar Gárda Mozgalom with the Magyar Gárda Hagyományőrző és Kulturális Egyesület better

known as Magyar Gárda was disbanded in 2009. This organization was responsible for organizing anti Gypsy protests and movements.

Most of the Gypsies are typically indifferent to politics. They are more interested in the elections of local governments, where several Gypsy candidates compete. There are heated campaigns, many times accompanied by anonymous denunciations against the candidates for various reasons. Local elections are not exempt from vote buying either, which can happen through money, donations, the promise of social benefits or community work or threats of withdrawing these or simply by organizing a party.

It is a typical feature of the Gypsy society as Szuhay pointed out that Roma groups are separated along the lines of occupation, lifestyle, financial status, kinship and geography. (Szuhay 2002.) It is typical even today that Gypsies are settled in clan-like groups (Gypsies do not call it this way, moreover they do not even have an expression to describe it), which have an informal leader: the strongest, cleverest, most respectable person. A candidate may find it worthwhile to get the support of the clan leader and then the members will vote for him, too.

At the municipal elections Gypsy candidates are an interesting issue. As I have mentioned above, it is relatively difficult for a Gypsy candidate to win if there is a non Gypsy candidate, as well. The reason for this is distrust in the Gypsy candidate. If more Gypsy candidates run for the position of mayor the problem is the division among the clans and the lack of cooperation, which usually lead to the victory of the non Gypsy candidate. However, there are many Gypsy people among the municipal councilors. Especially in villages with Gypsy dominance the majority of the councilors or even the total number of them may be of Romani origin.

The Hungarian legal system has a special institution, the minority self-governments (MSG), which was introduced in 1993 by the law on minorities. MSGs consist of elected representatives of the minorities. They have right for common decision-making with the local government. It means that, for example in the case of the Gypsies, the Roma minority self-government (RMSG) has to be asked before a decision affecting the life of Gypsies is made. The typical activity of the RMSGs throughout the country is organizing cultural events, however according to the laws and the tender documents they could be involved in several types of activities, like work creation, educational and social service programs.

There is usually tension between the representatives of the RMSGs and the mayor of the given settlements either because the mayor does not do anything or does not do enough for the Gypsies or because he does not do it in the right way. For instance in Miskolc the RMSG fiercely criticized the complex planned colony program as it did not aim the elimination of the colony but the improvement of the quality of life for the inhabitants.

Politics in Fulókércs

The Gypsies in Fulókércs are similar to other Gypsies in terms of their attitude to politics. They are quite passive concerning the national politics. „Here people do not politicize...” (Extract from an interview.) They are also afraid of the right-wing parties. At the time of

the latest election (2018) everybody in the settlement voted for Fidesz. One reason for this is the government's propaganda to induce fear and prejudices against the immigrants. „Everyone voted for Fidesz, because we are afraid of the immigrants.” (Extract from an interview.) The other thing is that over the past couple of years quite a lot of grant money landed in the settlement. There is a well working community work program, the standard of living has improved so people are satisfied. „If we got help from one side, we would support it.” (Extract from the interview.)

It is unique in the settlement that at the latest municipal election (2014) they managed to elect a Gypsy mayor. It can be explained by the fact that the current mayor was a successful leader of a civil organization. He could help the Romani people with essential issues like getting the heating fuels, cultivating the gardens, creating a workplace, organizing development programs and free time activities. These made him popular. Another important step was that before running for the title he convened a village meeting and asked for the people's opinion about his candidature and raised the issue that people should decide in the beginning who should be the challenger of the old mayor from among the Gypsies. (At the previous elections more Gypsy candidates ran for the elections unsuccessfully.)

Another unique issue is that all the members of the RMSG are women, the relatives of the mayor and the local councilors so the collaboration between the big and small local government lacks conflicts. This kinship does not refer to nepotism but derives from the fact that among the Gypsy community almost everybody has a kinship tie to everybody else. (It is shown by the fact that 90% of the inhabitants have the surname of Mata, Putnoki or Dávid.)

Conflicts between Institutions

The responders to the online questionnaires sent to the local governments as part of my research reported that there was no or very low level conflicts between the institutions. An example of the conflicts mentioned is when an event organized by the institutions did not come through but it boiled down to the lack of communication.

The interviewees in Fulókércs mentioned a conflict between the mayor and the school from the time when local governments ran the schools. Such conflicts occurred in other settlements as well and were over financial matters.

In 2013 the schools that used to be operated by the local governments were taken over by the state and brought under the control of a centralized institution, the KLIK (Klebensberg Intézményfenntartó Központ) The schools that had conflicts with the mayor were happy about the change, however, in other places new conflicts were reported. The conflict this time was between the KLIK and the schools and it was reflected at the micro level between the headmaster and the teachers. In most places the headmaster becomes the executor of the maintainer's will. The situation has reached the point when the teachers did not dare to give an interview so there is no reliable information on the improvement of the situation.

This issue is not specifically a Gypsy issue neither is corruption. According to the report of Transparency International the corruption perception index was 50 (2015), in

Hungary, which is the 22nd-24th worst position in the EU. Corruption, on the one hand, generates conflicts between corrupt and not corrupt players, and, on the other hand, it leads to a loss of efficiency, waste of resources and also contaminates public life, relationship between people and general trust. Corruption is perceived in Fulókercs, as well, which is perfectly illustrated by the following extract from an interview: „From that point all the development sources are cut, if you do not have connections, you will die, if you do not have a friend, you will die.”

For the Romani people the most outstanding institutional conflicts, which directly affect their lives are those between Gypsy civil organizations.

Following the change of regime, for Gypsies the way for self-help and asserting their interest was – apart from being a local councilor – to found and run civil organizations. Gypsies could have access to the opening national and EU supporting funds only as civil organizations. Several development programs had the objective to encourage and support such civil organizations. At first, mainly associations were founded but later social cooperatives were also established in great numbers. This latter is an institution of the social economy and can equally be regarded as the player of civil society, social and economic sphere.

One of the first organizations was the Phralipe, which was set up in 1989 as a result of a fight for asserting their interest. This is an umbrella organisation and later its member organizations sprang up in several settlements. Similar organizations are the MCDSZ established in 1989 or the Lungo Drom from 1990. Following the millennium the active Romani people formed rather smaller, independent civil organizations. The fever to establish civil organization is well demonstrated by the fact that there is a settlement in BAZ county with a population of 1000 mostly Gypsy people, where there are thirteen associations and two social cooperatives. The truth is that the majority of them are not active any more.

What kinds of conflicts arise during the operation of Gypsy civil organizations?

1. The question of „Whose Gypsy is it”?

Many of my Gypsy interviewees referred to the tendency in the early 90s that a non-Gypsy intellectual helped, mentored and guided a given Gypsy community. It was typical that these non-Gypsy Hungarians did not like when their Gypsies established rapport with other helpers. It also occurred that some donor organizations expected that their partners did not cooperate with other organizations. With the expansion of funds this phenomenon ceased to exist.

The phenomenon of „Whose Gypsy is it” appeared also in politics and continued to persist. In this case a leader of a Gypsy civil society organization made an alliance with a political party. The Gypsy leader delivered the proposal coupons and ballots and in exchange he expected access to resources. As long as the governing parties took turn in power it was worth maintaining this relationship. Now however, the common practice is the connection to Fidesz. There are some committed and politically neutral civil organization leaders left.

2. Unlawful operation, unlawful use of resources

Unlawful operation and unlawful use of resources were typical of many Gypsy organizations especially in the beginning. The reason for this was sometimes the lack of competence or knowledge but sometimes it was intentional. However, these cases started to decrease partly due to the inspections and the subsequent sanctions and partly as a result of a learning curve. Many organizations ceased to exist. Others learnt to be clever in both senses: clever in a way that they create values and clever in juggling with the rules and oversmarming the authorities. The long term negative consequences include the erosion of trust in the civil society as well as the wasteful handling of resources that could have been utilized better. This problem again does not arise only at Gypsy organizations but at other civil organizations as well.

3. Rivalry among Gypsy organizations

The rivalry between the civil organizations boils down to the fact that they compete for the same resources. This is a general, not a Gypsy specific phenomenon. What is however, a characteristic of the Gypsy organizations especially in smaller settlement are the envy, adverse rumors, gossip and denouncements accompanying the rivalry. A further bone of contention can be how much the Gypsy organizations themselves screen who they are willing to help. It is rare to find an organization which does not concentrate exclusively on the members of their own clan. Typically the management of the organization is made up of the clan members. This attitude is the natural derivative of human nature, especially when we talk about groups that are short on resources. It is even more interesting that there are organizations that try their best to cooperate with everybody turning to them.

Civil organizations in Fulókércs

In the settlement of Fulókércs with a population of 400 people 7 civil organizations have been founded since 1989 including a foundation and a social cooperative. In the region several donor organizations have been active like Autonomy Foundation, Netherlands Foundation, Soros Foundation, For the Hungarian Gypsies Foundation (Magyarországi Cigányokért Közalapítvány) and there have been many programs aiming at the Gypsy integration, such as UNDP Cserehát 2005–2007, Recovery Program for the Most Underdeveloped Regions 2008–2013, Community Recovery Program for the Integration of People Living in Deep Poverty 2012–2014, Children's Aid Program 2013–2015, Carpathian Euro Region Foundation „Breakout from Cruelty” program.

The first two organizations are connected to the same activist, their activity was accompanied by a lot of irregularities and conflicts. (Barát 2003.)

The foundation created after districts (Többet Együtt Egymásért Roma Alapítvány) was operated more carefully trying to avoid the errors of its predecessors. The foundation was created thanks to Kees Bakker and the Netherland Foundation. The assessment of these players in the region is ambiguous. They distributed aids, supported initiatives, bought houses and land to the Gypsies – all this without a strict control. However, they played a crucial role in the strengthening of the civil society in Fulókércs. Kees made good friends with Zorró, the current Gypsy mayor. Part of the activity done by the

foundation belonged to the sphere of social economy, that's why they created the social cooperative (Együtt Egymásért Kegyetlen Térségi Szociális Szövetkezet). Thus the foundation can concentrate on helping the children to catch up, nurturing their talent and community programs. While the social cooperative, the core activity of which is forestry management can focus on creating employment and arranging the heating fuel for winter. In the meantime another association was created but because of the red tape that aggravated the functioning of associations and the fact that the foundation did a great job this association terminated its activity and dedicated its resources to the foundation. The secret of the successful organizations in Fülökércs lies in the character traits of their leader. Zorro is an ethical, intelligent and friendly person. He strives to follow the rules and can make friends and establish rapport easily and tries to avoid conflicts.

Conflicts between institutions and individuals

In general

Child welfare system

Gypsies living in slums and deep poverty will inherently come across the child welfare system. In many places the relationship between the clients and the social workers is tense. The advice given by the professionals is often taken as an attack and the situation can be extremely nasty if the authorities take actions or children are removed from the family. The presence and intensity of conflicts depend on the settlement and the personality. Generally speaking Gypsy children are overrepresented in the child welfare system as well as among the poverty stricken people. There is a broad definition of endangerment and its application which results in children being removed from their families for material reasons, though this is banned by law. There are territorial differences within the country in the reasons for taking the children out of their families. Romani children appear to be removed more frequently from their families for material reasons than non-Romani children. (ERRC 2007.)

Rarely a controversial removal of a child or series of removals lead to litigation. In Kesznyéten the TASZ (Társaság a Szabadságjogokért) made a complaint and even undertook the legal representation in a lawsuit in 2014. In 2017 the Centre of European Romani Rights (ERRC) started legal proceedings against the EMMI. The reason for this latter case is that according to the research done by the ERRC the child welfare institutions of Nógrád county controlled by the ministry remove the children from their families because of the parents' social origin or financial situation. (Prókai 2016 2019 and Szurovecz 2015.)

Verbal atrocities against social workers working in child protection are quite common. Not long ago in a tragic case a social worker even died, when a (non-Gypsy) person attacked him in Inárcs in 2018. According to the chairman of the National Association of the Hungarian Family Counselling and Child Welfare Services social workers are not trained to handle crisis situations. Others think (many interviewees of mine) that the social workers in trouble probably do not keep the protocol.

The social workers and case managers are in a very difficult situation. They are overladen, threatened and often burnt out lacking the means to do something. A typical reaction to this situation is that they use a defensive risk culture, they try to avoid confrontations and they do not notice the signs of a child being in danger. At the same time they are very fussy when it comes to administration and they do these tasks painstakingly. (Kozma 2019.) In that way they can avoid conflicts but this attitude does not offer a solution to the situation of the children.

The police

The relationship between Gypsies and the police bears resemblance to the relationship between Gypsies and social workers. The police does its job – sometimes not without bias – and the Gypsies take it as harassment from the authorities. One typical manifestation of this relationship is when the police officer imposes fine on the cyclists. On the one hand, it is a fact that there is no ring on the bike but the 30 thousand forint fine imposed for this may constitute the whole monthly income of the person concerned (if the income is social benefit). In order to pay this fine they have to turn to a loan shark or serve the time in prison because the unpaid fines can be redeemed with prison sentence. What is more, the police does not fine non-Gypsy people in a similar case, the officers turn a blind eye to it. Recently the Authority of Equal Treatment dealt with the case of a policemen in Nógrád, who fined 35 Gypsy people out of 36 cases. Although infringement was not established the policemen were sent to sensitivity training.

The Hungarian Helsinki Committee has investigated many cases and initiated legal proceedings e.g. in the case when a Gypsy from Baranya under coercive interrogation admitted the stealing of wood even though he did not commit the crime. (He won the lawsuit at the European Court of Human Rights.)

The educational system

The conflicts that arise in the institutions of the public education happen at a personal level but if they occur they are quite typical and are tied to certain characteristics of the educational institutions.

Regarding the education of Gypsy children teachers consider the following difficulties in general: problems with conduct and assimilation, lack of motivation, lack of ability, absenteeism, no practicing at home, lack of parental support and insufficient school supplies. (Nagy 2002.) The problematic Gypsy parents do not cooperate, they are not active, they go to the school only if they are very angry, they interpret the problem in a different way and take it as an offence against minorities, they rather sympathize with their own children and they are very sensitive to genuine or suspected offences and they do not possess the behavioral patterns of the middle class. (Liskó 2001.)

As a result teachers cannot teach according to their own expectations and the failure will lead to frustration or burnout. Despite this they do not leave this career not seeing other possibilities. The reaction of the school to the parental aggression is sometimes aggressive, too e.g. excluding the parents or employing a security guard.

The strongest grievance of Gypsy parents and students is that the teachers have prejudices and are racist and they show favoritism. Gypsy parents have the feeling in a mixed class that teachers tend to favor non-Gypsy children or, if it is a purely Gypsy class, then certain Gypsy children. Teachers teaching Gypsy children often become prejudiced during their career. Children immediately sense this and react with resistance and rejection. A typical conflict situation concerning Romani children is when the school has in-house segregation i.e. they create specialized and totally Gypsy classes. Most of the Gypsy children tend to avoid specialized classes but in case they apply and are not admitted there is a strong suspicion of discrimination. It is a well-grounded suspicion which is supported by the legal cases won by the Association of Romani Women of Public Life in Bódva Valley. (See Dánielné 2018.)

Conflicts between children naturally occur in non-gypsy schools between non-Gypsy children as well. Bullying is an extensive problem (see Czövek 2019), but loud quarrels and stand up fights are typical between Romani children. Children bring the tension and the ways of conflict resolution from home to the school. The challenge for the teachers is to prevent and solve the conflicts of the frustrated children, who do not have clues of solving them in a non-violent way.

Physical violence applied by teachers is a serious question as well. Officially corporal punishment is prohibited but it still occurs in some cases. This is not always taken badly by the Gypsy children or parents especially if the teacher has the reputation of being fair and respected. Sometimes parents themselves authorize the teacher to beat the children. In other cases corporal punishment is resented by the parents. The consequences are various: some put up with it, others go to the school to make a complaint or start legal proceedings. In extreme cases they may turn to physical violence. The reasons for problems and conflicts at school may be summarized as follows: Typically children living in deep poverty are linguistically disadvantaged (Hungarian vocabulary), shortcomings in the subject, hygienic problems, lack of motivation, difficulty in adapting to the rules of the school. Besides, Gypsy children grow up soon, they are treated as adults, they share the household chores and they become sexually mature early. (Liskó 2001.)

Generally there are fewer problems with Gypsy children in the junior section of the primary schools. They make efforts, are motivated and are quite attached emotionally to their teachers. It is the senior years when more serious problems appear since they are treated as adults at home while at school they are in a subordinate position. (Liskó 2001.) The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that outside the school children do not come across the patterns of middle class behavior. Teachers always complain that what they achieved during the week is destroyed in the course of one weekend so they have to start everything from scratches.

Over time changes occurred concerning the education of Gypsy children which resulted in an increased number of conflicts. Teaching used to be an authoritarian, male dominated profession so parents accepted the traditional subordinate relationship. As the respect of the profession decreased and in parallel became female dominated Gypsy parents became uncertain about accepting the relationship of subordination. (Liskó 2001.)

The recent changes in the law bound the eligibility to social benefit to the schooling of the children. Consequently, the majority of Gypsy children go to school today and they finish primary school. Previously the children of problematic families used to go to school only for 2-3 years so the school quickly „got rid of” these children but now these kids remain in the system so it became more difficult to teach the others. (Liskó 2001.)

In settlements inhabited by Gypsies the schools can become segregated quickly. Teachers who did not choose this profession themselves but do it out of existential constraints teach the Gypsy children. (Liskó 2001.) Probably they are not prepared for the challenge methodologically, either, although the opportunity to make up for this shortcoming exists for them. In many cases the methodology is renewed and according to the interviewees the methodology of the teachers dealing with Gypsy children successfully is the most modern, their classes are playful and full of experiences.

Teachers of Gypsy children say that most of the conflicts can be prevented by keeping some simple rules:

- there should be fairness, consistency, strictness but love and humor in the relationship to children
- respectful way of speaking to the parents that can calm them even if they come in shouting

Apart from these, there is a range of different ideas that are successful in gaining the trust of Gypsy children and parents. The topic of the present paper does not allow me to give a detailed account of these.

Public work

The first workfare programs started right after the change of regime in Hungary. Over time they have become more widespread and the main form of handling unemployment in the most underprivileged layers of society.

After the change of regime (1989) certain economic sectors were hit harder by the crisis, especially those in which low.-skilled employees, and Gypsies in a large number, found full time employment. On a national average 30 percent of the workplaces were lost while 55 percent of the Gypsies’ jobs had disappeared by 1993. (Kertesi 2000.) The situation has not improved a lot for two decades and the new generations of Gypsy children have grown up not seeing their parents working, so they weren’t socialized to work. Apart from providing a low but regular income workfare programs have the purpose of making people suitable for the labor market, socializing them to work and making them accustomed to regularity. It is important that people do not get a social benefit but are expected to make efforts.

The downside of workfare program among other things, is for instance that it caused the weak local labor market to shrink. Several things were solved through this program, like the renovation of municipal buildings. It was worth using public workers to fulfill certain positions because the wage did not have to be paid from the budget of the given institution. Another negative side effect was that it became a valid ambition for many children with multiple disadvantages to become a public worker.

At first, these people did typical community work like road maintenance or improving the landscape of the settlement, later as part of the value creation concept they dealt with cultivating plants and breeding animals or making simple products or even implementing smaller projects like refurbishing the local institutions.

The wage for public work is lower than the minimum wage. This is a source of conflict as it is not considered to be a decent job. The wage for those positions that require skilled workers is slightly higher but is still under the minimum wage. Sometimes it gives rise to conflicts because simple public workers do not want to do the tasks of a skilled worker. At first the central budget employed really few public workers and the programs were administered by the mayor. This time the source of the conflict was the decision of who will be hired as a public worker. In certain places the intention was to employ at least one person of working age per family. In other places workfare programs became means to build the political clientele. Later the workfare programs extended (the highest number of public workers was in 2016: 193 800 people) and the scope of potential employers expanded to the local governments civil organizations, churches and social cooperatives. Another source of conflict is the situation when someone is regularly absent or comes to work drunk and it leads to termination. It also generates resentment. Sometimes it is the worker who hands in his notice if he finds the work tiring. The disgruntled ex-public workers and the rival institutions (who could be potential employers but their programs are not so successful either) keep denouncing the running programs.

Today because of the changes in the labor market i.e. in many sectors there is a shortage of labor even the unqualified Gypsy people can find job if they want. (Although they sometimes have to travel for hours to the factories of the region or go away to the other part of the country for days or weeks.). At the moment mainly those people will become public workers who are absolutely unsuitable for a job in the primary labor market because of their physical or mental conditions. The challenge is to find a task which the employer can assign them to do.

In Fulókércs

In Fulókércs a few children are taken into protective custody (senior section or secondary school children) due to school absence and not negligence or abuse. These cases do not generate conflicts between social workers and families. The relationship with the police is the same as in other areas inhabited by Gypsies. Police activity is considered to be a harassment of the authority and smaller conflicts occur on a weekly basis, mainly because of fines that people regard unfair.

At the local school there is only a junior section, children of the first 4 grades study together in one classroom in a daycare system. Two teachers and a local pedagogical assistant of Gypsy origin work with the children. Children like the school, which is proved by the fact that there is no absenteeism, what is more children want to go to school even if they are sick. This fortunate situation can be explained by many things. As I mentioned above there are fewer problems with elementary school children, they are more motivated and enthusiastic. Secondly, one of the pedagogues is a man, who taught even the parents of the children so he is respected and his authority is accepted. Both

teachers have a rich toolkit of methods and the assistant is also a talented and agile Gypsy woman. The daycare system seems to be a good solution: there is no problem with the equipment since everything is inside the school, children do not have to do homework, lessons and playtime alternate, which helps to keep up the kids' attention. The ex-schoolmistress (now a pensioner but an inhabitant of the settlement) makes mention of smaller conflicts e.g. certain parents feel that the teachers show favoritism towards certain families and children. She also finds fault with the children's behavior outside the school.

The workfare programs in Fulókércs are very successful. In 2018 69 public workers worked in the village, which equals to 29,55% of the working age population (true that sometimes public workers from other settlements come over here to work.) They have a big animal farm where they breed pigs, sheep, cows and chicken. The women grow the annual quantity of vegetables (organically) in the framework of workfare programs and the village dwellers can get some if they need them. The men handle and maintain the machines. The women have a pasta factory and they preserve part of the crop for winter. Despite this the mayor has a negative view on the public work program partly because they earn a low salary: „We consider public work ridiculous. But we need to give work and income to the people. The wage is low so in this sense it is just the lengthening of social subsidy.” (Extract from the interview.) Another other issue is that the local entrepreneurs find it hard to compete with the public employers for the labor force. Although the salary is not high it is still a stable income and they do not have to work too much for that. It is a convenient solution, which makes you convenient as well. „Situation of enterprises is harder. We cannot compete with paid idleness.” (Extract from the interview.)

In Fulókércs denouncing the workfare programs is quite frequent so are the subsequent inspections, which usually have positive results, what is more they are praised. A lot of men who found a job in the primary labor market were afraid that the mayor will hold grudges against them because of leaving the program but their fears turned out to be unfounded. The local government even helps them by providing transportation by the village bus to the neighboring village from where they can take the bus to the Bosch factory in Miskolc. „Their financial situation is much better and the families are so happy about it. Many thought that I would hold grudges against them if they went to work for Bosch. I will be angry only if they do not perform well. Even in this case I would not beat them or drive them away but would hire them again to the workfare program so that they could make ends meet.” (Extract from the interview.) Today few men work in the village and all the women are in the workfare program. We do not like if our women go to work to other places”. (Extract from the interview.)

Conflicts between individuals: Gypsies and non-Gypsies

In general

Settlements inhabited by Gypsies are often scenes of educational and residential segregations. They stem either from the persistence of the situations of the past or develop as a new phenomenon as part of a gypsyfication process. When the number of Gypsy children begins to grow in a school or the number of Gypsy residents in an area

the phenomenon of white flight appears i.e. non-Gypsy children are enrolled to another school and the non Gypsy residents tend to move away.

I have already talked about the schools and now I would like to continue with talking about the slums. Inhuman living conditions, lack of hygiene of the houses and the body, lack of services, roads, etc. are typical of the slums. (Interestingly enough not every house is dilapidated but the majority is.) Non-Gypsies do not want to see slums and meet people living there, while slum dwellers want better living conditions. From time to time there are initiatives to eliminate the slums or improve the living conditions there but they usually generate conflicts. If the aim is to improve the condition of living, the Gypsy right activists protest saying that it is not improvement that they need but total elimination. If they eliminate the slums and consequently non-Gypsy people may get Gypsy neighbors it leads to the resentment of the non-Gypsy inhabitants. In many cases the new Gypsy residents do not feel comfortable in this new situation as they are far away from their well-known environment. The non-Gypsy inhabitants would prefer the Gypsies to move to another settlement. In Miskolc and some neighboring settlements there were some attempts (later proved to be illegal) to give money to the ex-owners of the eliminated houses to leave on the condition that they can buy a house only in a different settlement. (See Havasi 2018.)

The following typical cases belong to minor conflicts of everyday cohabitation:

In villages when Gypsy families manage to buy a house in the centre of the settlement outside the slum they cannot properly preserve and maintain the property and they soon destroy it and the neglected, dilapidated building disturbs the neighbors.

In a housing estate people are often disturbed by the fact that large Gypsy families live next door. These cases generate hostility and latent tension but do not reach the point of actual rows. Loud music, singing and frequent parties often cause problems to the majority of the society. (Similar problems may occur when the neighbors are young, non-gypsy university students) In these situations verbal aggression and police intervention are more frequent.

A frequent source of conflicts is the typical Gypsy behavior, louder voice and bigger impulsivity especially in hospitals and other public institutions. On the public transport or in the street non-Gypsy people often mumble remarks against the Gypsies' behavior, which can cause verbal arguments. It also happens that the bus drivers or ticket inspectors talk to the Gypsy passengers loudly and disrespectfully, they do not open the rear door to the Gypsy women with a pram.

Gypsy youngsters in a group often provoke non-Gypsy young people who are alone picking a quarrel with them. Often they do not exceed the limit of verbal atrocities but there are cases of physical violence as well. Smaller or bigger thefts, cutting wood (for heating) are also common problems mainly in the countryside. The severity and frequency of these vary from village to village. In the worst case people stop farming the land or cultivating the gardens because the crop will be stolen anyway. In certain places houses cannot be left unattended because they would be burgled immediately. Both Gypsy and non-Gypsy owners are victims of burglaries.

There are robberies committed by Gypsies, which are quite rare but if they occur they leave a deep mark in the collective consciousness of the majority society. Some end in serious assault or even homicide.

In the country there are several cases of negative discrimination, which cause conflicts especially in the area of employment, distribution of goods and service providing. The victims of discrimination sometimes accept it and let it go, sometimes they quarrel but others turn to organizations of advocacy. These organizations typically give advice or do strategic litigation. TASZ used to have TASZ points in Gypsy inhabited settlements, where voluntary lawyers gave free legal counseling through the Internet and sometimes they provided legal representation. The National Ethnic Minority Advocacy Agency investigates and tests the discrimination cases they provide legal aid services and do strategic litigations. (See Udvari-Iványi 2010.) As far as educational discrimination is concerned the most active plaintiff in the country is Chance for the Disadvantaged Children Foundation. (See: www.cfcf.hu.)

In Fulókercs

The previously mentioned conflicts between Gypsies and non-Gypsies used to cause problems in Fulókercs as well but today they do not or do it only to a smaller extent (e.g. theft from gardens or cutting trees). The reason for this is that today almost everybody takes care of their own gardens (as a result of the agricultural programs that have been running for years) and people can get access to vegetables grown in the framework of workfare programs. A solution was offered to tackle the problem of fuel by the social cooperative, although since this cooperative is not active it has not been used. The financial situation of the locals has improved and the local government helps the poorest one with their heating fuel. Although there are still dilapidated houses with residents of poor hygiene, these are much less frequent than in other Gypsy villages. Running water is available only at 60% of the houses but people manage the issue of washing and personal hygiene. The washing facility offered by the community house has been quite popular recently.

There is a peaceful cohabitation between Gypsies and non-Gypsies. A local non-Gypsy interviewee talks about it: „We have had several events where I was the only one with this hair... they respected me, looked upon me and obeyed. There is a mutual respect, acceptance and tolerance... I am convinced that if you grew up with people and spent long years with them you develop a different rapport. They do not dare to treat me like they do with a stranger. Gypsy and non-Gypsy children play together, go to school or study hall together and even build relationships. True they are as poor as the Gypsies.” The Central Statistical Agency defined half of the village as a slum but many non-Gypsy people – even the mayor – live in this area.

In the school all the children are Gypsies with the exception of an autistic boy, who commutes from another village. The reason for this is that there is only one non-Gypsy family with children of that age range but they were enrolled at the school of the neighboring village (where all kids will continue their education in their senior years). This was the only school where the autistic boy was received. The children are open and tolerant with him. The school used to have a blind boy and the teacher learnt the Braille

writing system for his sake. It is beneficial that a woman of Gypsy origin also works in the school. „The relationship with the parents is totally different because they accept the negative criticism from you, because they know that probably not everybody is racist and they also know that I am surely not racist because I am one of them. So communication is totally different.” (Extract from the interview.)

Regarding criminality there were 39 criminals from Fulókércs between 2013–2017 (theft, vandalism, fraud). This number in 2018 was zero. This is a much better result than that of Csenyété (136), which is a village nearby and has similar figures of the population (the number and the proportion of Gypsy people).

Conflicts between individuals – one Gypsy with the other

Conflicts that are general and typical of Fulókércs, too. The conflicts among Roma people are general, human conflicts. The differences, if there are any, are in regard of their intensity, frequency, process and way of handling them. A typical conflict is the debate around inheritance, continual quarrels between husband and wife (or common law partners) and in a more serious case domestic violence. Tension between neighbors can also be considered a general human conflict. The most common source of this latter are the dogs in the Gypsy inhabited areas. As there are no fences or they are in a very bad condition dogs enter the yard of other people and do harm to the animals there or simply the inhabitants are afraid of them on their way home. The outcome is usually verbal aggression but in rare cases they poison the neighbor's dog.

Gypsies like chatting and gossiping and sometimes they lie or exaggerate things, which may lead to quarrels. These are sometimes not intentional lies, they also believe that they say and I would call them „situative truth” e.g. „the working women twist the words of the mayor without any bad intention”. (Extract from the interview). Envy is also a general human character trait. „There is an envy between those who are a bit more ambitious, have a better standard of living, who stand out from the rest a little bit, who have a more educated behavior and those who are not able to follow suit. They are jealous and envious and hurt one another.” (Extract from an interview.) The results of the questionnaire based research in Fulókércs concluded that there are no sexual, religious, political, ethnic or workplace related conflicts but there are conflicts originating from economic difference, educational qualification and positions in the power structure. These three give rise to envy.

Conflicts among Gypsies, which are absent in Fulókércs

Smaller fights under the influence of alcohol between men often occur, which can be quite serious and end up in injuries or a prison sentence. According to an interviewee „these take place once or twice a month, especially when the social benefits or other money is paid out”. (Extract from an interview.)

Sometimes scuffles between drunk men occur in Fulókércs, nevertheless it has improved a lot recently. The Chief of Police even mentioned that the police have had fewer issues since the current mayor is in power. The change can be attributed to the fact that at parties the women are the security guards and the men listen to them. The

remark of another interviewee, however refers to the presence of brawls. „If the friendship is good it can tolerate a few slaps.” (Extract from an interview.)

Loan sharks (usury) is a very serious problem, which causes a lot of harm among Gypsies. They turn to the first loan shark typically because of an unexpected, bigger expenditure. Due to the high interest the debt becomes permanent and the sum gets higher and higher. Loan sharks have their own tricks to make the deal attractive even to those not in need. In accordance with the Hungarian law usury is a crime. The problem is that its existence is difficult to prove because of the fear people experience in relation to loan sharks. And even if a loan shark is put behind bars there will always be another family member, who takes over the business. The forms of usury also change.

At first it was typically lending money but nowadays they provide food, drink or other services. Even if loan sharks do not use physical violence, threatening is often enough to collect the debt. Usury often leads to the indebtedness and the total bankruptcy of families. In order to pay off the debts girls often turn to prostitution and boys end up committing crimes. However, it is also true that sometimes usury is the last resort, they have no other solutions. It has a high price, though. This may be one reason why in a strong and united community there are no loan sharks because people help one another in trouble.

Another cause for concern in Gypsy villages or city slums is that parts of the people (especially youngsters but often older people as well) become drug addicts. They obtain the drugs from dealers or through the internet. In order to get money drug addicts start to steal or commit even more serious crimes (homicide, serious assault) in their altered mental state although this latter is fortunately rare. In Fulókércs there are families who consume alcohol but there are no drug addicts. I assume this is due to the fact that for many years there have been regular community and recreational programs organized for young people as well as for the whole village. The community is united which has a preventive function, too.

Tension and hostility between native residents and newcomers are also frequent in settlements inhabited by Gypsies. Native inhabitants have a peaceful common past with the non-Gypsy residents of the settlements from the communist times, when somehow the integration of the Gypsies started (even if it was not fully successful) and people had a job. Of course this cohabitation has never been idyllic, Gypsies have always been despised and they could experience smaller or bigger signs of this. The newcomers often escape from something. They move house because of a bitter conflict or a broken career in the city. Newcomers arrive in Fulókércs only through marriage but otherwise they do not let strangers come in. If an intention for a house purchase emerges, an informal, common decision is made if the move is acceptable or not. Mostly it is not. Once they even petitioned against a planned house purchase.

Today there are no houses for sale, which is quite rare among the Hungarian villages.

Summary and conclusion

In this study I focused on the institutional level conflicts (election clientelism, anomalies around elections, tension, corruption, conflicts related to the activities of Gypsy civil organizations), conflicts in the relations between individuals and institutions (police, child protection, education system, workfare programs) as well as conflicts between individuals (Gypsy–Gypsy, or Gypsy–non-Gypsy). In regard of each topics I examined if the given conflict can be found in Fulókércs or not, and if not, what may be the explanation to this.

In the followings I would like to answer the question what the sources of the listed conflicts are, if they stem from the Gypsy characteristics, and how they can be avoided in the future.

In my opinion the source of the conflicts related to the Gypsies is mainly the social position of the Gypsies, their situation in life (poverty, lack of or low education, lack of social integration, and their consequences). It is the phenomenon of discrimination which is explicitly connected to Gypsyhood. There may be a unique Gypsy characteristic in handling conflicts e.g. the bigger than average scale of passion and impulsivity. However the source of the conflict is not the mere fact that the participant is a Gypsy, the conflict arises between the mainstream society and the individual not integrated into it since Gypsy people who are integrated in the society do not tend to behave like this. (Naturally everybody is different and we can find more impulsive people among the non-Gypsies as well.)

In modern societies the weakening and disappearance of communities (as described by Tönnies) have been going on for a long time but this phenomenon is less typical of the Gypsies except in mixed slums without real communities, which are characterized by anomie and normlessness.

The thesis of the 'culture of poverty' is a popular and frequently applied theory according to which people of the culture of poverty have a strong feeling of marginality, of helplessness, of dependency, of not belonging. They are like aliens in their own country, convinced that the existing institutions do not serve their interests and needs. Along with this feeling of powerlessness is a widespread feeling of inferiority, of personal unworthiness. They learn how to survive, but not how to emerge. (Lewis 1966.) Most scholars today reject the notion of an unchanging 'culture of poverty'. My argument is that this culture of poverty does exist but it is not unchanging and that this culture and its implications are mainly responsible for the conflicts arising in connection with the Gypsies in Hungary.

The good news is that the financial-cultural elevating and emerging of the Romani people (the two are often interrelated) would put an end to these conflicts. We must meet this challenge not sparing funds and we must start with increasing the quality of education. Currently eliminating the school segregation is not a viable option but there is no excuse to prevent the high quality teaching even in segregated schools.

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Emőke Horváth

The group of 'cuentapropistas' as a solution to curb social tension in Cuba today*

Abstract

The study examines a growing group of self-employed workers, *cuentapropistas* emerging in Cuba in 1993. The analysis is based on three types of sources: the annual reports of CEPAL (*Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe*, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) and the results of surveys on the issue of *cuentapropismo* (2017, 2018) and the data of the National Bureau of Statistics and Information of Cuba (*Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información*, ONEI). In my paper I analyze the characteristics of the *cuentapropismo* today, how political power relates to it and what additional directions the legislative changes are taking on the social phenomenon.

Keywords: cuentapropista, Cuba, Caribbean, Special Period, Raúl Castro

Introduction

The phenomenon of *cuentapropismo* (self-employed persons) has become a new form of employment in Cuba in 1993, which has led to a kind of explosion and nearly eroded the socio-economic framework of the society. Self-employed workers today represent a growing and often envied social group across the country. Although the social structure of the island is called socialist, the system of self-employment has been pervaded for over a quarter of a century. Comprehensive sociological analysis has not been conducted on this issue, despite the fact that both Cuban and foreign authors have dealt with certain aspects and stages of this social phenomenon. The data I used to analyze the question were basically derived from three sources. On the one hand, I worked on the annual reports of CEPAL (*Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe*; the results of surveys on the issue of *cuentapropismo* (2017, 2018) and data from the Cuban National Bureau of Statistics and Information (*Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información*, ONEI). The cited independent surveys were not conducted by Cuban institutions and may therefore be a good counterpoint to the official discourses. The first survey was conducted between 26 October and 15 November, 2017 under the professional guidance

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of the *North American Center for Insights in Survey Research* (CISR). This research focused specifically on the phenomenon of *cuentapropismo*. Another representative survey was carried out by *CubaData* project involving American and Mexican researchers, and 2287 Cuban interviewees. In the latter case, there was only one of the 22 questions that directly addressed the problem of self-employment, but the answer to two additional questions could also be included in the analysis.

The appearance of *cuentapropismo* and the early years

The *cuentapropismo* reappeared in Cuba after 1990, when the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc put the island state in an extremely difficult economic situation, first of all due to the cessation of the financial support of the socialist countries, the sudden loss of Soviet oil, the dissolution of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (PSCC) operated by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, the disappearance of secure markets and favorable prices. The period from 1990 was called *Período Especial* (Special Period) by Fidel Castro, they were the most difficult years lasting until 1994.¹ By this time, self-employment was only a distant memory for the Cuban population; it mainly characterized the service sector and was revived in this area as well, but not exclusively, during the socialist period. The harsh economic situation required the government to change the legislation and provide an appropriate framework for reform measures to assist the population. For these reasons, Fidel Castro, in his speech on the fortieth anniversary of the attack on the Moncada Barracks, addressed the issue of economic hardship at length on 26 July, 1993 (Fidel Castro 1993). According to him, the breakup of the Soviet Union put Cuba under a double blockade. Cuban imports amounting to 8 billion dollars in 1989 fell nearly a quarter, from 2 billion dollars to 236 million dollars in a year, whereas, due to the US embargo, imports came from the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc in the largest volume (Holgado Fernández 2000). Between 1989 and 1993, Cuban domestic production decreased by 35%, exports by 79% and imports by 75%. Soviet oil import was still 13.3 million tones in 1989, but dropped to almost a tenth by 1992, as only 1.8 million tones of oil came from Russia this year (the previous year, the Soviet Union disintegrated) (Gibbs 2011).

The troubles were crowned by the severe shortage of convertible currency, which was also brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, since from that time it was not possible to pay in rubles or other non-convertible currencies. Even this year, it was announced that more than 100 types of private sector employment would be licensed by the government and a new situation arose regarding the use of the dollar, as the dollar steady presence on the black market forced this economic move. In 1993, approximately \$ 200 million circulated through Cuban households on the black market, as Cubans living abroad regularly supported their relatives in the island country. The US currency allowed their relatives to buy essential foods in stores selling for hard currency (*Tiendas de Recuperación de Divisas*, TRD), called *chopin* by vernacular language (Holgado Fernández 2000). The Cuban government decriminalized the possession of the dollar

¹ See Sawyer 2006: in particular pages 102–154; Gibbs 2011: in particular pages 27–45; Mesa-Lago 1994; Nagy–Drexler 2017.

and regulated the exchange rate at a cost of 25 pesos for 1 US dollar (L. Scarpaci, Jr. 1995; Giles Tremlett 2004). By 1994, significant changes in the employment sector had taken place as a result of the changes in legislation. The number of employees in the public sector decreased by 24.6% while in the private sector it increased fivefold (*Figure 1*). According to the official reports, the number of *cuentapropistas* in 1996 was around 150,000, which was less than 2 percent of the total workforce at the time (*Figure 2*) (Scarpaci – Henken – Ritte 2016).

STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT BY SECTORS (IN PERCENTAGE)

SECTORS	1988	1994
State	94, 4	69, 8
Mixed	-	0, 6
Cooperative	1, 4	7, 8
Private (urban and rural)	4, 2	21, 8*

Figure 1. The figures also reflect estimates of unregistered independent workers.

Source: Mayra Espina – Lilia Núñez – Lucy Martin et al. «Impactos socioestructurales del reajuste económico», informe de investigación, CIPS, 1995. Quoted by: Lilia Nuñez Moreno: Más allá del cuentapropismo en Cuba. In Temas, no. 11, Julio–septiembre, 1997, 41–50, 42.

Another noteworthy phenomenon is the impressive advancement of cooperative ownership, which has increased to slightly more than fivefold compared to the years before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Initially, cooperatives were allowed to set up only to carry out agricultural activities. The UBPC (*Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativa*, Basic Cooperative Production Units) system (Law No. 142. 1993; Pérez Rojas & Echevarría León 2006) was set up in September 1993 and this reform made it possible for the government to overcome the severe supply difficulties. The law stipulated that cooperative production units are legal entities that hold land for an indefinite period of time, are the owners of the goods produced and have the right to sell their crops to the state through a company or according to their discretion. The land which was less than half a hectare in size and which was unsuitable for cooperative farming was transferred to pensioners or to persons unfit for regular farming, to help them provide for themselves (Law No. 142. art. 2). Interviews with Cuban housewives by Isabel Holgado Fernández, an anthropologist at the University of Barcelona, revealed that agricultural products sold directly or through intermediaries by village producers appeared on the market in 1994, and since then, those who were able to pay the high prices, already found fruits, vegetables and meat on the market (Holgado Fernández 2000). The appearance of goods was accompanied by a 24% increase in consumption, which was achieved mainly by the appearance of free-market products (Ferriol Muruaga 1997).


SELF-EMPLOYED WORKERS IN CUBA, 1994–2013

Figure 2. Source: *Oficina Nacional de Estadística, Havana*. The graph is published by *Scarpaci – Henken – Ritter (2016): 379*.

The socialist economic and social system also wanted to ensure full employment in Cuba, but with the intention of achieving this goal, the state took on burdens that were no longer sustainable. In consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, 80% of Cuban industrial facilities had to be closed due to lack of raw materials, fuel and spare parts. Every sector, including the sugar industry, experienced a sharp downturn. One of the consequences of the unfavorable economic changes was the decrease in the demand for labor. The problem was exacerbated by tens of thousands of soldiers returning from African service and Cubans returning from the Soviet Union (Mesa-Lago 2010). Despite the difficulties, the government managed to achieve a slight increase in employment between 1990 and 1991 by providing subsidies to state-owned companies to offset their losses. However, attachment to full employment and a lack of internal work raised other issues, such as relaxation of work discipline and “in-door” unemployment of the workforce. Productivity decreased by 31% between 1989 and 1993 (Mesa-Lago 2010). This is well illustrated in *Figure 3*. Government attempts were able to reduce visible unemployment from 7.9% to 6.2%, however, hidden unemployment increased from 7.9% to 34% over the same period, i.e. it more than quadrupled (Ferriol Muruaga 1999). The visible indicators of unemployment started to improve in 1996 and reflected a steady downward trend until 2008, with a spectacular increase in the number of unemployed this year. A gradual rise has started since 2009. The increasing numbers did not represent such a drastic leap as it was observed between 1990 and 1995.

DETAILS OF CUBAN UNEMPLOYMENT (VISIBLE AND HIDDEN) BETWEEN 1957 AND 2009

Años	Visible	Años	Visible	Oculto ^a	Total	Años	Visible
1957	16.4 ^b	1989	7.9	7.9	15.7	1999	6.3
1959	13.6	1990	7.3	10.3	17.6	2000	5.4
1960	11.8	1991	7.7	19.0	26.7	2001	4.1
1963	8.1	1992	6.1	24.2	31.7	2002	3.3
1965	6.5	1993	6.2	34.0	40.2	2003	2.3
1970	1.3	1994	6.7	32.5	39.2	2004	1.9
1975	4.5	1995	7.9	32.1	40.0	2005	1.9
1979	5.4	1996	7.6	26.6	34.2	2006	1.9
1981	5.5	1997	7.0	25.7	32.7	2007	1.8
1988	6.0	1998	6.6	25.1	31.7	2008	1.6
						2009	1.7

Figure 3. Source: Elaborated by Mesa-Lago based on CEE 1991; CEPAL 1997, 2000; Mesa-Lago 2002; 2003; 2010: 60.

Evolution of the cuentapropist system: 2010-2018

In 2010, fundamental changes took place in Cuba, that time led by Raul Castro. It was announced in September that 500,000 employees would be laid off by the state in January next year. Raúl Castro promised: „The Revolution leaves no one unprotected... it will fighting to create the right conditions for all Cubans getting a decent job but that does not mean that the State would commit itself to placing anyone through more job offers.” (Mesa-Lago 2010). The government saw a solution in redirecting the unemployed mass to the self-employed group, so the formerly unemployed state employees were absorbed by the private sector, helping to ease social tensions. At the level of numbers, it meant that 465,000 jobs were to be created in the private sector, out of which 250,000 would be self-employed and 215,000 would be engaged in other activities in the private sector.² The latter, as paid private employees, worked for small farmers or for *cuentapropistas*. In 2009, a total of 591,300 people worked in the private sector, out of which 143,000, the 11.4% of employees, were *cuentapropistas* (Mesa-Lago 2010). 2010 can be clearly interpreted as a dividing line in the history of *cuentapropismo*, as the number of self-employees (in this case most of them forced entrepreneurs) did not show such a drastic increase in any previous years. *Figure 4*, based on datas published by Word Bank, shows that over the three years between 2010 and 2012, the continuously but slowly rising visible unemployment figures produced outstanding datas, between 2013 and 2015 declined, and from 2015 there was a stagnation in the field of visible unemployment.

² *Información sobre el reordenamiento de la fuerza de trabajo*. 2010. La Habana.


CUBAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 2008–2018

Figure 4. Source: World Bank

(data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.NE.ZS?locations=CU)

Published: www.statista.com/statistics/388644/unemployment-rate-in-cuba/

(Retrieved: 2019. 08. 15.) International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. Data retrieved in April 2019.

At first, the practice of self-employment was typical of the agriculture. This situation was facilitated by Law 259 of 2008 (Ley No. 259), which allowed non-cultivated state-owned land to be used by both natural and legal persons to increase food production and reduce food imports. Natural persons have had access to land use for a period of 10 years, in the case of legal persons this period has been increased to 25 years and in both cases it was possible to extend it. The legal regulation did not authorize the transfer or disposal of the land to a third party.³ In the year following the big wave of layoffs in 2010, 1,387,936 hectares of farmland were taken over by peasants engaged in self-cultivation and during this period, livestock production was largely (59.9%) tied to private farmers. In crop production, 8.6% of rice production, 3.1% of sugar cane production, 2.3% of coffee production and 2% of fruit and tobacco production were also produced by private

³ Ley No. 259. *Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba*. Ministerio de Justicia. No. 24, 93–95. (11 de julio de 2008, La Habana.)

producers.⁴ Public sector employees have also been helped by the state by providing smaller loans to start their businesses.⁵ Prior to 2010, self-employed workers accounted for only 2.7% of the employment structure, 84.1% for public employment, 4.5% for agricultural cooperatives, 8.7% for other work, including self-employment as small farmers working in the private agricultural sector (Mesa-Lago 2010). According to data published by CEPAL, in October 2010, 157 300 self-employed persons were registered in Cuba and this year they were allowed to practice 178 professions.⁶ The number of self-employed workers increased dramatically the following year. It practically doubled to 392,000 licensed persons in 2011, which is an increase of 37.5% in one year. The year following the drastic political action (2012), their number stagnated (394,000), and was followed by a steady increase in headcount later. The latest data on the number of self-employed workers comes from the Cuban Office for National Statistics and Information. According to it in 2018 there were 580.800 self-employed workers from a total of 1. 415.700 workers in private sector this year.⁷ The Ministry of Labor and Social Security recorded that by May 2019, the number of licensed self-employed workers had increased to 605,000, which meant that 35% of the female workforce and 32% of young workers were self-employed.⁸ Although the government had already allowed 207 professions for *cuentapropistas* by 2017, a representative survey of the *Center for Insights in Survey Research* also showed that self-employment activities were most widely distributed (62%) across five areas. These include housing (14%), artistic activities (13%), taxis (12%), operating *paladars* (small restaurants) (12%) and selling handicrafts (11%). The remaining 38% includes personal services (cosmetics, hairdressing, massage, etc.), construction, agriculture (2%) or antiques and book trade (3%). The popularity of this latter activity is certainly surprising, even if to a small extent, it precedes agricultural work. Indeed, it seems to be a much easier task to trade antiques than to work in the fields or in animal husbandry in the unforgiving Cuban climate. The survey made by the *Center for Insights in Survey Research* shows that more than three-quarters (85%) of the respondents (*cuentapropistas*) have employees between 0 and 4. The share of single workers is the highest (31%), but right after that come *cuentapropistas* with one employee (30%), while the number of 2-4 employees is slightly behind (24%). Although representing a significantly smaller group (10%), there are also *cuentapropistas* in the society who employ 5-8 people to run their businesses. This data set illustrates why, in spite of the 945,800 self-employed groups, 1,41,500 people work in the private sector.⁹ The question of the survey whether the *cuentapropista* status is the only form of employment of the person interviewed, refines

⁴ CEPAL, *Informe Macroeconómico*, 2011–2012, Cuba, 2.

⁵ *Granma Internacional*, 2010.

⁶ *Cuentapropistas: A Survey of Cuban Entrepreneurs*. October 26 – November 25. 2017. Center for Insights in Survey Research.

⁷ *Panorama Económico Social. Cuba 2018*. Edición Julio 2019. Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información. La Habana, 2019, 29.

⁸ *Panorama Económico Social. Cuba 2018*. Edición Julio 2019. Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información. La Habana, 2019, 29.

⁹ *Panorama Económico Social. Cuba 2018*. Edición Julio 2019. Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información. La Habana, 2019, 29.

our knowledge further. More than three-quarters (84%) of the respondents live only from his/her micro-enterprises. The data set shows that 63% have a single source of income with their current status, 21% also have another *cuentapropista* job. 10% are engaged in *cuentapropista* activities in addition to their work in the public sector. According to the announcement of Margarita González Fernández, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, in October 2018 the number of officially registered *cuentapropistas* was 588,000, but the number of self-employed workers without any official license is almost the same. In connection with the latter phenomenon in 2015 Ted. A. Henken, an American sociologist published data sets showing that 505,000 licensed *cuentapropistas* worked in Cuba that year. Relying on the research of the *Brookings Institute*, Henken estimates the number of unlicensed *cuentapropistas* to be more than 606,000, making a total of well over one million self-employed workers in Cuba that year (Henken 2015). There is no reason to believe that there will be a significant improvement in administrative and financial discipline in the coming years and we are certainly not far from the truth if, based on the experience of previous years, we estimate the number of unlicensed self-employed workers in 2018 to nearly seven hundred thousand.

Tourism and *cuentapropismo*

There are two reasons why tourism should be highlighted briefly in our research. On the one hand, because self-employed workers are most involved in tourism-related activities (accommodation, restaurants, taxis, souvenir, guides, etc.), on the other hand, because one of the keys to Cuba's economic strength lies in this economic sector. This fact has been recognized by the state, and for this reason, the national development plan of 2030 aims to more than double the number of tourists to 15 million, with the intention of receiving 5 million visitors from the *cruises* which stop in Cuba and double the number of the available accommodations from 50,000 to 100,000 beds.

It helps to achieve the goal that 2,000 private restaurants and approximately 22,000 rooms for rent were in the hands of self-employed people (Whitefield 2017). The growth of tourism to Cuba, which is growing year by year, is largely influenced by the number of tourists coming from the United States, along with Canada. In March 2016, the Obama administration authorized the launch of scheduled commercial flights and cruise services from the United States to the island country, and these changes have had a positive impact on the development of Cuban tourism. In 2017 only, 619,000 American tourists visited Cuba (Bustos 2018). The growth of tourism to Cuba proved to be steady and according to the *Ministerio de Turismo*, the number of people arriving from North America (of Cuban and non-Cuban origin) was 1,121,108 (Figures 5) in 2018. In the first four months of 2019 93,5% more American tourists arrived to Cuba than in the same period of 2018.¹⁰ However, the boom in tourism was not accompanied by a surge in the number of private entrepreneurs, because in 2017, Cuban leadership unexpectedly suspended issuing new licenses for restaurants and bed and breakfast accommodations. According to the official explanation, the government has introduced new measures in

¹⁰ Number of Tourists to Cuba Almost Doubles. havana-live.com/number-of-us-tourists-to-cuba-almost-doubles/.

December 2018 to curb tax evasion and accumulation of wealth. Although the need for small businesses was recognized, the dominance of state property is guarded vigilantly, therefore, they prefer to have stricter controls on small businesses. As a consequence of the new measures, Cuban entrepreneurs had to conduct all transactions through accounts held in state-owned banks. High-income businesses have been subjected to new taxes and those who have registered their businesses in the name of their friends or relatives could expect to be permanently deprived of their official license (Weissenstein & Rodríguez 2018). Altogether, the government has made twenty changes in the rules in force until 7 December, 2018. Earlier the food and beverage service was provided with a license to provide a general gastronomic service, but the new regulation split the previous single permit into two, treating bars and nightclubs and restaurants as separate categories. At the same time, the tightening allowed restaurants to exceed the maximum limit of 50 people, only limited to the size of the restaurant service space.

The new licenses have been valid for one type of activity only, which is a step backwards from the previous period. It has been announced that they would not grant licenses to wholesalers and retailers of agricultural products, operators of recreational equipment, as these services have in many cases been associated with criminal activity. After the Regulation has entered into force, licensees had 90 days to change the operation of their businesses in accordance with the new legislation. The state wanted to ensure that the *cuentapropistas* were aware of the new legislation in all forms, so it was made (*Gaceta Oficial*) available on the Internet for free. Martha Feito, Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Security, explained at a press conference announcing the changes that the state wanted to encourage self-employment, particularly because it has improved the quality of products, services and facilitated the reorganization of employment conditions.¹¹ These provisions illustrate that Raúl Castro and Díaz-Canel have been extremely cautious about the issue of private sector growth and it has been limited in order to prevent the concentration of private assets and to safeguard the rapid transformation of the social system.

¹¹ Cuba publishes new self-employment regulations. progresosemweekly.us/cuba-publishes-new-self-employment-regulations/.

VISITOR ARRIVALS IN CUBA, 2018 (BY ORIGIN)

Growth, thanks to U.S. travelers		
Visitor arrivals in Cuba, 2018 (by origin)		
Origin	Total	% Difference 2017-2018
Canada	1,109,630	-2.6
United States (non-Cuban)	638,365	+3.0
Cubans living abroad	600,049	+15.95
from United States	521,059	+20.45
from other countries	78,990	-6.7
Germany	208,506	-14.3
France	197,521	-5.7
United Kingdom	189,963	-7.6
Italy	177,852	-22.0
Mexico	171,945	+21.1
Spain	167,969	-1.0
Russia	137,440	+29.7
Argentina	97,484	-2.1
China	49,944	+8.8
Chile	49,889	+12.9
Netherlands	47,614	-9.4
Colombia	45,966	+11.7
Brazil	41,088	+15.3

Source: MINTUR, ONE

Figure 5. From the Ministry of Tourism of the Republic of Cuba (MINTUR); ONE; and Cuba Standard. Source: www.cubatrade.org/blog/2019/2/7/cuba-reports-2018-visitor-statistics

Conclusion

All in all, the *cuentapropista* is a self-employed person with a secondary school or university degree. He/she is usually a white Cuban.

The difficult economic situation following the collapse of the Soviet Union forced the official approval of self-employment in Cuba, due to the large number of layoffs from state institutions and factories. The emergence of such a layer in the labor sector made the power effort, as the concept of a socialist society based on the principle of equality. Due to political uncertainty, the first *cuentapropistas* were allowed to operate in 1993 in a very cautious, over-regulated manner, but by today they have reached 13% of the workforce. In order to prevent this stratum from rapidly gaining wealth they have been hit by extremely high taxes. The income tax of *cuentapropistas* rose from 41% to 45% between 1998 and 2008, then reached 47% in three years. In effect, the state skimmed almost half of their income. In spite of the high tax burdens, the average earnings of the *Cuentapropistas* are nearly three times the average salary (Carmelo Mesa-Lago 2012), so the statement that they represent an enviable social group across the country is not empty (Mesa-Lago 2012). In the light of the numbers, it's not a coincidence that the Cuban government announced and implemented salary increases in the budget sector and in the field of the pensions this year. At all costs, they want to avoid the

fragmentation of the society and the greater inequality in income distribution. At the same time, it is also clear to politicians that self-employment is inevitable, because self-employed workers mean a way out of the possible social tensions in a very difficult economic situation.

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Iveta Jeleňová – Zlatica Sáposová

The use of the Hungarian language in Košice as a challenge

Abstract

In this paper, the authors study the use of Hungarian language in Košice, the second largest city of Slovakia. It presents selected results of a secondary analysis performed on the data collected by the NGO Forum of Hungarians of Košice. The data were collected from a sample of 408, at least 16-year-old participants, who live in Košice and speak Hungarian. The results show that Hungarian is mostly used in informal situations. The feedback on using Hungarian that the respondents received was more often positive than negative. Nevertheless, seven of 10 respondents have already faced negative and/or offensive reactions of their environment only due to using Hungarian language.

Keywords: language, minority, minority language, Hungarian language

Language plays a very important role in handing over a culture to the following generations and in maintaining it, while it has also been a base for identity forming. When people of different cultural backgrounds communicate, the use of a certain language may present an obstacle to communication in some situations. In some cases, even hearing a specific language, used by others when communicating in public, may be a source of conflict.

In this paper, the authors focus on the use of the Hungarian language in Košice, the second largest city of Slovakia. Even though the number of people claiming their Hungarian ethnicity is not very high, the group of ethnic Hungarians is the second largest ethnic group in the city, following the majority. Due to this fact, the authors focus on the ethnic structure of the population of Košice and the inhabitants' use of Hungarian, not only at the level of the city itself, but also at the level of its districts. The goal of this study is to survey the experience of members of the Hungarian community in Košice with the use of their mother tongue, based on selected questions included in the survey carried out by the NGO Forum of Hungarians of Košice in 2017. In this paper, the authors analyze the answers to questions aimed at finding out where (i.e. in what environment) do the respondents most frequently use Hungarian language and how do the Slovaks react to it. This study also deals with the conflicts, resulting in physical attacks that occurred due to the use of Hungarian language.

Language as a source of conflict

Cultural diversity of cities is becoming an accepted fact and many cities perceive it as a positive phenomenon. However, the coexistence of various ethnic groups in a city also calls attention to certain topics, such as social exchange and communication between the respective groups (Schiller 2016). One has to search for solutions of potential conflict between members of the majority, members of ethnic groups permanently residing at the territory and groups migrating permanently and temporarily. One of the challenges of accepting cultural diversity is also the acceptance of the fact that pursuant to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe 1995; 2016), every individual has the right to use his or her minority language both in public and in private. The laws aimed at the protection and support of the state or official language have to be formulated in a manner allowing the application of this right. However, the lack of knowledge of the official language may be a significant obstacle to the economic growth of individuals and subordinate language groups.

The language – a system of shared symbols – is important in terms of the communication of people, but it does not serve only communication purposes. In addition to the aforementioned role in maintaining a specific culture and the formation of a cultural identity, it is important for a sense of group membership and a shared cultural-ethnic identity, making it possible to distinguish members of a non-reference group (Ting-Toomey, Chung 2012). Language and culture are mutually interconnected and inseparable. Seen from the perspective of many ethnic groups, it is worth fighting and dying for the maintenance of a language (Ting-Toomey, Chung 2012).

During the last three decades, the relationship of Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia has been influenced primarily by the policies of the governing elites in the Slovak Republic and in Hungary. Undoubtedly, the response of Slovak politicians to the activities of recent Hungarian governments related to providing care to Hungarians living abroad, in the countries neighboring Hungary (such as the Forum of Hungarian Lawmakers of the Carpathian basin, Hungarian Act on Citizenship) had an impact on the relationships of Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia. It was also influenced by the efforts of the Slovak governing elite to improve the position of the Slovak language (these include the conflict on using Hungarian names in school textbooks or Slovak Act No. 270/1995 Coll. on the State Language of the Slovak Republic). In addition to the political factor, the relationships of Slovaks and Hungarians are still influenced by historical events from the time of coexistence in the Kingdom of Hungary, as well as the political events following the establishment of the Czechoslovakian state and the events following the Second World War (such as the inviolability of the decrees of president Beneš).

Lanstyák and Szabó Mihály (2005) claim that most conflicts between the Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia emerge due to the language. For example, the event in Nitra, Slovakia, where a university student was attacked allegedly because she spoke Hungarian in the street, traumatized the society for years. A vigorous debate on the state language act arose not only among politicians, but also among everyday citizens. In everyday life, verbal conflicts rising among citizens due to the use of Hungarian may occur; however, only some will get the attention of the media. One of the more recent sources of conflict was the prohibition of singing the Hungarian national anthem in Slovakia at

ceremonies or events organized by representatives of Hungarian ethnic groups. This prohibition resulted in a wave of protest: people started claiming their Hungarian identity in social media. As far as the relationship of Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia is concerned, there will be conflicts in the future as well. Their impact will depend on various factors, such as the media and the interest of political entities.

The position of the Hungarian ethnic group and Hungarian as a mother tongue in Košice

Košice is one of the cities, which underwent a significant transition in terms of language use in the last century. Its multi-language character is both a result of its history and of demographic changes. According to the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (Čičváková, Kašková, & Kostiščová 2018), at the end of 2017, there were 16 ethnic groups of various sizes living in Košice in, addition to the national majority (Table 1). The most numerous ethnic group in the city is that of the Hungarians (Table 2). Of the total population of Košice (239,141 as of 31 December 2016), Hungarians amounted to 2.8% (6709 people). The last data published by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic confirmed stagnation and/or a slight increase in the headcount of Hungarians until the end of 2017, compared to 2016, by 31 people (6740). The share of Hungarians of the total population of the city reached 2.82%.

Table 1. The current ethnic population of Košice

Ethnicity	Total	Košice I	Košice II	Košice III	Košice IV
Total	239 095	67 908	82 255	28 860	60 072
Slovak	180 665	50 164	60 567	23 835	46 099
Czech	1 731	556	621	158	396
Moravian	136	32	61	13	30
Silesian	1	1	-	-	-
Hungarian	6 740	2 180	2 044	708	1 808
Romani	4 721	611	3 523	310	277
Polish	397	103	193	29	72
German	681	224	216	44	197
Rusyn	1 597	451	575	190	381
Ukrainian	1 045	410	273	139	223
Russian	227	85	78	21	43
Jewish	55	38	7	2	8
Greek	99	45	38	3	13
Bulgarian	95	41	25	11	18
Romanian	90	31	39	2	18
Austrian	36	12	15	-	9
Vietnamese	422	36	282	9	95
Other and	40 357	12 888	13 698	3 386	10 385

Source: Čičváková, Kašková & Kostiščová (2018: 15).

Table 2. The share s of the respective ethnic groups of the population of Košice

Ethnicity	%
Slovak	75.56
Hungarian	2.82
Romani	1.97
Rusyn	0.67
Ukrainian	0.44
German	0.28
Other and unknown	17.54

Source: Čičváková, Kašková, & Kostiščová (2018: 15).

The most numerous Hungarian community lives in the Západ district – 1224 people – compared to 2016, the headcount increased by 17 people. Other more numerous Hungarian communities live in districts: Juh– 975 – and Staré Mesto– 974. There are 4 city districts having Hungarian communities with a headcount above 600 people: Sever, KVP, Dargovských hrdinov, Nad jazerom (Table 3).

Table 3. Headcount of Slovaks and Hungarians in 2017, by city district

City district	Total population	Slovaks	Hungarians
Džungľa	697	563	5
Kavečany	1 310	1 248	3
Sever	20 281	15 005	688
Sídliisko Ťahanovce	22 340	17 433	476
Staré Mesto	20 751	13 918	974
Ťahanovce	2 529	1 997	34
Lorinčík	718	685	10
Luník IX	6 411	2 537	46
Myslava	2 257	2 113	21
Pereš	1 939	1 534	39
Pol'ov	1 198	1 137	2
Sídliisko KVP	23 864	18 627	646
Šaca	5 890	4 446	56
Západ	39 978	29 488	1 224
Dargovských hrdinov	26 169	21 593	660
Košická Nová Ves	2 691	2 242	48
Barca	3 626	3 407	45
Juh	23 030	16 028	975
Krásna	5 401	4 618	55
Nad jazerom	24 803	19 142	690
Šebastovce	732	699	3
Vyšné Opátske	2 480	2 205	40

Source: Čičváková, Kašková, & Kostiščová (2018: 19).

Data on the population of Hungarian-mother-tongue is available only as census data from 1970, 1991, 2001 and 2011. The size of the Hungarian-mother-tongue-population surpassed the number of people claiming to be of Hungarian ethnicity in all aforementioned censuses. In 2001, the difference between the size of the Hungarian ethnic group and the size of the Hungarian-mother-tongue-population amounted to 4020 people. 10 years later, it shrunk to 2213. It is necessary to note that the decline of size of the Hungarian-mother-tongue-population between 2001 and 2011 was a lot more significant than the decline of the size of the Hungarian ethnic group (Table 4).

Table 4. Hungarian-mother-tongue- and Hungarian-ethnicity-population in Košice

	People of Hungarian ethnicity	People of Hungarian mother tongue	Diff.
2001	8 928	12 948	4 020
2011	6 371	8 584	2 213
loss	- 2 557	- 4 364	

Source: Čičváková, Kašková, & Kostiščová (2018: 15); Forum Minority Research Institute (2018)

In addition to this, the difference between the size of the Hungarian ethnic group and size of the Hungarian-mother-tongue-population was higher in Košice (being 34.7% in 2011) than was the nationwide difference (10.9%). It applies to all city districts that size of the Hungarian-mother-tongue-population surpasses the size of the Hungarian ethnic group.

The use of Hungarian based on the 2011 Population and Housing Census

It was the 2011 Population and Housing Census that first surveyed the most frequently used languages, both in public and in private. The population of Košice used mostly Slovak both in private and in public (Tables 5 and 6). The second most frequently used language was Hungarian.

Table 5. Permanent residents of Košice, by the language used most frequently in public, 2011

Headcount		Language used in public		
		Slovak	Hungarian	Unknown
Košice I	68 467	50 082	781	16 242
in %	100.0	73.1	1.1	23.7
Košice II	82 676	60 673	641	17 477
in %	100.0	73.4	0.8	21.1
Košice III	30 048	22 224	168	6 859
in %	100.0	74.0	0.6	22.8
Košice IV	59 242	44 216	578	13 227
in %	100.0	74.6	1.0	22.3

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2015: 52).

Table 6. Permanent residents of Košice, by the language used most frequently in private, 2011.

Headcount		Language used in private		
		Slovak	Hungarian	Unknown
Košice I	68 467	45 377	2 068	18 967
in %	100.0	66.3	3.0	27.7
Košice II	82 676	53 934	1 843	20 965
in %	100.0	65.2	2,2	25.4
Košice III	30 048	20 491	577	8 142
in %	100.0	68.2	1,9	27.1
Košice IV	59 242	40 393	1 668	15 716
in %	100.0	68.2	2.8	26.5

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2015: 53).

In Košice (based on the 2011 Population and Housing Census), Hungarian is used in 6156 households, which rate is significantly lower than the size of the Hungarian-mother-tongue-population (8584 people); however, it approximates the headcount of people of Hungarian ethnicity (6371 people). Comparing these two values is difficult for multiple reasons: we don't know the language of communication in households of mixed families; we don't know the answers and the reactions of people living alone (households of singles) to the particular questions, etc.

On the other hand, we have to point out that the number of people of Hungarian mother tongue significantly decreased between 2001 and 2011, by 4364 people, although Hungarian is still the second most frequently used language in Košice. Compared to the previous census, Hungarian managed to maintain its second position.

One has to take into account also the significantly growing trend of having "no nationality and no ethnicity", i.e. leaving the field related to nationality/ethnicity or mother tongue empty (Table 7).

Table 7. Nondisclosure (and/or omission) of ethnicity by the inhabitants of Košice, by city districts in 2001 and 2011

Year	Košice I	Košice II	Košice III	Košice IV
2001	1 923	1 530	500	3 835
2011	14 699	15 689	983	11 699

Source: Čičváková, Kašková & Kostiščová (2018: 15); Forum Minority Research Institute (2018)

Method

To map mother-tongue-usage by the Hungarian community in Košice, we performed a secondary analysis of the data collected in a survey aimed at the assessment of language usage of Hungarian-speaking people living or working in Košice. The data were collected by the NGO Forum of Hungarians of Košice in March and April 2017.

Participants

For the purposes of this study, the authors analyzed a sample of 408, at least 16-year-old respondents habitually resident in Košice in the previous year. In the sample, women prevailed (58.1%) and so did people with a university degree (Table 8). Primary education was stated only by respondents aged between 16 and 26.

Table 8. Demographic characteristics of the sample (n = 408)

	n	%
Age		
16 to 26 years	86	21.1
27 to 40 years	113	27.7
41 to 50 years	75	18.4
51 to 60 years	39	9.6
61 to 70 years	49	12.0
70+ years	46	11.3
Gender		
Male	171	41.9
Female	237	58.1
Highest completed level of education		
primary	28	6.9
secondary vocational school without a matriculation exam	16	4.0
secondary grammar school with a matriculation exam	145	35.8
university	216	53.3

The mother tongue of 94.9% of the respondents was Hungarian, while 3.7% of the respondents claimed it to be Slovak, three respondents stated their mother tongue was another language. However, by self-assessment, 89.7% of the respondents claimed their skills of Hungarian were at mother tongue level (level C2 pursuant to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages) 83.3% of the respondents studied at schools educating in Hungarian.

Instrument

The extent of using Hungarian language in private and in public in various contexts, in the presence of members of their own community and in the presence of the members of the majority, as well as the experience concerning the reactions of their environment were surveyed using a 24-item questionnaire created by the NGO Forum of Hungarians of Košice for this particular purpose. The survey was administered in Hungarian. In the first of the six selected items, the respondents were presented a list of 12 environments with the instruction to select five locations in Košice, where they spoke Hungarian the

most frequently during the last five years. Then, using a frequency scale (ranging from 1 [a few times a year] to 4 [daily]), they had to state how often they used Hungarian in the respective selected environments. Further questions were related to the feedback of their environment (both positive and negative) concerning the situations, in which they spoke Hungarian. As an answer to the last selected question, the respondents had to state the correct action in the case, if a member of the majority, not speaking Hungarian, joined a group of people speaking Hungarian. In every item of the survey, respondents had to select one of the listed categories.

Social and demographic characteristics: Overall, 10 selected characteristics were surveyed, including gender, age, mother tongue, level of knowledge of Hungarian and Slovak.

Procedure and data analysis

Participants were recruited through the Facebook page of the NGO Forum of Hungarians of Košice and through articles published in three on-line Hungarian media. Data were collected both electronically and in print (pen-and-paper). 82.6% of the respondents – included in the sample selected by the authors – completed the survey on the Internet.

SPSS 24 statistical software was used to analyze the data.

Results

In the first of the selected questions, the respondents were presented a list of 12 environments. The design of the questionnaire also allowed the respondents to select an answer not corresponding to the instruction, which required the respondents to select five locations in Košice, where they spoke Hungarian the most frequently during the last five years. Only 43.1% of the respondents selected exactly five locations. Most frequently, the respondents spoke Hungarian at home or at their places of residence (92.6% of the respondents). The other more frequently stated environments were the flats/houses of their friends (77.2%), public places, streets and parks (52.5%), theatre (58.8%) and workplace (55.4%). The least frequently mentioned locations were offices of authorities, police and court (17.2%), sports facilities and sport grounds (23.0%). In case of each selected environments, the respondents also stated the frequency of communicating in Hungarian. The distribution of the respective answers is given in Table 9.

Table 9. Frequency of using Hungarian in various environments in Košice

Environment	Frequency (%)			
	daily	weekly	monthly	annually
at home, at the hostel	74.5	2.5	12.3	3.4
at friends and acquaintances, at their flats or houses	31.1	19.4	21.3	5.4
in public, in streets and parks	26.2	16.7	14.5	5.1
in primary and secondary schools and university buildings	24.8	4.9	9.8	8.1

Environment	Frequency (%)			
	daily	weekly	monthly	annually
workplace	23.5	11.8	10.8	9.3
in public transport (on buses, trams)	11.3	7.1	10.8	6.9
at the theatre or at premises of cultural groups	8.1	9.1	27.9	13.7
in church, at church facilities	7.6	21.3	11.3	10.5
in restaurants (canteens, cafés, taverns)	6.9	13.2	19.9	8.1
at other places	5.9	4.7	6.9	7.1
at sports facilities and sport grounds	2.0	3.9	4.7	12.5
at the doctor, in hospitals, in senior homes	2.0	1.5	10.0	12.7
at the offices of authorities, at the police, in court	1.5	0.2	2.5	13.0

Note: weekly means a few times a week; monthly means a few times a month; annually means a few times a year.

Three respondents, who used the possibility to fill in another location (not included in the survey), claimed that they spoke Hungarian wherever they wanted. A younger respondent (male, 16 to 26 years, primary education) stated: "Wherever I can, I speak Hungarian. Having Slovaks around me doesn't embarrass me. If they don't like the fact that I speak Hungarian, they should cover their ears."

Other selected questions were related to the feedback the respondents received in the past (without a more precise specification of the time), in situations, when they spoke Hungarian in the presence of Slovaks – i.e. the majority of society – or others came to know that they spoke Hungarian. The results show that the feedback received by the respondents in Košice was more often positive than negative (Table 10). Moreover, 28.9% of respondents have not met any negative reaction.

Table 10. Feedback concerning knowledge or usage of Hungarian in the presence of Slovaks

How often	feedback		negative (offensive)	
	positive (friendly)			
	f	%	f	%
never	48	12.1	114	28.9
seldom	92	23.1	157	39.7
occasionally	181	45.5	100	25.3
frequently	63	15.8	24	6.1
always	14	3.5	0	0.0

Then, the respondents had to state where in Košice they received the most negative (offensive) feedback for speaking Hungarian (Table 11). The most frequently stated locations were the streets or parks or other public locations (33.3% of the respondents), means of public transport (24.8%) and workplaces (15.0%).

Table 11. Environments in which respondents received the most negative feedback

Environment in Košice	f	% of total
street, park, public location	136	33.3
means of public transport (buses, trams)	101	24.8
workplace	61	15.0
restaurants, taverns, bars, etc.	56	13.7
primary and secondary schools and university buildings	29	7.1
at the doctor, in hospitals, in senior homes	25	6.1
temporary residence (hostel), from roommates, teachers, etc.	25	6.1
at the offices of authorities, at the police, in court	23	5.6
at the place of permanent residence (family house, house of flats) from neighbors	15	3.7
cultural institutions	14	3.4
sports grounds and sports facilities	12	2.9
Other	6	1.5

Physical attacks triggered by the use of Hungarian were given special attention. Surprisingly, 25 respondents (6.1%) of the analyzed sample stated that they got into a fight in the past because they spoke Hungarian in Košice. Using the chi-squared independence test, a statistically significant relationship between gender and participation in a fight due to use of the Hungarian language was found ($\chi^2 = 7.22$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.007$), while the experience of physical attacks is associated with male gender (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Dependence of the respondents' gender and reported participation in a fight due to speaking Hungarian in Košice

As an answer to the next question, the respondents had to state the reaction they considered correct if a person speaking only Slovak joined a group of Hungarians speaking also Slovak. 44.1% of the respondents considered switching to Slovak to be the correct action (Table 12). 37.7% of respondents would react depending on the situation. Other answers included solutions proposed by the respondents themselves such as one of the members of the group would start speaking Slovak with the newcomer.

Table 12. What is the correct action if a member of the majority, speaking only Slovak, joins the Hungarian speaking group.

Appropriate reaction, from the respondent's perspective	f	%
to switch to Slovak	180	44.1
depends on the situation	154	37.7
to continue in Hungarian, with someone interpreting	50	12.3
to continue in Hungarian	7	1.7
Other	3	0.7

At the end of the survey, respondents could enter their proposals aimed at more frequent use of Hungarian. Based on the experience of one of the respondents (male, 51 to 60 years, secondary education) people in Košice tolerate the use of Hungarian. However, another respondent (male, 16 to 26 years, secondary education) describes his negative experience related to the use of Hungarian in public as follows: "Most inhabitants of Košice speaking Hungarian are ashamed to use the language or they do not want to let others know that they speak Hungarian, because they are afraid of their environment excluding them or of getting fired from their jobs". It often happens to this man that he cannot turn to the authorities because he does not speak Slovak. A reaction to this view may be the proposal "to remove the fear of having problems due to using Hungarian. One has to be bold and let others know that the knowledge of a second language is useful" (female, 27 to 40 years, university education). Everyone has the right to use his mother tongue and he or she should fight for this right (woman, 51 to 60 years, vocational secondary school without a matriculation exam).

Discussion

The first step in the study was to find out how often the respondents used Hungarian in various contexts, specifically, in what environment. The results show that Hungarian is most often used in informal, personal situations (at home, with friends and in public environments such as streets and parks). These results are consistent with other studies conducted abroad. Baker (2001) claims that minority languages are used mainly for communication at home, with the family, at various social and cultural activities within the community, in communication with relatives and friends and religious activities. Similarly, Fenyvesi (2005) found that Hungarian immigrants in the US used Hungarian mainly at home, when talking to friends and practicing their religion. Based on a social and linguistic analysis of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, Lanstyák and Szabó Mihály (2005) state that the use of one's mother tongue in various contexts depends on the type of residence. While in the Hungarian language territory, in theory, people may use Hungarian in all domains of language use, in territories with the prevailing majority of Slovaks, Slovak language is used at significant rates (sometimes even exclusively).

In Košice, respondents use Hungarian language least frequently with the authorities, at the police or in the court. In other words, the respondents use the language of the majority in formal, official contexts more often. This finding is not surprising, since in Košice – as a municipality not meeting the conditions defined in Art. 2 par. 1 of Slovak Act No. 204/2011 Coll., amending Act no. 184/1999 Coll. on the Use of the Languages of National Minorities – members of national minorities may use a minority language in oral communication with the organs of local state administration, public administration and legal entities established by municipalities only if the employee of the public administration body and any other participants of the proceedings consent to it. Moreover, the low rate may also relate to the fact that people usually need to deal with the authorities, the police or the court only occasionally and the youngest respondents do not necessarily have such an experience.

The choice of using or not using Hungarian in public in the presence of the members of the majority may be related also to one's previous experience and reactions of the environment to the respondent using Hungarian. The fact that the respondents mentioned positive feedback more often may suggest that respondents in Košice experience mostly tolerance to cultural differences. Infrequent or no positive feedback, mentioned by approximately one third of the respondents, may be explained in various ways. One of these is that the environment accepts cultural diversity and the related use of various languages, it does not consider the knowledge of the particular language as a fact requiring any especial attention or positive feedback, so this knowledge is considered only to be a neutral information about the language skills of the individual or his/her ethnicity.

However, approximately seven of ten respondents have already faced negative reactions from their environment only because they spoke or used Hungarian. Negative feedback may also contribute to reduction in use of the Hungarian language in public. It should be noted that in the study, the time of the negative feedback was not surveyed. Satinská (2016) found out various rates of negative feedback (to using Hungarian in public) in various periods in the respondents' answers. Based on the interviews, she found that respondents from Bratislava had negative experience related to the use of the language mainly after the Second World War and in the 1990s. The various negative experiences were projected by some respondents into a strategy of using Hungarian at home and Slovak in public. The respondents most often encountered negative/offensive reactions in streets or parks, in public places and on means of public transport in Košice. Even though people usually consider communication with relatives or friends in public to be private, this is an environment, in which it is easy to catch whole or partial discussion of others. In some cases, calls to use Slovak language or various comments may result even in physical attacks. Physical aggression requires direct contact; therefore, in general it is less frequent than verbal aggression. In spite of this, six of 100 respondents have experienced physical attack due to the language. A limiting factor is that the location and the age of the respondent, as well as the time of the incident were not surveyed. The study found a statistically significant dependence between gender and the participation in a fight due to the use of the Hungarian language. This corresponds to the findings on gender differences in physical aggression, identified in various studies (e.g. Card et al. 2008; Ramirez, Andreu & Fujihara 2001).

In addition to mapping the experience of the respondents with members of the majority in Košice regarding communication in Hungarian in public, the questionnaire contained also a question aimed at the behavior of the respondents to the presence of Slovaks not speaking Hungarian. The aim of this question was to find out whether the members of the Hungarian minority realize that they may trigger conflicts with their own tactless or inappropriate behavior. The respondents' most frequently mentioned reaction was that they considered switching to Slovak as appropriate. The use of Slovak should not be a problem for most respondents, since 61.7% of them reported knowledge of Slovak at levels C1 (advanced) or C2 (mother tongue). Approximately four of ten respondents consider it to be appropriate to react according to the situation, i.e. sometimes to continue in Hungarian, sometimes with occasional Slovak interpretation or to switch to Slovak at other times. Further research would be needed to find out what specifically influences their behavior and choice of the particular language.

A potential source of conflict due to the language in use may be the belief of seven respondents, who think it is appropriate to continue the discussion in Hungarian, regardless of the language skills of the new member of the group. This is reflected in the answer given by one of the respondents, who claimed that the correct reaction is to have someone interpreting, however, he heard multiple times that Slovaks expected Hungarians to switch to Slovak.

The main limit of this study – in addition to the aforementioned limits related to the instrument – is the chosen method of data collection, which could lead to the sample bias. Since the call to complete the survey was published at the Facebook page of the NGO Forum of Hungarians of Košice and in newspapers published in the Hungarian language, the questionnaire was completed mainly by individuals interested in the life of the Hungarian community in Košice. The characteristics of the sample indicate that the survey did not address people having only primary education school or secondary vocational education without a matriculation exam. Even though we did not focus on the differences of the respondents having various degrees of education, it is a fact worth noting. Since the final sample was obtained through the selection of volunteers, the results may not be generalized to the population the sample comes from. Therefore, further research is needed to be able to generalize the results to a relatively heterogeneous population of the inhabitants of Košice of Hungarian nationality.

Conclusion

One of the challenges in accepting cultural diversity by the majority society is to respect the fact that every individual has the right to use his or her own mother tongue or any other language when communicating in public, not only in the privacy of his or her home. This paper presented selected results of the analysis of using Hungarian language in Košice, based on the data collected in the survey aimed at finding out how often and in what contexts do the respondents of the selected city use Hungarian and what experience they had with the reactions of their environment. Residents of Hungarian nationality are currently the largest ethnic group in Košice. Sadly, its demographic trends (low birth rate, high mortality, ageing population, migration, and assimilation) are a threat to its stable future position. The future development of the Hungarian

community depends also on maintaining and supporting its language and culture. In Košice, ethnic Hungarians live in a bilingual environment. This bilingual environment may contribute to language assimilation and thus may weaken the position of ethnic Hungarians in Košice. Negative feedback of the environment may also contribute to language assimilation, i.e. using exclusively Slovak language in public. The study conducted by the NGO Forum of Hungarians of Košice is an interesting first survey performed in the field of using Hungarian in Košice. The results of the survey show that respondents use the state language both in formal and informal contexts. However, this does not mean that in certain situations they do not prefer to use their mother tongue. The issue of using the language in various domains requires further attention and research, since the future development of the Hungarian community in Košice, its active participation in the life of the city, depend also on maintaining and supporting its language and culture.

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Angéla Kapusi

Ways of coping with conflict situations with the help of stories for children*

According to the general concept, stories for children are a world of ideals and illusions where anything can happen. This statement is just as false as the one stating that stories for children have nothing to do with reality, the heroes, places, and conflicts in them are mere creations of imagination and fantasy. We have all met the 7-headed dragon, although sometimes it is called a boss or our worse personality. We have also tried to glance over the glass mountain, which meant finding a solution for certain problems. Stories for children always tell us something important about the individual, his/her options, choices, mistakes, and the corrections of these mistakes. Therefore they are not about everything being fine, but that everything can be made fine.

In this paper I will discuss works of children's literature regarding their messages, linguistic features, and contents. Firstly, I will discuss the characteristics of the old, classic children's tales and contemporary ones, and discuss the changes in the topics, grammatical and literary quality, as well as the current target audience. Next, using a specific story, I would like to illustrate the special features of contemporary stories for children and their presumed role in conflict resolution. Examining the text I will also discuss the differences in grammatical and literary quality, the presence and the effects of the fantasy world and imagery.

1. Altered function in children's literature: Classical and contemporary stories

Regarding the message of stories for children, the initial function of children's literature had a pedagogical aspect: teaching that is right. In the stories the good always prevailed, and the bad was always rightfully punished. This moral norm or scheme kept the balance of the world's so called correct way of functioning. Until the 20th century stories for children were defined by their pedagogical usability, carrying out some kind of a pedagogical-didactic mission the goal of which was teaching while entertaining. At the turn of the century a new approach started to emerge that regarded children's literature as a form of art-mediation. In accordance with this view children's literature is supposed to provide aesthetic experience for children, and not teach directly, as it would then lose its artistic value. Compliance with this condition defines children's literature as a vehicle

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to raise readers, as well as a tool of literary education. Thus it is a body of texts that will get the children to the point where they choose a book freely, preparing them to become adult readers.

New stories with different topics and messages started to emerge in children's literature in the beginning of the 21st century. This turning point divided story consumers into two well-defined groups. There is a strongly conservative adult group who make selections on a normative, pedagogical-didactic basis focusing on the literary works' ideals and ideological aspects rather than the esthetics. To them a real children's literary piece or a story is one that teaches and entertains at the same time. The artistic-aesthetic children's literature is quite the opposite: its main goal is entertainment, art-mediation, playing with words, and trying to get the underlying message across, pushing the teaching aspect into the background.¹ Stories for children are originally meant to teach the rules and opportunities with the help of which a human can fight supernatural creatures, objects, life, and their most inner selves. These stories show girls and women how to behave and make choices. The men's tasks (quests) are both physical and mental trials, which teach them how to get a woman, liberate her even over the glass mountain, where everything is so fragile. All heroes work hard for their success, and to achieve it they have to complete tasks along the way during which they can get hurt or even fail. The essence is that the hero must push forward and he has to win even against himself.²

On the other hand, contemporary children's literary topics depict well-known situations in life, showing how micro-worlds that are run by the defining schemes of children function. As examples there are the books by Erika Bartos, like *Anna, Peti, Gergő* or her *Berry and Dolly* series, or the fairy tales by Judit Berg, her *Panka and Csiribiri* series, or the *Maszat* series. These books became relevant guides to children in their everyday problems. These newer stories deal with smaller and larger existential and family problems and conflicts which had been previously neglected, as well as the resolution to these issues. Such topics are offending others, sibling rivalry, divorce, solitude, and death. The enrichment of topics and content that have appeared in children's literature in the last decade certainly has a connection with the shift in the target audience and the change in society. In the contemporary stories being vague and expression via symbolism are presented in an unusually honest way and within a grammatically well-constructed literary frame.³ The shift in the target audience applies to the receivers (the children) as well as the transmitters (the parents). Today's children's literature targets those intellectually selective parents who are looking for literary entertainment while reading to their children. With their slightly absurd or grotesque usage of language and imagery, "these books address registers that also provide internalization techniques from the view point of fine arts and literature meant for adults".⁴

¹ Lovász 2015: 9–10.

² Boldizsár 2004: 14–15.

³ Lovász 2015: 14–15.

⁴ Lovász 2015: 17. For example: Schein 2015.

2. “...and the problems vanish bit by bit, one after the other” – The Angry Anger of Little Piou (*Kiscsipisz*)

As a result of changes in the social, sociological, psychological, and pedagogical child image, contemporary stories, such as *The Angry Anger of Little Piou*, are adapted to the needs of today's children. Solutions are presented in them focusing on problems that are different from those presented in the old, classic, so to say traditional stories. The heroes of these new stories are capable of executing the tasks that fall on them, acting responsibly, overcoming their fears, and saving the world created in the story, for the story.⁵ In the contemporary stories the presence of humor is important, and it may be absurd, grotesque, or even vulgar. The role of games is more valued as well. The greatest addition to these stories is the subtle and meticulous playfulness with words. The whirling puns, play on words, and meticulous constructions encourage the reader to embrace the subtle references in the text as much as possible.⁶ In order to process reading in a pleasurable manner, *slow reading* is required. This is a very important practical and reading-pedagogical contribution of these new literary works, which results in a change in reading habits and methods, by giving a chance to snuggle up, discuss the story, deepen the conversation with the child, discover problems, and contemplate the conflict resolution strategies.⁷

The Angry Anger of Little Piou was published in the *Kisgombos Children's Story Collection* in 2017. The volume contains six individual short stories. The stories were initially published in French targeting the youngest audience: as the stories are short, even a one-and-a-half or two-year-old child might be willing to listen to them. At the same time, the texts have the significant advantage of being polished in style, and their vocabulary not only promotes the language development of the youngest of readers, but also fulfills the linguistic needs of the audience in the kindergarten age-group. At first the stories seem very simple: they articulate basic emotions and concepts which are well-known to little ones, such as fear, bad mood, excitement, attention to each other, selflessness, or love, thus making them more palpable, familiar, and understandable. However, all of these texts hold a deeper meaning within, making these stories meaningful for children and parents alike.

Using expressive language and imagery, the story illustrates the set of everyday emotions and their resolutions that fit specifically its target group. It depicts what preschoolers and kindergarteners potentially live through every single day, due to their age characteristics: they are unable to voice their feelings, therefore they feel like they constantly hit a wall, thus having internal tension. Little Piou and Big Piou, the two main characters in the story, live happily in their *funny cotton-nook*, between the bird meadow

⁵ Lovász 2015: 20.

⁶ For example: János Lackfi's *Dombontúli mesék* (*Tales from over the Mountains*) series. The two main characters of the Plaster Muesli and Strawberry Cake story are Csigalassú Biztibácsi (Uncle „Snailslow Forsure”), who is responsible for the security of the Dombontúli Lakópark (Over the Mountains Residential Park), and Akác (Acacia), the little elephant. The vocabulary of the story, the font, size and shape of the letters, the wrapping, as well as the illustrations, allow for an action-packed and interactive storytelling.

⁷ Lovász 2015: 22–23.

and the small creek. They watch the sunrise in the morning and the sunset in the evening, and the rest of the day they play *sprig-skipping*, *worm-whirling*, or *silent strolling*. One morning, after waking up, and taking off to watch the sunrise, Little Piou starts to feel that a terrible anger is beginning to “grow and grow *inside him*, and then he starts to cry and yell. Little Piou kicks and flails, but Big Piou does not understand why. All of a sudden Big Piou notices that there is a terrible, awful, horrific *coil of troubles* around Little Piou’s heart. Later on we find out that this coil of troubles contains several knots. Each of these *problem knots* within the soul have a meaning, which might be a favorite song, which one associates with feeling good, a favorite toy, or laughing together, and going even deeper they might be associated with any internal problems, unprocessed memory, or dealing with conflicts.

Big Piou first starts to hum a song, to which the first knot slowly gets untied, and Little Piou stops stomping. Big Piou tries to untie the second knot, too, pulling it hard, cutting his finger in the process. Eventually the knot gets untied, and inside of it they find the *long-lost-tiny-teddy-bear*. Little Piou hugs the teddy bear, and stops screaming. Big Piou patiently unties the third knot, too, and the problems vanish bit by bit, one after the other. Little Piou doesn’t even cry any more. The last knot is the hardest to untie, Big Piou tries to pull it with *all his heart*, but the knot doesn’t let loose. Finally they both pull on it, in opposite directions, and as a result, *boom*, they knock their heads together, and start to laugh out loud. Because of their laughter, the last knot gets untied as well, as if by itself, and the coil vanishes entirely. To untie the knots the solution is patience, love, laughter, and playing together. The story nicely illustrates the levels, showing how the coil of troubles slowly dissolves, one by one, and also presents how to overcome these problems and troubles.

In the story, where we must acknowledge the translator’s clever and polished language choices, the words beautifully reflect the world in which it is displayed: the characters live in a *cotton-nook*, and spend their days *by sprig-skipping, worm-whirling, and silent-strolling*. The story’s subject of conflict is depicted perfectly by the term *coil of troubles*. Big Piou tries to untie the knots one by one in order to ease the unspecified tension in Little Piou’s soul. He does so by pulling with *all his might and all his heart*. The principle of “we create the world with our words” appears in this story: it depicts the world of imagery in which the story is set by using colorful language, and the tones, rhythm and playfulness of the words. Critics dealing with contemporary children’s literature (Ágnes Hansági, Andrea Lőrincz, Gábor Tamás Molnár) have already called attention to the fact that there are more and more texts written for children that intentionally no longer choose to tone down the language just because its target audience is made up of children, instead, they utilize the complexities of the language to create a contemporary, living language universe.⁸ On the other hand, there are still children’s books today which, considering the target audience, use reduced vocabulary, everyday language, to help overcome reading difficulties, and most of all, to try to facilitate understanding. This is achieved by using simple sentences, and a limited vocabulary. One example for this is the highly popular *Berry and Dotty* series. These texts

⁸Hansági 2018: 86.

meant for children miss their mark, according to Ágnes Hansági, because “by eliminating the special characteristics of the written texts used in the written culture, they are unable to bring the reading culture closer to the children by using the tools of language reduction. By eradicating the complexity of the written language, teaching how to read can merely be postponed, not executed.”⁹ In addition, if we agree that children’s literature is meant to teach children and prepare them for adult reading via transmission of art, then reading texts, which have rich linguistic features and a world of imagery, is essential at an early age.

3. Summary

The highest value of stories for children is that they teach us that there is a way out of all crises. I believe that this is a common characteristic of classical and contemporary stories, and is a fundamental message to children and adults alike. According to contemporary children’s literature critics stories for children are the “all age” kind, meaning that all ages can find themselves and their internal voices in these stories. A dividend of reading together is that the adult and the child are not only addressed together, but also individually.

Any situation is ideal to tell stories, not only in the evening, before bedtime. In a traffic jam, while traveling by car or the underground, at times of sickness, or while we are waiting in the patients’ lounge. Many times it is not even the plot that is important but that the “story-sound” that invokes a pleasant experience in us, which will assist in resolving even the most unbearable situations. Paying close attention to the stories that the children ask for is especially important. These stories are important for them for some reason; in that place and time these stories are the best to reflect on their internal processes, a conflict or trauma they lived through. The story helps the children to be able to process (tell, play) their internal tension or the issue at hand, by talking it over several times. Let’s tell them the same story, even if they ask for it for the hundredth time.

According to Ildikó Boldizsár the therapeutic value of stories for children lies in the fact that “all stories show the way to balance (health), by saying that one is not to suffer from the imbalance; instead, we should try to restore balance, even through suffering.”¹⁰

⁹ Hansági 2018: 86.

¹⁰ Boldizsár 2004: 21.

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Attila Kasznár

Some reflections on the peculiarities of the European terrorism of new type*

Abstract

Based on current trends terrorism will be one of the most challenging security challenges in the future. The many-faced, variable appearance of terrorism creates a new environment in which the direction of the threat often becomes unpredictable, hereby reducing the general sense of security, even if the actual level of threat does not increase. The peaceful and sustainable social coexistence is based on optimizing the sense of security. Only a part of this task is the fight against terrorism, but based on current trends it can be predicted to be one of the most important segments.

Keywords: European Union, postmodern terrorism, migration, counterterrorism, social integration

For today terrorism has become the number one security challenge. The international terrorism, where *“operational theatres and the possible targets have been diversified”*, (Bács 2017) features new or renewed challenges. There is no further chance to thwart the advance of international terrorism or to prevent the preparation and perpetration of new terrorist acts by using previously applied forces, tools and methods.

The experts of security policy and security actively urge the elaboration of new tools and procedures of counteractions for the struggle against international terrorism. The national security and counter-terrorism services have to reconsider their operational frames because in the ambience of new challenges the *modus operandi* and the circle of perpetrators and their types have started to play an important role. The condition of successful counteractions is the permanent widening of knowledge, collecting information as wide as possible following the growing complexity of terrorism.

As terrorism becomes more and more global, or in other words international, along with the change in methods and instruments used by terrorists participants in counter-terrorism are being challenged significantly. After the 9/11 attacks it became clear that the force, methods and instruments used before had not been able to prevent acts of

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international terrorism and the preparation of new actions. Consequently, experts were urging the implementation of new, more efficient instruments and more successful strategies in the war on international terrorism. Warfare against fanatic suicidal bombers challenges both soldiers and law enforcement because not only the *modus operandi* of terrorism but the person and types of offenders have got centered, focused. As it can be seen, the services had always been ready to adapt to the newly formed challenges and to acquire the necessary facilities needed to fend off those threats. Therefore, one of requirements of successful action is to update the acquired knowledge from time to time, exchange experiences, reach conclusions, while *"research results have to be incorporated in government policy, military law enforcement and national security forces' training, and into the general training of the population."* (Boda, Boldizsár, Kovács, Orosz, Padányi, Resperger, Szenes 2016)

Under the new threats the security environment has also changed significantly. These changes can be interpreted correctly if we are aware of the forms of appearance of terrorism.

New forms of appearance

The goals and targets of terrorism have not been changed in their essence during the evolution process of the terrorism itself. Nevertheless, the tools' and methods' development is in progress.

The classic terrorist communities had been applying traditional methods so in their actuations the self-constraining mechanisms aimed to prevent limitless destruction were imminent. Therefore, terrorist acts rather had an adverting character and the will to destroy human lives appeared not so decidedly. On the other hand, the most important feature of postmodern terrorism is the decision to maximize destruction and the number of victims.

Once terrorism is in all its cases a political phenomenon (Gál 2015), the ideological motivation of the contemporary terrorist activities is usually identical with that of the classic and modern terrorism. To understand the challenges in terrorism more precisely it is useful to examine how the following three point materialize:

- a) Ideological forms,
- b) Personnel forms,
- c) Variation of tools.

The ideological background of the emergence of postmodern terrorism can have roots in the radical religious ideology of the migrants' communities or simply religious radicalism. It can also be based on right-wing radical political ideology or can have an extreme left-wing political content.

The terrorist acts based on religious radicalism of the migrants' communities are mostly based on the frustration vis-a-vis the major society, with some elements of politics. Its final and extreme condensation is the susceptibility to terrorism. The factual perpetration of a terrorist act, its preparation can be carried out both individually or in a group. The terrorism based on religious radicalism is not a new phenomenon. It is imminent since the very beginning as a form of materialization of classic terrorism and

is also a characteristic element of the postmodern terrorism. Abusing religious conviction as the conglomerate of unconditional acceptance and obedience is one of the main and most inhuman and cruel tools of the prophets of radicalism.

The right-wing ideology based terrorist activities make up an important segment of the European counter-terrorism. Keeping under control the activities of the right-wing movements and the violent acts related to them is one of the basic national security and counter-terrorism tasks aimed at preserving and maintaining the democratic juridical and political system of the continent. Starting at the end of the 2010s– mostly due the influence of migration on the altered European cultural dimension – we may or even more, we shall consider the possibility of the growing activities of the movement of this kind. If it happens we cannot rule out that it could generate a series of actions much more violent than ever.

If the goal is to eliminate the migration processes it is necessary to keep the maximum possible of masses ready to migrate in the countries of outflux i.e. to block the migration process. The task is not easy at all because in this case we should create the appropriate conditions for local people in order to prevent the rise of will to migrate mostly in the conflict zones of the world, suffering from wars, national and ethnic conflicts, poverty and hardly existing infrastructure. The implementation of this task requires the coordination of complicated economic, social, military, law-enforcement and other activities hence the practical task is the economic consolidation of the donor countries of migrating masses, the set-up of their infrastructural, educational and social system as elements of guaranties of safe life in the given countries.

The rise of terrorism linked to the left-wing radicalism is mostly related to the ideology of anarchism, represented by individuals or groups. The left-wing extremism has its roots in the crisis of the state as a notion in political sciences. If we analyze this we see that the nation-states fell in fulfillment crisis under the influence of supra-national ideologies in the globalism-ruled world. This crisis generates strong revulsions in the societies against the existence of nation-states. The radical groups gain more and more space against the state and its regulation mechanisms thus the security risk they mean also grows. It worth to note that the activities of extreme right-wing movements have a strong influence on the left-wing extremist movements thus they mutually strengthen each other.

The personnel side of the appearance of postmodern terrorism can be split in three groups. The first group is of the perpetrators commonly called lone wolves. These individuals are not those who, by using terroristic tools, commit acts which have nothing to do with real terrorism because their motivation is different. The latter could rather be called an amuck. These individuals usually have already over of a long process of self-radicalization based upon an extreme ideological tendency with strong political content invented in the majority of cases by themselves. When this self-radicalization ends these individuals are already terrorists. "For lone wolf terrorism to be appropriately addressed, researchers must first dedicate appropriate attention to the topic in order to assist in the influencing of future policies and counter-terrorism and extremism measures." (Dickson 2015)

During the process the lone wolves do not have a companion. They act alone. The second group of perpetrators is of the uni-personal perpetrators. Generally, the public opinion treats the uni-personal perpetrator as a lone wolf, but this is incorrect. While the real lone wolf is always alone the uni-personal perpetrator is only alone during the actual terrorist act. The uni-personal perpetrator is supported by the terrorist community during the whole preparation process leading to the terrorist act. The third group is of the terrorists who perpetrate the attack together with other members of the same terrorist group. Most of the radical Islamic lone wolves are in this type. (Maras 2016)

The above mentioned categories of the actors of postmodern terrorist attacks depict the complexity of the contemporary terrorism. Even though the complexity is high, the structure has preserved the elements of classic and modern terrorism and modified them in accordance with postmodern challenges. The majority of the terrorist attacks are committed by groups or uni-personal perpetrators while the ratio of the uni-personal perpetration constantly growing. This is not incidental. During the planning and preparation the terrorists try to make the attack cheaper. The cost of the attacks perpetrated by uni-personal perpetrators using postmodern tools is minimal which makes this *modus operandi* very attractive for the terrorist communities. Another advantage of using uni-personal perpetrators is that it gives a chance to reduce the risk of deconspiration i.e. if the attack is prepared and committed by a single person the risk of being discovered is minimal. Even if it happens the loss does not affect the whole branch of the network. As it has been stated earlier, the uni-personal perpetrator has contacts with some terrorist groups. The innovation of this tactics is that the uni-personal perpetrator can be used as a dormant cell that supposes low level intensity of interpersonal contacts which significantly reduces the threat of deconspiration.

The use of traditional tools is one of the most important risk factors of the appearance of postmodern terrorism. Nevertheless, cyber terrorism, the use of drones and UAV-s and the spread of alternative tools represent a growing menace. We should omit the CBRN as the top level threat of the future. In the group of traditional tools we find bombs, different explosive devices and firearms. Their use does not have timeframes, these tools of physical destruction or killing human beings will always be present in the armory of the terrorists. We have to know that the terrorist organizations representing a new sort of threat are not only well financed but also are opened to the implementation of the new technical solutions. (Gordon 2003)

The cyberspace is a brand new field that gives a lot of opportunities for the terrorism. Given that *"the asymmetric warfare becomes more and more sophisticated and efficient"* (Tomolya, Padáyi 2014) the integration of the cyber tools into terrorism is only natural. Therefore, cyber terrorism can be considered as a step forward on the way of the evolution of terrorism. A famous professor of Haifa University said: "cyber terrorism is more anonymous than traditional terrorist methods." (Weimann 2004) The virtual world of the internet offers chances for radicalization to an extent that has never been seen and never considered before. The social media has already created new ways for radicalization and becoming a terrorist. From the counter-terrorism's point of view the best examples are the new forms of radicalization spreading via the internet that can be

seen, in a figurative sense, as “*the main road and railroad network of the electronic world which enables a highly efficient transfer and also can reach persons living far from each other and also capable to influence their community and world perception.*” (Rolington 2015)

The cyberspace also plays an important role in financing terrorism that is an important point because “*the guaranties for transparency of the financial system and traceability of financial transactions have to play an outstanding role in the struggle against terrorism.*” (Padányi 2015) We can state that the cyber threat is one of the most serious challenges in the work of the national security and counter-terrorism services. It proves that terrorist organizations use the opportunities given by the development of the information technology for improving and widening their capabilities quite often. As its consequence “*the dependence of the majority of societies from the online infrastructure also means a real vulnerability against cyber attacks.*” (Dannreuther 2016) The main features of the new challenges emerging as consequences of the use of cyberspace by cyber terrorists are:

- a) Global opportunities;
- b) Opportunities given by the big data;
- c) Opportunities given by the three-dimensional informatics
- d) Opportunities given by the internet media;
- e) The internet as the tool and scene of the terrorist attacks.

The use of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear tools (CBRN) is also among the important future challenges in relation to terrorism. The global warming also opens new perspectives for the terrorists. This phenomenon has played an important role in creating the conditions for attacks with biological agents. The biological terrorist warfare has opened new opportunities for the terrorists to maximize the number of casualties. The threat is enormous and the world must prepare for that. Biological warfare using bacteria and viruses is not a new invention. The poisoning of wells, deploying contaminated animal cadavers had been a routine practice in the ancient times. The cruelest period of chemical arms race was during World War I. Biological weapons, as we know them, were used in World War II and in Vietnam as well. The criminal groups started to invest in laboratories some decades ago. They used these labs for producing narcotics but we should not exclude the production of materials usable for terrorist purposes. There is a chance that in some operations – for example in Syria – chemical weapons have been used but usually there are few cases with undisputable evidences proving it.

The use of drones is an absolutely new terrorist challenge. On the one hand, the uncontrolled and unlimited spread of these devices can provoke a serious danger and, on the other hand, their use has no legal regulation yet. Beyond the cited author's words the fact that the ISIL also applied drones proves that drones became one of the major challenges of the postmodern terrorism.

The most complicated field in countering terrorism is of the alternative tools. In general terms we can say that there are infinite numbers of tools used in terrorist attacks. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the terrorist try to reduce the cost of attack

as much as they can. Ramming, i.e. the physical frontal and direct attack using vehicles, is one of the mostly spread and best known form of acts using alternative tools. Ramming also has a millennium old tradition in warfare. The ancient Greeks used this tactics quite often during battles on the sea. Kamikaze attacks practically have the same root.

Ramming is not only a new challenge for the services and institutions participating in the struggle against terrorism, but also represents a new level of threat which is able to increase the fear and uncertainty, i.e. intimidation that is one of the goals of the terrorists.

The truck ramming in Berlin on 19th December, 2016 showed that for the price of a handgun and a fistful of cartridges a terrorist attack can be organized. Due to its low costs ramming may be one of the most dangerous and spectacular tools of terrorists. The prevention of the attacks with alternative tools and the protection against such attacks is an extremely hard task from the technical and technological point of view.

In the previous pages the formal and practical features of postmodern terrorism have been overviewed. According to the current and foreseeable tendencies, it is highly probable that contemporary technology will be mixed up with traditional tools. (Jenkins, Butterworth 2018) As we can see, on the one hand, tools of postmodern terrorism are partially the same as those of classic terrorism and, on the other hand, some new and more effective tools appear representing a higher risk. The new situation requires the elaboration of new mechanisms to respond to it. This is the top priority task of the national security, law enforcement and counter-terrorism services. In the new strategic ambience the words of Mark M. Loewenthal, the former head of analysis of the Central Intelligence Agency gain new importance: *“the capability of gathering information about the target can exist and cannot exist. Once it exists it can be successful or can be not.”* (Loewenthal 2017)

Conclusion

What will the future bring us in the period of the radically changed security ambience, during the era of postmodern terrorism? The question is more than logic. To answer where, in which direction will terrorism go in the forthcoming years and decades is really difficult. All our answers, even the simplest ones, have a number of uncertainty factors. The most important amongst them is the human factor itself.

There is a very important basic point: The researches related to cyberspace and to “the use of information technology by terrorist groups or individuals to achieve their goals” (Bogdanoski 2013) confirm the importance of the use of structural and technological innovations to successfully face and struggle against the new security risks of terrorism.

It can be explained with the fact that terrorism is primarily a political phenomenon (Gál 2017) therefore it has the mark of the consequences of incalculability of human behavior. At the same time it does not mean that we shall reject the possibility to forecast the possible tendency in order to undertake the necessary measures.

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János Rada

Anticlericalism and „Kulturkampf” in the last third of the 19th century in Hungary*

During the last third of the 19th century, Hungary had to face a series of ecclesiastical policy struggles that, especially during the second half of the century, were tearing apart the traditional public and social positions of the Catholic Church Europe-wide, hence abolishing or at least severely restricting the old privileges of the clergy. Therefore, Hungarian ecclesiastical policy struggles were part of the history of European Kulturkampf.¹ Events, ratified laws and struggles leading to them are well known and thoroughly processed in Hungarian historiography.² However, it is still contradictory whether the use of the term “Kulturkampf” (“cultural struggle”) is appropriate in the case of Hungarian church policy struggles and tensions. Naturally, Kulturkampf has been interpreted by many people and in many ways. Depending on the different perceptions, historians and historical figures both judged differently whether a Kulturkampf took place in 19th century Hungary. On the one hand, my paper is about the investigation of the concepts and positions of the Hungarian historiography. On the other hand, I also pay attention to the concepts of the historical sources from the 19th century, which are mainly press distributions and parliamentary documents discussing Kulturkampf. Finally, on the basis of the study of radical ecclesiastical discourses, I will highlight how strongly the Hungarian anti-clerical discourses and programs invoked the Prussian and German Kulturkampf,³ which was regarded as a model of cultural struggles. At the same time, these were generally embedded in the European ideology system of contemporary anti-clericalism.

On January 17, 1873, the term Kulturkampf was introduced by Liberal Rudolf Virchow in his speech before the Prussian Legislative Body. From then on, the expression conquered most of the European languages. Shortly after Virchow's speech, the term “Kulturkampf” appeared in the Hungarian press as well. The way in which the expression was used was characterized by the wide variety of concepts and interpretations. Although the term was mostly used in reports regarding the Kulturkampf in Germany or Switzerland, the Catholic press in the 1870s introduced

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¹ About the European struggles see for instance Stadler 1996.

² E.g. Salacz 1938; Hanák 1978.

³ About the ideology of the Kulturkampf see e.g. Borutta 2011; Gross 1997.

theories which interpreted Kulturkampf in a broader sense. A great example of this is to be found in an essay published by Roman Catholic priest Viktor Palkovics in 1876. While exploring the principles of Kulturkampf, the author of the essay soon expounded that, as a result of the enlightened philosophy that was introduced primarily by Voltaire and was independent from religion, anticlerical struggles had been fought out against Christianity all across Europe since the French Revolution. According to Palkovics' position, liberalism that is rooted in philosophy fought a fierce battle against the church as well as religion. The separation of church and state, the civil marriage or the freedom of the press and religion were all brought bitterness for the church.⁴ It is visible that the author used the term Kulturkampf to indicate conflicts associated with secularization efforts that had indeed emerged all over the world at that time.

Similar concepts of Kulturkampf appeared on the pages of the Catholic newspaper titled *Religio*. In an article published in 1874, the terrible phenomenon of Kulturkampf can be observed in almost every part of the globe: there are places where fighting takes place openly and violently, while the struggle is quiet but still active somewhere else. The author of the article also points out that the essence of Kulturkampf is a trial of strength and struggle of power for the state and the church.⁵ Another article published in *Religio* reaches the idea of Kulturkampf by criticizing the liberal concept of state. In this phenomenon the author accordingly identifies the inherent structure of the religiously neutral "constitutionality", while proclaiming the responsibility of the theory of state omnipotence. According to his view, the authority of the state sees the church as its own competition.⁶ (At this point, it is worth noting that, unlike the classic Anglo-Saxon liberalism with the idea of "night watchman" state, several authors of continental liberalism have indeed proposed constitutionality that is widely competent and regulates most aspects of life by law.)⁷ In addition to similarly broad interpretations, the majority of publicists were discussing the specifically German-style Kulturkampf in the clerical press: one that is accompanied by the open and exaggerated confrontation between authority of state and the Catholic Church and is characterized by the harsh statutory and regulatory measures taken against the church.

It is no coincidence that catholic publicists in the 1870s considered the possibility of Kulturkampf very threatening, in accordance with the general Prussian pattern. In addition to the developments in Germany, their fear was based on the experiences of the previous years in Hungary. In 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Conciliation was a turning point for church policy:⁸ after the restoration of the Hungarian constitution, the liberal political elite was once again in a governing position. Therefore, policy debates that focused on the influence of the former established church immediately flared up. At the same time, attacks on Catholicism also intensified. The direction of the public morale was indicated by parliamentary applications and interpellations as well as programs in the press, which called for the review of the legal status of the Catholic Church, the

⁴ Palkovics 1876.

⁵ *Religio* 34/40. May 19, 1875. 315.

⁶ *Religio* 33/35. May 2, 1874. 274–275.

⁷ Szabó 2008: 15–16.

⁸ About the Hungarian Church Policy of the 19th century: Csáky 1973; Csorba 1999.

abolition of its old prerogatives, the regulation of the relations of denominations – as about half of Hungary's population was non-Catholic –, and even the civil reform of the law of marriage. More radical concepts have already reached the program of secularization of the vast, medieval church estate. After 1870, at the time of the Prussian-German Kulturkampf, there were already intense debates in Hungary.⁹ However, Hungarian historiography does not discuss the topic of the “Hungarian Kulturkampf” in connection with the history of the period between 1867 and 1873, which was highly tense in terms of ecclesiastical matters. This can largely be explained by the fact that major reforms, such as the introduction of civil marriage, have not been introduced yet. Consequently, the secularization of the ecclesiastical estates did not take place. From the mid-1870s onwards, church policy disputes grew faint.

Hungarian historiography primarily refers to “Hungarian Kulturkampf” as the history of struggles that took place between 1890 and 1895. Namely, this period lasted until the adoption of liberal church policy laws. In his monograph, Catholic historian Gábor Salacz argued that the struggles of the first half of the 1890s could safely be called a period of Kulturkampf. According to Salacz's definition, Kulturkampf arises when it becomes impossible for citizens to equally comply with the laws and regulations of the church and state.¹⁰ (His interpretation was otherwise entirely in line with the typical Catholic conception at the time of the struggle.) The domestic laws that regulated the issues of denominationally mixed marriages and – more specifically – dealt with the religion of children born of such union, pushed the country in such a situation at the beginning of the last decade of the century. At that time, the debate on the reform of the church policy was flared up once again, as the introduction of the long-awaited civil marriage and state registration promised remedy for the issues. These reforms have now been included in the program of Sándor Wekerle, who served as the head of government since 1892. It is quite natural that the Catholic Church, regarding marriage as a sacrament, has fought against the church policy of the liberal government. The Hungarian Episcopacy received instructions from Rome several times. The *Constanti Hungarorum* encyclic by Pope Leo XIII urged the Hungarian Catholics to organize themselves and fight against the upcoming church policy reforms. Cardinal Rampolla declared in a very warlike manner that the Catholic Church would not deliver St. Stephen's apostolic kingdom to the Calvinists and Jews without a fight. Despite the Catholic resistance, the parliament finally ratified laws on state registration, civil marriage, free practice of religion, and the Israeli reception in 1894 and 1895.¹¹ At this point, the struggles around church policy have come to an end.

Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the term “Hungarian Kulturkampf” has not become a commonplace in studies that deal with politics and church history.¹² The events of these years are regarded as “church policy struggles” (*egyházpolitikai küzdelem*) by the authors who wrote about the tensions of this period. It is also typical that the term “Kulturkampf” is used only in quotation marks. The *raison d'être* of

⁹ See Salacz 1974: 19–27.

¹⁰ Salacz 1938: 9.

¹¹ Fazekas 2008: 13–15.

¹² For example Csáky 1973, Hanák 1978; Csorba 1999; Katus 2009; Kósa 2011.

Hungarian form of the term is called into question mainly because the struggle in Hungarian territories did not get as bad as in the German Empire and especially in Prussia. The confrontation between the government and the church remained much more subdued, therefore it proved to be less intensified. In Hungary, no bishop was deprived of his office, Catholic priests were not imprisoned, and church people were not forced to leave the country. Additionally, laws ratified in the 1890s did not affect either Catholic education or ecclesiastical property. There was no ban introduced concerning religious orders. In terms of Kulturkampf, the point of reference for Hungarian historians is mainly the Kulturkampf in Prussia. In the light of this, we can understand why they are more cautious about using this term.

It is worth examining if the contemporary historical figures identified an ongoing Kulturkampf in Hungary in the first half of the 1890s. In the absence of a generally accepted answer, divergent opinions were raised in this case as well. In the Hungarian Parliament, debate not only took place in connection with church policy reforms, but sometimes they were also about as to whether the current conflicts can be identified as a Kulturkampf in the country. The opponents of church policy reforms have repeatedly spoken of cultural struggle, which was disconfirmed, opposed by the government.¹³ The reason for this was that there were very strong fears regarding the expression of Kulturkampf. According to these concerns, the cultural struggle would disrupt the peace of the country by flaring up religious conflicts, and would dissipate its forces, thus hindering the establishment of the strong Hungarian national state. The term aroused fear even among the more moderate liberals. They saw the Kulturkampf as an unfortunate opportunity that a religiously and nationally divided country must avoid by all means.¹⁴ After a series of attacks, Minister Csáky finally drew attention to the absence of tougher retaliation against the church. He was trying to refute the accusation that his decree of 1890 had become the initiator of Kulturkampf. According to his argument, Kulturkampf would only be present in Hungary if the enforcement of the law would have been maintained by the use of authorities and ever-increasing penalties.¹⁵ In this flow of thought, it is worth to note that he used the term "Kulturkampf" in its German form, wherewith he used to refer to the events in Prussia and Germany. Still, we cannot say that only the Catholic press and the opposing forces against church policy reforms identified a real Kulturkampf in the struggles of the first half of the 1890s. Similar positions have sometimes appeared in the moderate liberal and Protestant press as well. However, the responsibility here was usually attributed not to the liberal government but to Rome and to the society of "ultramontanes".¹⁶ In radical anti-clerical groups, contemporary developments have often been identified as a Kulturkampf. In fact, it was considered especially necessary that such fights should take place in Hungary too. According to their beliefs, the Church's power can only be broken through Kulturkampf.¹⁷

¹³ See for instance *Képviselőházi napló* [Parliamentary Diaries] 1887–1892, XIX. 379–380; XX. 43. and *Képviselőházi napló* [Parliamentary Diaries] 1892–1897, III. 387; XXII. 126.

¹⁴ Such fears are well summarized in *Pesti Napló* 44/72. March 8, 1893. 1–2.

¹⁵ *Képviselőházi napló* [Parliamentary Diaries] 1892–1897, XVI. 145.

¹⁶ For instance Bartha 1892: 799. col.

¹⁷ See "Rutilus" 1893; "Trebla Kádler" 1894.

We have seen that the position of Hungarian historiography is not unified in the issue of whether the tensions and conflicts of the Hungarian church and state in the 19th century can be called Kulturkampf or not. Moreover, the opinions of historical characters are also diverse regarding this topic. In the followings, I will make a short attempt to interpret the intellectual history of Kulturkampf based on the analysis of political discourses. During my research, I examined anticlerical press products, especially pamphlets, written in the last third of the 19th century.¹⁸ On the basis of this source material, I will write about the rhetoric of Kulturkampf.

What characterized this interpretation scheme, manner of speech, namely the rhetoric of Kulturkampf? Firstly, the accusation of ultramontanism was formulated, according to which the ultramontane priests are loyal to Rome, not to their own country. In other words, the opponents of the Church have pushed the issue of the hierarchy of loyalties. As a result, loyalty towards church and state confronted each other. According to anti-Catholic press products, the Pope is the first for the ultramontanes, therefore clergy – especially the high clergy – was marked unpatriotic and treasonous. Anti-clerical publications have identified the essential condition of total state sovereignty in the eradication and breakdown of clergy's influence on the state and society. Thus, anti-clerical action was urged in the name of state sovereignty. (During the conservative reign of Pope Pius IX, the Church had indeed denied the supremacy of civilian states and the fact that state laws would stand above church rules.¹⁹) In summary, the anti-Catholic, liberal and nationalist groups interpreted the struggle as a national independence and self-defense campaign against Rome.

This vision was fully in line with the Prussian and German Kulturkampf ideology. Popular phrases and slogans in Hungary as well as in the German Empire were identical. Moreover, the popular anti-clerical programs were similar in Hungary and in Germany. They demanded – for instance – the expulsion of the Jesuits, the nationalization of schools and the introduction of civil marriage. Finally, there were suggestions also in Hungary that recommended the creation of a national church independent of Rome. The importance of European intellectual interactions and transfers is evidenced by the fact that Hungarian publicists were well informed in German literature, and often referred to the works of German authors. For example, the book *The Pope and the Council*, by Ignaz von Döllinger, was often quoted. The author was a German theologian, who was also the loudest critics of the church. The book was later published in Hungarian as well.²⁰ However, it is important to emphasize that both the German and the Hungarian anti-Catholic concepts have been based on earlier precedents from the Enlightenment-era. For this reason, articles have been published in anti-clerical literature dating back to the 18th century. For instance: since clergy was the enemy of “Enlightenment” and “Light” based on their approach, Catholic priests were often referred to as owls or bats.

¹⁸ E.g. Toldy 1868; “Papramorgó” 1870; Simonyi 1874; “Febronius” 1891; “Rutilus” 1893; “Veridicus” 1893; “Flamma” 1894. “Trebla Kádler” 1894.

¹⁹ See *The Great Papal Encyclicals*. Quanta Cura & The Syllabus of Errors. Condemning Current Errors. Pius IX. www.rosingsdigitalpublications.com (Last downloaded: September 10, 2019.)

²⁰ “Janus” 1870.

So they compared the clergy to nocturnal animals that were afraid of the light and their real home was the dark night.

All in all, we can say that the widespread anti-cleric ideas that inspired the legislation of Kulturkampf in Germany were also accepted in Hungary. However, the radical anti-clerical political practices were no longer valid on Hungarian ground. This can be explained partly by the limitations of the political system after 1867 and by the very strong positions of the Catholic Church in Hungary. Looking at the anti-clericalism and the rhetoric of the Kulturkampf from intellectual-historical approach, I think we can safely say that there is no doubt about the appearance of Kulturkampf in Hungary.

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Beáta Siskáné Szilasi – Péter Vadnai

Spatial pattern of social conflicts based on statistics data

Abstract

Social conflicts are present today not only at the level of individuals, but also at the levels of the community and the settlement. Some of the conflicts are visible, meaning they are not only perceived by the parties involved but also by others, but most are unexplored because they are out of the public domain. The aim of our research is to reveal the conflicts, either well-known or hidden, in the settlements, and to confirm their existence with the help of secondary statistical databases (HCSO – Hungarian Central Statistical Office, TEIR). The establishment of a primary database is essential for accurate identification and more detailed knowledge, which is carried out through questionnaires and interviews in the settlements. The purpose of creating and developing the database is the spatial representation, the creation of so-called social informatics maps.

Keywords: settlement conflict, statistical database, social informatics maps

1. Introduction, research questions

The aim of the basic research presented in the paper is to better understand the nature of social conflicts, to systematically describe them in the Northern Hungarian region, and to propose possible solutions for managing different types of social conflicts. The research is being carried out in the framework of the project EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00007 „Aspects on the development of intelligent, sustainable and inclusive society: social, technological, innovation networks in employment and digital economy.” at the University of Miskolc. In connection to the project, a statistical work group has been set up to continuously expand the secondary database with the aim of assisting the exploration of settlement conflicts. The basic concept of the research is based on the idea that conflicts in operation and in everyday life make the life in the settlements difficult. It is important to resolve ongoing tensions and conflicts of interest, it is important to take steps and find solutions in order to create a viable settlement environment and well-being.

The aim of research is to explore as many conflicts as possible, to gather the factors that trigger problems and to show them all. The first task of the team was the establishment of a data collection, as it was necessary to identify the settlements in the Northern Hungarian region that will be subjected to empirical research. The settlements

were classified in accordance with their population and in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County two towns (Ózd and Sátoraljaújhely) and three villages (Bükkszentkereszt, Kistokaj and Fulókercs) were selected. The main questions of our research were the followings:

- What are the statistical indicators in the appearance of which settlement conflicts arise?
- Do territorial disparities confirm the presence of conflicts indicated in questionnaires?
- How do settlements involved in the primary research fit into the characteristics of their immediate environment, and what position do they have within the region?

Based on two case studies, this paper presents the findings of the current phase of the research. One analysis is related to conflict types (demographic characteristics – social connection; residence – crime), while the other case study attempts to answer the questions above using the example of the Ózd.

2. Literature review; data and methods

Conflicts can be classified along several aspects. The importance of model creations lies in choosing the right treatment method. In previous studies, for example, we classified them by the level at which the human relationship system operates.

Another type-creating feature is to focus on the existential level of the conflict, meaning that we shall determine if the conflict exists in reality or only in the perception of the participants (imaginary). The base of “real” conflicts could be the conflicting goals, emotions, values and interests of the parties. In contrast, “imaginary” conflicts are the results of human misunderstanding, delusion, historical tradition, stereotypes, prejudices or hostility.

Conflicts can be classified into different types based on the root causes of them.

- Relationship (intrapersonal, interpersonal) conflicts
- Value conflicts
- Structural conflicts
- Communication and information conflicts
- Conflicts of interest (konszenzus.org).

In the 21st century the analysis and exploration of social conflicts became more widely researched than in previous centuries. Social conflicts can no longer be regarded as purely socio-cultural, ethnic, religious, political or economic conflicts, are no longer clear in nature and scope, but became multi-faceted. Conflict research is not a homogeneous field of research in the sense of a specialized discipline as found in academic science; it develops in changing forms of specialization and knowledge combinations that are described as inter- or transdisciplinary (Nowotny et al 2001). Complex social conflicts have various reasons and causes, both in the life of people and in the structures of

societal systems, in the structures of power and forms of ownership, and in the ways humans deal with nature and use natural resources (Bruckmeier 2014).

The statistical research team is constantly expanding its secondary database to assist the exploration of settlement conflicts and to enable the spatial, later interactive, display of statistical data. To display social conflicts in a map, firstly we used data coming from the following indicators:

- Population change (2001–2016) by district level of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county
- Number of registered job seekers (2001, 2011, 2016) by district level for the three counties
- Population at the end of the year (2001) by settlement level
- Population at the end of year (2011, base index, base year: 2001)
- Population at the end of year (2016, base index, base year: 2001)
- Total number of registered job seekers (persons) (2001) by settlement level
- Total number of registered job seekers (persons) (2011, base index, base year: 2001)
- Total number of registered job seekers (persons) (2016, base index, base year: 2001)
- Population aged 0-14 at the end of the year (persons), Population aged 65 and over (persons), aging index – settlement level

The sample settlements were selected by a simple random sampling method, and ArcGIS software was used to map the statistical database.

3. Statistical confirmation of social conflicts

This section of the paper presents some examples of the results obtained from the processing of statistical data and questionnaires. In the case of the Northern Hungary and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county, the increase of differences between the regions is common on a social level. In the case of larger cities, it is the risk of turning into ghetto, while in the case of villages population decline and the aging of the population are the highest risks. A significant number of young graduates have left the region over the past decade, influencing and forming labor market processes. Demographic indicators show that where the Roma population lives in a higher rate, the standard of living, educational level, the comfort level of buildings are lower than average. In deprived settlements, the number of people in need of social assistance and the number of unemployed is high (Gelsei et al. 2005).

In recent years, significant demographic changes have taken place in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County as well, which meant a decrease in the number of 15-74-year-olds considered to be economically active. The overall decline in population is also common. According to the aggregate data of the HCSO publication, the county had a population of 675,000 in 2014 (compared to 753,497 in 2000). Labor market data show that in 2014 there were 243,500 people employed, of which nearly 64% had secondary education, 21.8% had a diploma and 14.1% had a lower qualification (Siskáné Sz. 2018).

The first type of conflict analyzed is that of the intergenerational problems based on demographics. As the process of aging is continuous in Hungary it is becoming an increasingly important issue of today. The basic data we have analyzed: population at the end of the year; three age groups of the population; migration balance. The population change that is the basis of Figure 1, which is given by the base index (the base year was 2001), shows that there are no districts in the region where there has been a positive population change. Four districts have high values (population decrease over 20%): Bátonyterenyé district in Nógrád county, Bélapátfalva district in Heves county, and Sátoraljaújhely and Tokaj districts in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county. Besides the losses due to internal migration, the decrease in population was also influenced by the increase in the engagement in foreign labor. , Based on statistical data, settlements (Figure 2) where the aging index is very high can be clearly distinguished in the region.




Figure 1. Change of the population of Northern Hungary region (between 2001 and 2016) and the number of registered job seekers at district level (2001, 2011 and 2016).

Source: Hungarian Central Statistics Office, edited by P. Vadnai




Figure 2. Aging index of the Northern Hungary region for 2016 and age-related conflicts in the studied settlements based on primary data.

Source: primary databases, edited by P. Vadnai

The growing proportion of older generations means not only a shrinking population or even 'depopulation' of villages and towns, but also a disparity of behavioral and moral standards, which can be a source of conflict. Figure 2 shows that in each of the examined municipalities age-related tensions appeared. In terms of ratios, 'yes' responses were found with similar frequencies for settlements of different sizes, suggesting that this type of conflict is present in urban and rural social spaces regardless of the settlement's size.

In terms of focusing on the institutions, the following indicators have been selected: educational institutions; general practitioners, social services, disadvantaged people, unemployment rate, public work. In the case of the settlements, one of the most important issues is the existence of job opportunities or the lack of them. Based on the statistical data (Figure 1), which shows the change in the number of registered job seekers, it can be concluded that a significant improvement has happened in the case of the municipalities surveyed between 2011 and 2016.

The reason for this positive change is related to the labor market transformations connected to the global crisis. One possible response to the processes generated by the global economic crisis, introduced by many countries (including Hungary), is the employment-related policy trend model of the workfare society. In Hungary, the public

employment system has been transformed since 2011, with the aim of achieving a form of employment that is socially useful and generates value, based on the principle of 'giving jobs instead of subsidies' (Koós 2016).

Public employment rates are reflected not only by actual numbers, but also by direct job creation costs, which may vary considerably from country to country. In the case of Europe in 2012, Hungary, Ireland, Bulgaria and France spent the most on direct job-creating public employment programs. Expenditure increased subsequently in only three countries in the following period: Bulgaria, Latvia and Hungary. The rate of participants in direct job creation varies between countries, the highest rates (above 5% per 100 job seekers between 2006 and 2012) can be found in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, France, Ireland and Hungary (Siskáné Sz. – Halász 2017).

The rates shown in Figure 1 are therefore the results of this economic measure. It will be an important question for the future to know how many people will be transferred from the public work program to the primary labor market, as this form of employment is not for long-term sustainment. The empirical study revealed that the inhabitants of the settlement are more satisfied with the working conditions (Figure 3), but there are also differences, as the inhabitants of Bükkszentkereszt are less satisfied than the inhabitants of Kistokaj. There are also differences between the two towns, those living in Ózd preferred to choose between values 3 and 4, while in Sátoraljaújhely most respondents indicated values of 4 and 5. The statistical data also confirm the changes in employment, as in the HCSO's 2016 micro-census statistics, in the topic of the economic activity of the population, the ratio of the employed in the Northern Hungary region is 42.7%, and in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County 42.4%. These values are much higher than those recorded in the 2001 census, which was only 28.1% for the county.




Figure 3. Percentage of job satisfaction in the surveyed municipalities (on 5 value measurement scale; 1 = not in the least, 5 = greatly)

Source: primary databases, edited by B. Siskáné Szilasi

The characteristics and the image of a settlement are shaped by the people living there within the natural and built environment. However, settlements are constantly changing over time, and the strengthening of certain factors (society, economy) may make a living space attractive, while others (decline, crime, segregation) may make it repulsive, leading to depopulation and then unbeing. Some of the conflicts within settlements are related to these components, and, within these, are determined by crime-related events. In our crime map for the Northern Hungary region, we used the HCSO data for 2016 (Figure 4) and compared it to the demographic situation and educational attainment.




Figure 4. The number of registered crimes of Northern Hungary region in 2016 at district level (per 100 000 inhabitants)

Source: Hungarian Central Statistics Office, edited by P. Vadnai

In the case of the settlements in focus, two important factors can be observed in the light of the new data: one is that the crime data did not increase, i.e. there is no increase in the number of criminal offenses in the region, which may be due to the decline in economic indicators and the economic power of society (impoverished and aging population of small villages). Another factor is that generational crises, as a result of migration losses (internal or external), may gain more and more significance in municipalities. It is also reflected in the different quality and ways of life.

As a result of the increasing emigration, villages (rural areas) are becoming more and more depopulated, the average age of the population remaining in the area is increasing, and the resistance to crime (thefts, burglaries) is decreasing. In the future, it will be an important question whether crime in these areas will increase as a result of the demographic shift. Another important question is personal involvement. In the primary research, respondents were asked whether they had been involved in a crime or if they had been victims of crime e.g. theft. The distribution of answers is shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Have you been the victim of any crime related to valuables, such as theft?

Source: primary databases, edited by B. Siskáné Szilasi

In the case of the two towns we got almost the same proportion of the affected population, 10% of the respondents of Sátoraljaújhely answered 'yes', while in Ózd the proportion was 8.01%. In case of the villages, between 0.5% and 1.1% of the respondents in Fülökércs and Kistokaj were affected by theft, in Bükkzentkereszt the response rate was 2.12% for all respondents.

4. Case study – Ózd and the settlements of the Ózd district

The urban development of Ózd began in the 18th century, when coal mines were opened in succession and an iron refinery and rolling mill plant were built. Thanks to these developments, by the 1930s, the town has become one of the country's major industrial centers. The daily lives of the people living there, their way of life, their livelihood, as well as their community life were determined by the factories and the working life. The settlement was given town status in 1949 by when its population has already exceeded

20,000 people (24,830 people). The Roma population in the settlement was around 2000 at that time (Esélyteremtő Programterv 2015).

It was also common for mining settlements and ironworks centers to employ a greater number of people with lower qualifications for auxiliary and unskilled labor. In the case of such settlements, the closing of factories and mines resulted in much greater social conflict because of the generally mono-industrial economic structure. Thus, after closures, due to the lack of education and occupation, some people were unable to find work elsewhere and remained largely in the respective municipalities, thus increasing the number of unemployed. The economic conflict was also significant, as workers with a lower qualification at mines and factories formerly earned quite high salaries, but after closures they became completely vulnerable to subsidy programs, and their social status also changed significantly. This process can be observed in many towns and villages with similar characteristics causing serious tensions at the municipal level (Siskáné Sz. B. 2006).

After 1990, Ózd experienced the greatest crisis in its modern history with the parallel regression of metallurgy and mining. At the time of shutting down, there were only a few parts of the plant that were still profitable to operate, which were successfully privatized. However, only a fraction of the people living there could be employed in the remaining jobs. An industrial park was created in 1995 to promote urban rehabilitation could employ only 1,400 people. The number could be regarded as high if it were not compared to the 10,000 people who became unemployed when the factories closed down. Mine closures due to the uneconomic nature of coal mining have further aggravated the unemployment situation in the region. Coal mining for heavy industry in the county previously employed about 12,000 people (Esélyteremtő Programterv 2015).

The Ózd district is one of the most unfavorable districts of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county in terms of unemployment. In 2012, for example, the unemployment rate was 21.4%. Nowadays, this has been reduced to slightly more than 10% thanks to public works programs. However, the proportion of long-term unemployed in the Ózd district was slightly above 40% in 2015, compared to 46% in Ózd. It is a particularly difficult situation in terms of social conflicts, especially since we are dealing with a lasting and long-term process.

Of the 17 settlements belonging to the Ózd district, two have a city rank (Ózd, and Borsodnádásd), only the district center has a very large population (Figure 6). In terms of the size of the settlements, there are 4 smaller villages (Bükkmogyorósd, Kissikátor, Lénárdaróc, Uppony); 5 small villages (Borsodbóta, Csernely, Csokvaomány, Domaháza, Nekézseny); there are also 5 larger villages (Borsodszentgyörgy, Farkaslyuk, Hangony, Járdánháza, Sáta) and one village with an outstandingly large population (Arló).




Figure 6. The distribution of settlements in Ózd district by size of settlement (*Source: Hungarian Central Statistics Office*)

Since 1985 the population of settlements in the district has begun to decline steadily as a result of the regression of iron manufacturing. Figure 7 shows the data of previous census and the census of 2017 in terms of population (without Ózd). It can be seen that the population has decreased in all settlements during the 6 years between the two censuses. It is not only due to the decrease in the number of live births, but also to the migration balance. There are settlements where the number of births has increased compared to the year of the census (Borsodbóta, Borsodnádásd, Csernely, Domaháza, Hangony, Járdánháza, Sáta and Uppony). However, it can be seen in Figure 8 that these settlements had a significant emigration compared to the average internal migration in the district, which resulted in a decrease in the population even with a higher birth rate.




Figure 7. The population number in settlements of Ózd district in 2011 and 2017 (without Ózd; *Hungarian Central Statistics Office*)




Figure 8. The net internal migration rate in the settlements of Ózd district measurement the average of the district (per 1000 inhabitants).

Database: B. Szilasi Siskáné; edited by P. Vadnai

The data of Ózd are analyzed separately because, as we can see in Figure 5, it has a much larger population than the other settlements in the district. Ózd reached its population maximum in the 1980s (1985: 48 990 people), and since then the population has been declining steadily. By 2005, the population of the town has dropped to 37,528, and by 2017 it has fallen to 32,564, with the significant contribution of the persistent migration losses of the recent years (Figure 9).




Figure 9. Change of population number of Ózd between 2005 and 2017

Hungarian Central Statistics Office

In the case of Ózd the former increase in population was accompanied by changes in the structure of settlements. The settlements forming the town of Ózd (Ózd, Sajóvárkony, Bolyok, Vasvár) were agricultural settlements. The conflict between nature and man emerged when the growth of the settlement and the construction of new dwellings caused the elimination of the former agricultural areas. The anthropogenic landscape formation process has already started before World War II because of the continuous modernization of the factory. As a result of the expansion of the factory area and the continuous construction works, an unfavorable urban structure, has been created that still exists today. It has also determined the development opportunities for a long time. An industrial estate is located in the central area, so the living areas were constantly contaminated by iron dust and noise pollution. From 1969 onwards, the construction of the new city center began with ten-story buildings and service centers built there (Centrum Department Store, District Office, Police, Court, Post Office). Up to the end of iron production in Ózd, the elimination and management of environmental pollution were significant sources of conflict in the settlement. One step towards the solution was the establishment of well-arranged green areas (F. Dobosy 2001).

For Ózd, the change of regime brought about significant economic changes, mainly in the transformation of the labor market, the creation of new employment opportunities and the management of high unemployment. Entrepreneurships have played and still play an important role in the city and the district (Figure 10).




Figure 10. The number of active enterprises in settlements of Ózd district (per 100 inhabitants)

Databases B. Szilasi Siskáné; edited by P. Vadnai

The restructuring of the economic structure and the transition to market economy brought two important measures: one was the establishment of the Ózd Industrial Park and the other was the promotion and support of entrepreneurs, for which the city founded specialized organizations in the 1990s (Ózd City Economic Development Office, Ózd Industrial Park Ltd., Ózd Business Center etc.).

Small and medium-sized enterprises were established and developed in the city, with more than 400 social enterprises, cooperatives and 1,100 sole proprietorships in the early 2000s (F. Dobosy 2001).

In recent years, the number of operating businesses was steady (Table 1), and non-profit and non-governmental organizations are also present. In 2017, there were 120 non-profit organizations and 113 NGOs in Ózd. The number of registered job seekers was 2037, while that of the public employees was 1337.

Table 1. The number of enterprises and employments in settlements of Ózd district
Source: Hungarian Central Statistics Office

	Number of active enterprises (According to business demography) - GFO\ '11, GFO\ '14 (2016 data)	Number of nonprofit organizations (2017 data)	Number of NGOs (2017 data)	Number of registered job seekers (person) (2017 data)	Number of public employees (person) (2017 data)
Ózd district	548	191	175	4022	2570
Arló	11	6	5	587	215
Borsodbóta	2	3	2	79	105
Borsodnádasd	34	12	11	265	128
Borsodszentgyörgy	11	7	7	68	31
Bükkmogyorósd	2	1	1	9	6
Csernely	12	3	3	63	96
Csokvaomány	8	3	3	52	58
Domaháza	8	4	3	142	41
Farkaslyuk	14	3	3	248	118
Hangony	14	11	10	149	115
Járdánháza	37	5	5	151	139
Kissikátor	3	2	1	23	8
Lénárdardaróc	1	1	1	15	10
Nekézseny	4	4	3	35	28
Ózd	380	120	113	2037	1337
Sáta	4	-	-	91	114
Uppony	3	6	4	8	21

As we have seen earlier, one of the main problems in the Ózd district is employment, and the presence of a significant Roma population makes it even more complicated (Table 2). The low employment rate in the Ózd district is made up of several factors - lack of jobs, high number of job seekers and unemployed, high long-term unemployment rate, high number of inactive people, low entrepreneurial activity, transportation difficulties, lack of work experience, and unskilled labor (Esélyteremtő-programterv 2015).

In Ózd, the number of people unemployed for longer than 180 days is high and the proportion of registered unemployed with qualification not exceeding primary school is around 50 % of all unemployed.

Table 2. Rate and number of Roma population in settlements of Ózd district

Source: Gyerekeshelyi Kistérségi tükör, municipal estimate

Settlement	Resident population number (January 2010) (person)	Roma estimated population	
		number (person)	rate (%)
Arló	4 008	2 000	49,9
Borsodbóta	943	470	49,8
Borsodnádásd	3 380	600	17,8
Borsodszentgyörgy	1 248	200	16
Bükkmogyorósd	145	15	10,3
Csernely	846	171	20,2
Csokvaomány	963	114	11,8
Domaháza	902	450	49,9
Farkaslyuk	2 023	1 000	49,4
Hangony	1 694	520	30,7
Járdánháza	1 886	849	45
Kissikátor	345	0	0
Lénárdvár	311	7	2,3
Nekézseny	812	0	0
Ózd	38 344	-	29-33
Sáta	1 274	400	31,4
Uppony	351	4	1,1
Ózd district	59 475	6800	24,4

Due to the presence of families with constant low incomes and the high proportion of beneficiaries, the district's population is heavily indebted. Due to difficult financial conditions the population also has to face poor housing conditions. The condition of the houses is deteriorating and there are no financial resources for renovation. The stock of municipal rental housing is decreasing. The number of people living in low-comfort houses is high and there are segregated areas and areas at risk of segregation in the municipalities. The disorder of the living environment and the deterioration of public security place an increasing burden on the city administration (Esélyteremtő-programterv 2015). Both in the life of the city and the district, these characteristics can be regarded as the causes of the everyday settlement conflicts.

5. Conclusion

Based on the data available so far, the research has shown that in many cases conflicts in the operation and everyday life of settlements make it difficult or hinder functions. In order to resolve the ongoing tensions and conflicts of interest, and also for the sake of human well-being, it is important to take steps and find solutions for the creation of a livable environments.,. Secondary statistical data have contributed to the selection of sample settlements, and primary research data have helped to identify actual conflicts.

The database, created from two statistical sources and continuously expanded, helps to display spatial processes, similarities and differences, thus providing additional information to develop a system of settlement conflicts. Demographic, institutional, labor market and crime-related conflicts in municipalities have been identified so far. These are the types of conflicts that occur in both urban and rural areas and determine the daily lives of those living in the settlements. As the research progresses, we will get even more detailed data that will help establish a general action plan, a conflict management model. In the case of the conflict types presented in the first case study, it has been demonstrated that demographic statistical indicators can be used to identify those settlements with a higher chance of conflict. Labor market, employment-related and crime statistics can also be used to confirm problems identified in primary research.

The second case study shows that it is worth comparing the data of the given settlement with its immediate surroundings and with the characteristics of the settlements belonging to the district, because this way the regional disparities are more visible. Primary research supports the information that appears in statistical data and maps, and help to understand why a particular type of conflict appeared in that particular settlement. The further analyses will align primary and secondary data, continue mapping, and locate sample settlements within the districts.

Acknowledgement

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Kinga Szabó-Tóth

Measuring Local Social Innovation Potential*

Abstract

Compared to technological innovations social innovations concentrate on the rejuvenation of human potential. In the 21st century the ever-renewing social sciences, and especially sociology, are facing a challenge: social innovation cannot be developed without them. In this study we give a short summary of the notion of social innovation and present some previous research regarding the question in focus carried out at the Institute of Applied Social Sciences. It is followed by the introduction of our methodological tool for measuring local social innovation potential.

Keywords: local innovation potencial; applied social research; spatial differencies, social inclusion, regional development

I. Introduction

In the North Hungarian region both social and regional disadvantages are more concentrated than that of the Hungarian average. These disadvantages, regional and social inequalities offer a real challenge for the researchers of social sciences. The results of scientific research on regional and social processes show that disadvantages can only be lessened by innovation and especially by encouraging and spreading social innovation. Compared to technological innovations social innovations concentrate on the rejuvenation of human potential. They are not created in scientific labs but in everyday workshops. Theories are drawn for practical experiences and the emergence of social innovation shall always come from widespread social consensus. In the 21st century the ever-renewing social sciences, and especially sociology, are facing a challenge: social innovation cannot be developed without them.

In my study I give a short summary of the notion of social innovation and present some previous research regarding the question in focus carried out at our Institute. It is followed by the introduction of our methodological tool for measuring local social innovation potential.

When working on the local innovation potential (LIP) index I drew upon existing theories and models of social innovation. The complexity of LIP index comes from the

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
fact that it builds upon qualitative and quantitative data and research methods. Therefore it is simultaneously based on social scientific methods that are traditionally considered “soft” and “hard”.

As a starting point I focused on the fact that settlements and communities can be multifaceted which means the LIP index shall also be such. The LIP index is fitting to take local specificities, local characteristics into account and by doing so it is fitting to present a fine-tuned description of the current situation and characteristics of a settlement, together with its future potential and the directions in development.

II. The sociological model of social innovation

The basis of social innovation might be found in personal innovation, i.e. in innovative thinking. Creativity has first been described by the psychologist Joy Paul Guilford in 1950.¹ Taking his aspects into account the innovative mind can be described as follows.

Figure 1. Characteristics of the innovative mind




Source: The author

¹ Guilford 1950.

The notion of social innovation has been described in various ways.² A common point in these is the emphasis on the novelty of innovations and the fact that social innovation is always associated with the well-being of a community and the improvement of the quality of life.³ The definitions also point out the need for communal solutions, for participation and for the joint effort of different sectors (state, nonprofit and religious) in finding the novelty factor of innovation.

Social innovation tends to work toward changing the status quo. In order to do so innovative and problem-solving turn of mind is a must. There are different ways and forms for an innovative initiative or product to come into life, but the process cannot skip any of the following steps: mapping problems and their causes, critical examination of already existing solutions and points of view, finding the domain of intervention, initiating innovation and, by the end, evaluation. Social innovation may have many forms: strategies, concepts, ideas, know-hows, organizational changes, co-operations and projects.

Figure 2. The complex model of innovation




Source: The author

² For a summary, see also Szendi 2018.

³ Howaldt – Kopp – Schwarz 2014; G. Fekete 2001; Kocziszky – Szendi 2018; Nemes – Varga 2015.

The model above illustrates the complexity of innovations. In terms of its modes of appearance innovation can be a new technology, product or service or, in institutional form, a new brand as well. In terms of financing innovation can be finance by the community, by volunteer work or by individual and civil sources. It has four scopes and its impacts and aims are complex. The steps of generating social innovations (figure 3.) follow the steps of social scientific research.

Figure 3. Steps of generating social innovation



Source: The author

As you can see above, the first and foremost step of generating innovation is complex exploration. It requires prudence and complexity. During this step we shall identify the problem(s) and familiarize with the environment of the innovation. During the second phase the challenge lies in the social-communal nature of innovation: we have to invite the local community. We need to find the aims of the community and include those in the innovative process (this step is closely related to the methods, views and processes of community development⁴). The third phase is the realization of local actions, the intervention with continuous feedbacks and testing of reactions. The key factor in generating social innovation is sharing – in several accounts. On the one hand in the forms of finding alliances; on the other in creating competent (preferably interdisciplinary) teams, and also in the form of dissemination well-known in projects.

⁴For more information: Szabó-Tóth 2010. and Tóth 2004, 2007

III. Former researches focusing on innovation

As I have already indicated, the survey of social processes and the follow-up changing of them have always been part of the sociological approach. The founding father of sociology, Auguste Comte concluded that the duty of social sciences is to provide accurate data, to facilitate change and to act as a form of mediator between social activism and science. The evolutionist Herbert Spencer point of view was that sociology can even change evolution (as he described social development in the terms of biological evolution) for the better. Following such first steps it is no wonder that the first president of the American Sociological Association, Lester Frank Brown advocated that in a so called sociocracy social scientists should control social processes by acting as public servants. In Ford's motor company a group of social scientists acted as human resource management body.

In the history of sociology – besides other approaches – the notion of surveying, describing and reforming and influencing social processes has always been present. I would even go that far as to say that it was a requirement of sociology. If a university department like ours operates in a region disadvantaged from so many points of view it has to deal with the external need for applying social scientific knowledge in problem solving. We need to carry out research that provides some sort of a guideline to practical issues, helps the inhabitants of the region to live better, strengthens social integration, compensates disadvantages and, by surveying the current situation and resources points out approaches and solutions. This is what makes us legitimate.

Following the statements above, in the last 10-20 years our institution participated in several projects aiming toward new solutions, new modes of cooperation (civil, religious and governmental). We did so by applying creativity, by turning to the methodology and paradigms of quantitative and qualitative sociology and helped in generating, facilitating, doing and monitoring projects.

In order to present our methods and approaches in applied science we shall now present some examples from the North Hungarian region showing our connections to social innovation.

In 2003 we were among the firsts to join a development project (Digital Secondary School) aiming toward the spreading of a new and feasible solution to learning support that has not been present in the education.⁵The goal of the program was to decrease failure and drop-out and to strengthen the capacity of educational institutions (and their teachers) to re-integrate long time drop-outs. The program focused on the spreading of a network-model that provided opportunity for disadvantaged young adults to return to the school and reach graduation. As part of our research we recorded life histories among those who joined the program in Miskolc and its surrounding area. We focused on their resources and opportunities helping them to participate in the project and work toward successful graduation.

⁵ Társadalmi Megújulás Operatív Program. Új tanulási formák és rendszerek – Digitális Középiskola program című pályázati felhívásához Kódszám: TÁMOP – 3.2.1. B-09/2 [Social Renewal Operative Programme – Digital Secondary School. Nr. TÁMOP-3.2.1B-09/2].

In 2013 we were able to participate in the research project “Social innovations in service of inclusion”. The main objective of the project was to decrease social and regional disadvantages by facilitating social innovation potential drawing upon the potential of three higher educational institutions. In order to fulfill this objective the participating universities (Károly Róbert University College, Eszterházy Károly University College and the University of Miskolc) developed social innovations working against disadvantages, participated in their implementation and helped to create a framework of social cooperation. In the framework of the project a social innovational cluster, the so called Inclusion Cluster has been formed. Social innovations were carried out at two platforms: firstly within the universities to decrease social disadvantages and secondly in three deprived micro-regions to lessen regional disadvantages. As the first step of generating social innovation innovative workshops were created with the participation of universities and local actors. Besides identifying and communicating values the workshops aimed to find and spread good practices, build innovative networks and draw in more players from the market.

In 2015 the Digitális Úton-Útfélen [Digital Roads and Turns] program was launched. On the one hand, the program aimed to a more successful and effective education for multiply disadvantaged students. On the other hand it wanted to strengthen the inclusion of elements of the digital culture in the education.⁶ Teachers had a chance to learn the Program for Complex Instruction. The Complex Instruction Methodological Center of Miskolc-Hejőkeresztúr has been established at the University of Miskolc, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. It is a unique center in Hungary focusing mainly on the region but providing training for teachers all around Hungary.

At last I would like to mention two recent projects, both initiated in 2017. The first one is our Phoenix Project⁷ in the frameworks of which we aim to lessen the social and regional disadvantages, increase the number of college-graduates and advance the quality of life and opportunities at the labor market of disadvantaged groups. In order to meet our goals we established a public academy, support our disadvantaged students through a network of mentors and formed the Phoenix Group including both lecturers and students that carries out surveys and community-development projects.

The second program launched in 2017 is the “Rag rug or patchwork? – Forms and norms of living together, cooperation and conflicts in multicultural environments” project. The aim of the research is to understand social conflicts in the North Hungarian region, to give a detailed description of them and to provide feasible solutions to prevent and handle different social conflicts. The objective of the program is to provide methods and approaches based on constant, reliable, multidimensional, empiric data for policy making to stop negative escalation in multiply disadvantaged regions that are unable to find their ways out from deprivation on their own. The project emphasizes social innovation and works in partnership with Hungarian and international groups. The

⁶ „DIGITÁLIS ÚTON-ÚTFÉLEN” TÁMOP-3.1.16-14-2014-0001 [Digital Roads and Turns].

⁷ „FÖNIX ME – Megújuló Egyetem Felsőoktatási intézményi fejlesztések a felsőfokú oktatás minőségének és hozzáférhetőségének együttes javítása érdekében” (EFOP 3.4.3.-16-2016-00015) [Phoenix UoFM – Renewing University. Institutional developments in higher educational institutions to increase equality and accessibility of higher education].

tools (know-how) collect social, economic and socio-psychological data that allows us to estimate the conflict potential of disadvantaged regions, map conflicts and facilitate timely intervention and problem solving.

IV. The local innovation potential

The basic model

The basic model has been formed in regard of the previously existing models. We wanted it to have more pillars (as, in an ideal case, settlements also have more than one strengths to draw upon) and to reflect one of the most important characteristics of innovation: diversity. We also wanted the model to be suitable for applying quantitative and qualitative methods and approaches and for building on different data sources.

The model presented in the followings rests on five pillars: (1) grassroots initiatives in the service of progress (GI); (2) novel solutions to social problems (NS); (3) human resources potential (HR); (4) economic potential (EP) and (5) cultural and natural “resources” (CNR).

The first two appears in the model because we wanted to put on emphasis on the fact that social innovations tend to come from a grassroots perspective and that it usually offers a novel kind of solution to existing social problems or challenges.

In terms of the CNR we applied the approaches of the Collection of Hungarian Values.⁸

Within each pillars we listed the dimensions and the possible indicators by which we can measure them. We understand that the model needs further refinement and its indicators are not necessarily even at this point. The later is also its strength: building on the traditions of sociology the model values qualitative data with the same regard as quantitative ones. When forming the model we built on the concept that correlations revealed by quantitative data and the hidden meaning of them can further be examined by qualitative approaches. Thus part of our data comes from statistics, documents (decrees, strategies, reports) another part comes from survey while the rest comes from qualitative interviews and fieldwork notes.

Figure 5. The basic model of Local Innovation Potential (LIP)

1. Grassroots initiatives in the service of progress (GI)

- civil social activity (number civil organization/100 persons; number of events and action organized/initiated by organizations/year)
- volunteering (membership in civil organization/ 100 persons; characteristics, modes, fields and motivations of volunteer work)
- local activity rate (number of inhabitants actively engaging in community affairs/100 persons; number of social entrepreneurship/100 persons; modes of participation at community events; forms of engagement)

⁸ www.hungarikum.hu.

2. Novel solutions to social problems, social inequalities (NS)

- good practices in pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, school and after school activities – formal and informal (number of good practices/ 100 persons; methods, approaches, types of activities; number of participants/100 persons)
- cooperation between settlements (modes and forms of cooperation)
- novel approaches in local leadership (good practices, modes of leadership)
- novel solutions for strengthening the economy (good practices, innovative solutions, their modes and methods)
- tender activity of the local government (tenders won/100 persons; types and impacts of tenders)

3. Human Resources Potential (HR)

- proportion of higher education graduates – locals/non-locals (number of higher education graduates/100 persons)
- innovativity of leaders (habitus of formal and informal leaders)
- cultural activity among the inhabitants (frequency of participating in cultural activity/100 persons; type of cultural activities)
- local community events (activity in organization and participation; type of events)
- hidden resources, gems, local knowledge (intangible cultural heritage, local exchange trade system)
- health potential (survey, infant mortality rate, abortion rate, etc.)
- age pattern (especially: proportion of the 19-50 age group, aging and dependents)
- emotional resources (trust, self-esteem, activity, resiliency, trust in the future, trust in the settlement – from survey)
- local identity (its characteristics, strength, composition; pride – from survey)
- political activity (campaigners/100 persons; participation at the elections in relation to the number of eligible voters)
- presence of other nationalities (number of houses owned by other nationalities/100 persons)
- vehicles (number of passenger cars/100 persons)
- kindergarten and school (operation, programs, teachers, special features)

4. Economic potential (EP)

- number of entrepreneurship (/100 persons; economic sector, types)
- GDP
- Net income per person (based on survey data)
- modernity of the infrastructure (road network, running water/100 households; gas supply/100 households; cultural institutions, comfort of houses/100 households; educational infrastructure)
- unemployment rate
- local tax (local tax/100 persons)
- employment rate
- migration (migration balance)

5. Cultural and natural resources (CNR)

- natural values (landscape, hiking routes, springs, wells, flora and fauna)
- values of the built environment (number of architectural values, their type and status)
- intellectual property (literature, art, know-how)
- local gastronomy
- artifacts (number, type and status of artifacts)
- art groups, artists (number of groups and individuals; type and form of groups)
- famous people (number of famous locals/former locals; their scope of activity; their recollections among locals)
- local traditions (type and form of traditions, keeping of traditions among the locals)

Source: The author

V. Conclusion

It is always very exciting for a social scientist to create something new, something innovative but empirically proven and applicable from the existing knowledge. Since the minute we started to do fieldwork in the region we wanted to summarize our knowledge and experience in an aggregated, integrated index that not only describes the current situation but also points toward the ways of potential development.

We also wanted to show that two settlements of similar socio-demographic and geographical background can vary significantly, can show very different “patterns” when we want to look behind the macro- and micro statistical data. Such data leaves place to hasty conclusions, rough sketches that otherwise can be elaborated by systematic fieldwork. On the other hand we wanted to show that two settlements that are very different at first (and at second as well) can face similar challenges and fall into one category.

Our intention was to create an index that allows giving a visual representation of social, economic and cultural processes and phenomenon. In our view, the LIP index meets these challenges. As an aggregated index it is put together as a mosaic, it shows the colors, the similar patterns but also the existing shades and nuances.

It is suitable to do so as it is built on both qualitative and quantitative data, on “soft” and “hard” social scientific methods. It shows a social science that I personally love. A social science that, according to my view, makes social sciences lovable: it is playful, creative, innovative but aims toward systematic analysis. It does not fail to mention that social realities and worlds depend on the point of view taken. They can only be showed from the perspective of parallel universes and opinions. The picture will never be homogenous or, at least, similar.

Social sciences and – as I see it – especially sociology has to be forgiving. A wise enough person knows that she/he cannot see and know everything. She/he understands that everything is perceived by her/his own filter. She/he is not exact, not perfect. But still, she/he reserves the right to take herself/himself seriously and expects others to do so as well.

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Norbert Vajda

Designer Drugs at Deprived Areas*

Abstract

This paper is dealing with the social effects of the spreading designer drugs in deprived areas of Hungary. Global commercial networks and fast internet connections made it possible to react on high demand for these narcotics, even in unprivileged regions of the country. Easy accessibility raised brand new challenges for the whole society, but teenagers without preventive communities are the most vulnerable. Market economy and its pressure for continuously consumption is a focal point of frustration among these youngsters. They want to consume and are desperate to have similar living conditions being considered as “normal”, but their severe reality is disappointingly different. Their social status determinates their low-level opportunities: inherited poverty through generations, rare interactions with higher status representatives and deprived physical environment are the main indicators of this process. However, youngsters at the deprived areas do not want to accept their reality, so they need to distract their thoughts. It fueled actions, which in recent years led them to designer drugs. These narcotics provide prompt solution for their users how not to face reality, but their long-term effects are horrific. Not just for these teenagers, but for the whole Hungarian society.

Keywords: designer drug, deprived areas, social integration, consumption, market economy

Introduction

Alcohol is widely known and used psychoactive drug. As all psychoactive drugs, this one also changes brain functions, which results in alterations. The consumer step in a different world and cannot adequately recognize reality. Interestingly, in human history there has been always a high demand for changing reality. The homo sapiens, the only human species which could survive thousands of years due to its accurate observation of the environment, loves to confuse its own sense organs. Different cultures used different drugs for this purpose, but many of them had a common point: all social status groups' representatives consumed psychotropic.

Naturally, we will not be able to analyze all social groups who use drugs in the contemporary Hungarian society, but this paper concentrates on low-status young

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addicts. They have not much money and live who live in deprived villages. Due to these characteristics, they were never an attractive target group, not even for narcotic drug dealers. However, thanks to the globalized market economy, the narcotic drug industry recently introduced an innovation which made them potential consumers.

The Cambridge Dictionary says “innovation” is a new idea or method, or the use of new ideas or methods.¹ The expression “drug innovation” has a positive tone: this kind of innovation should help people to live a better and healthier life. For instance, pharmacogenomics uses the newest technologies to create person-based drug therapies. This approach considers the person genome and predicts one’s reaction on certain medication. Unfortunately, in the first decade of the XXI. century we had to learn another meaning of “drug innovation”. The newest waves of narcotic drugs, often being referred to as designer or synthetic drugs are also developed in labs using high-tech technologies.

The narcotic drug industry always needs new ideas and methods to keep its business running: from production through transportation until distribution, there are many parts which regularly requires new strategies. The dark side of the Internet made illegal narcotic drugs widely spreading all over the world. The so-called Dark Web is not indexed by search engines, but those people who want to use them can find their way to its content. However, the existence of Dark Web was a needed, but not sufficient part of that dramatic, worldwide process, which launched the market boost of designer drugs. The main question of unlawful commercial activities was always about connecting sellers and buyers effectively and at the same time not drawing the attention of law enforcement.

It sounds obvious... but what if the narcotic drug industry should not fear law enforcement anymore as its products will not be considered as illegal? That would be a real innovation. In fact, the representatives of this blacklisted commercial line made this idea come true. Synthetic or designer drugs just turned this idea into reality with permanently changing compounds. This made a breakthrough and a brand-new innovation at the narcotic drug market.

The role of social interactions

In this year (2019) Hungary celebrates the 30th anniversary of its democratic political transition. 30 years ago, the state supported planned economy switched to market economy, where supply and demand determinate consumption. Capitalism does not need undereducated people en masse at the labour market, so most of these people lost their jobs in the first half of the 1990s. Many of them never made it to get legal and long-term employment under the conditions of market economy, so they become homeless in the cities or moved to the destitute places of the country. The latter group is much bigger, but is far less recognized as it is far less apparent. The members of these group are mostly undereducated people who only have place to live in deprived and segregated villages of the country. Their children and grandchildren born here, but since 1989 not many moved to these places from the upper class. The most deprived population concentrate in the most deprived areas of Hungary.

¹Source: dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/innovation.

Deprived area²

The infrastructure of these places is the worst in the country: bumpy roads, crumbling buildings and poorly maintained sewage system are typical characteristics. The private sector is barely represented and there is not much chance for new investments from external resources. Without legal private investments, municipalities cannot get much money from local business taxes. It means, these municipalities do not have enough funds even for basic public services in the interests of its residents.



Institutes and services that are easily accessible at other places are simple not available here. There is no pharmacy, no post office, no library. The overlapping disadvantages lead to segregated living conditions, where people through different generations face physical and social exclusion from the society. They have not much personal interaction with people who are not belong to their homogenous neighbourhood. Their social capital with people from other status is extremely low, so it will not help them to get out of their underprivileged status. On the other hand, they do have non-personal connections through television and internet. As a consequence, they have exactly the same obsessions as an average citizen who lives in modern market economy. They are also influenced by advertisement campaigns broadcasted by television channels. They also would like to consume more and get the newest products as many others, but in most cases, they just simple cannot afford it. It results in continuous frustration. Moreover, the homogeneous local community that provided some protection for its members, has been broken in recent years:

² Source: magyarhang.org/belfold/2019/02/18/egymasrol-marnank-le-a-hust-ha-lenne-egesz-csenyete-egy-szegregatum/.

"Since the beginning of the 2000s, more and more signs indicate that the common internal solidarity has been broken in these communities. Permanent unemployment and exclusion from the society are still the main characters of these places, but the internal coherence of the communities certainly belongs to the past. The process of disintegration ... reached the level of the families too." (Vajda 2014: 215)

Without strong community and family relations in the deprived areas, marginalized and highly frustrated young people, are in intense danger. Many of them deal with mental illnesses and different addictions.

Families cannot provide protection anymore. In the same time individuals, especially teenagers, struggle to keep up with the expectations permanently flooding from television and social media.

Teenagers left out of school, without any regular duties and incomes, soon feel themselves useless. They are extremely vulnerable. They do not have plans for the future, but have dreams about life they would like to live. In fact, most of them have not much chance for a better life. They have grown up watching the older generations getting little money from state subsidies and public work.

Most of the youngsters of these places clearly see that they have minimal chance to get well paid, legal jobs. There will be no better infrastructure and there will be no extensive public services in these villages, so their living conditions will likely not change either. In other words, it remains segregated and unattractive.

However, the youngsters, who are the most sensitive for technical innovation, found a new platform for interactions. The cheaper internet and smart phones made it possible to connect the world outside. In the same time, it has also increased their obsession of getting rich and get more respect as an individual, which they hardly can accomplish.

Consumption stimulating capitalism and widely available on-line social media together created an atmosphere which brings high expectations to districts individuals. These expectations always existed in modern market economy dominated societies, but they never have been more intensive. The lower social status someone belongs to, the lower chance one gets to meet consumption focused expectations.

It is a main source of frustration for most deprived youngsters: the only way out from this trap if they can escape from their reality. It calls a high demand for effective psychoactive drugs.

High demand

No question, in modern societies there is a high demand for relief and modified mental states among all social groups, regardless to social status. The reason is simple: life can be hard and drug excipients promise instant solution. People use legal, but illegal psychoactive drugs too. Cocaine, LSD, cannabis are well-known drugs, but alcohol, caffeine or nicotine are also on the list. All of them cause changes in the brain which could modify the person's mood and behaviour. These drugs can alter one's perceptions and thoughts too.

The younger generations at drawback areas of Hungary are not exception. They cannot change their living conditions, but they have access for psychoactive drugs. It helps them escaping from their dark reality. They have seen their parents who used alcohol for this purpose, but the deprived areas' teenagers recently changed this method. Alcohol is expensive and if there is regular consumption, human body will become resistant. It means there is no instant effect, so they have to get more and spend more money on it to reach the same level of relief.

It has lead the way to find new alternatives.

Youngsters rather use other, new materials to alter perceptions and thoughts, even if their ingredients and mechanism of action are unknown. The requirements are simple: reachable, cheap and effective. Adhesives and cannabis were good choices for many years, but now a brand-new narcotic available even at the drawback areas. Synthetic or designer drugs are relatively cheap, easily accessible, but stronger and more effective than anything before. It soon become the perfect "solution" for desperate youngsters.

Easy Accessibility

Synthetic drug is a man-made drug produced in illegal laboratories all over the world.

„It is essentially an experiment by a chemist done to create a new drug that can be sold legally (on the Internet or in stores), allowing dealers to make money without breaking the law. As law enforcement catches up with new chemicals that are so created and makes them illegal, manufacturers devise altered versions to steer clear of the law.” (The Truth About Synthetic Drugs 2015: 3.)

The abovementioned method perfectly works in Hungary too. Since 2010 designer drugs become a major problem in Hungary and especially at the drawback areas, where mostly the poorest and socially excluded population live. (Sarosi 2017)

In sharp contrast with the Dark Web, legal products are easily available. Anyone can find hundreds of designer drug selling Hungarian web-shops within seconds, with the support of the biggest search engines. These web-shops are professional selling points with price list and customer service, but many of them even have quality policy too. These online shops work as normal retailers, perfectly integrated into the legal market. Quite a few of these web shops have so-called ad-banners³, where visitors of the website meet personalized advertisements from big international companies, based on their previous on-line activity.

The user can select the desired product and right after the payment, the order completed. In the last step, a legal government or market based delivery company is in charge to bring the narcotic drug to the consumer. Everything looks normal. The method works everywhere, even at the deprived areas of the country. The on-line ordered and prepaid designer drug soon arrives on bumpy roads to the crumbling buildings in a segregated area.

³This mean that those who operate these narcotic-distributing websites easily makeextra profit from selling legal advertisement banners.

A website selling “brutal strong herbal, cannabinoid and crystal” with an advertisement-banner of an international insurance company



There are local dealers of the deprived area who can afford to order a larger quantity and get discount at the web shops. They run their own retail in the villages, using their personal based social networks. It is important to understand that these networks in underprivileged communities are not connected through solidarity anymore. It is pure business, under the conditions of market economy.

Effective

People at deprived areas face permanent exclusion from the society. There is not much interactions with the representatives of higher statuses and futureless attitudes are common through generations. The one

time dominant psychotropic, the alcohol is still an alternative, but the youngsters turned to synthetic drugs. The underprivileged new generation found this new method to alter their perception and thoughts. They order legal narcotic drugs from the internet. It is simple to get, in many cases cheaper and not least, the dealers pledge this one is more effective.

The customer, who easily can be a frustrated teenager, immediately can knock out from the world they cannot cope with. They have no idea what the ingredients are, but got what they wanted: do not have to face reality. The feeling what the drug caused can be very good, it even can lead to euphoria. The physical performance can rapidly improve for a while, the person does not experience tiredness.

Furthermore, the narcotics promise something more important for the youngsters at the deprived area. Something that they normally miss: balance and self-confidence. For a short period of time it could relieve stress and makes the person forgetting his/her frustration.

Nonetheless, these positive brief impulses are not necessarily come true, but there is always a high risk for sudden functional disorders. It is because the effects of the varying compounds are unpredictable. Contrary to other well-known narcotics, the ingredients of synthetic designer drugs are always changing. It poses a very serious threat to all users, even the first attempt could lead to fatal consequences.

In certain cases, the effects are terrible: drug users totally lost control of their body and mind. Rapid heart rate or uncontrolled body movements often occur. Many users experience panic attacks and severe paranoid ideas too. Under the influence of the drug, behavior is erratic. An extreme example is the so-called zombie-drug, which is a new type of synthetic drug and could have exactly the effect what its name suggests. Others can trigger intense aggression against any person, regardless to age, gender or social status.

There are long-term effects which show up days or weeks after usage. The main one of these is the physical and mental addiction. In this level the addict rarely receives the abovementioned short-term positive effects, but desperately wants to escape from his/her own new reality. This is not the reality one wanted to forget when ordered the first package of designer drug on the internet. Since this process has started, "reality" gets worse even during "clean" periods by the withdrawal symptoms: it includes cravings, tremors and nightmares.

Consequences

The narcotic drug industry successfully found its way to its customers. The industry took advantage of the XXI. century, using global networks for commercial purposes and internet for sales and marketing. Making its products "legal" helped them spread synthetic drugs faster than ever before.

As a result of this process even teenagers at deprived remote villages have access to this dangerous psychotropic. Compared to other youngsters in the Hungarian society, they are much more vulnerable as their community relations usually cannot provide protection. They live with a deep sense of frustration without supportive community relations and designer drugs seems to provide a good alternative to get out from this situation. In many cases, it happens for a short period, but then addiction quickly develops. Soon after the first side effects and irreversible mental problems appeared their chance to broke the vicious circle is over. They got into trouble, because they desperately wanted to forgot their reality, but instead of relief got something worst.

Narrowing consciousness paves the way to self-destruction.

We have no reliable statistics, but today we are talking about thousands-, if not tens of thousands of youngsters, who are heading to this dead-end. Most of them teenagers. As the designer drug distribution system legally operates law enforcement and local social workers can do very little against it. In the end, the new wave of psychotropic seal thousands of teenagers' fate before their adulthood, which react catastrophically upon the whole Hungarian society.

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